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 ABSTRACT 
 
The pactum de non cedendo:  A re-evaluation 
 
KD Sunkel 
 
LLM Thesis, Department of Private Law, University of the Western Cape. 
 
Plenty has been written on this topic, but with changing times, much of 
what has been written is outdated.  Not necessarily outdated in the sense 
that recent case law or legislation has not been considered, but outdated 
in that some of the ideas expressed do not foster commercial growth and 
development, nor consider international trends. 
 
Since the pactum de non cedendo is prohibitory by its nature and 
operation, our law should have proceeded with caution when determining 
its effect.  This, unfortunately, is not what transpired in the locus classicus 
decision.  Nor did subsequent cases correct this fatal ratio.   
 
The distressing truth is that the old authorities, upon whom the locus 
classicus judgment is based, were in all probability not writing about pacta 
de non cedendo.  Strangely enough, when this was suggested by an 
academic in the field, it elicited no response. 
 
The lack of response evidences a lack of interest in the topic in general, 
partly due to the uncertain state of affairs in which the pactum de non 
cedendo operates, and partly due to the courts’ unwillingness to rectify the 
situation.  
 
Despite the waning interest, the pactum de non cedendo is prevalent and 
appears in many types of contracts, most recently in the powerhouse 
factoring industry, and cannot simply be swept under the rug.  
 
This dissertation breathes new life into the pactum de non cedendo and 
discusses its validity and effect from a fresh perspective:  A commercial 
perspective with a strong influence from American law. 
 
Hopefully this re-evaluation of the pactum de non cedendo will re-capture 
the attention of academics and judges alike, so that those in the position to 
do so, will re-consider its validity and effect.    
 
 
 
 
 
September 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 OPSOMMING 
 
The pactum de non cedendo:  A re-evaluation 
 
KD Sunkel 
 
LLM Tesis, Departement Privaatreg, Universiteit van die Wes-Kaap. 
 
Die onderwerp het in die verlede menige artikels ontlok, maar met die 
veranderende tye is baie wat geskryf is, verouderd: nie noodwendig 
verouderd in die opsig dat onlangse gewysdes of wetgewing nie oorweeg 
is nie, maar verouderd in dié opsig dat sommige van die idees wat 
uigespreek is nie alleen nalaat om kommersiële groei te kweek nie, maar 
ook nie daarin slaag om internasionale neigings na behore in ag neem nie. 
 
Aangesien die pactum de non cedendo vanweë sy aard en werking 
verbiedend is, behoort ons reg die gevolge daarvan met omsigtigheid te 
benader. Ongelukkig is dit nie wat gebeur het in die locus classicus 
uitspraak nie en die daaropvolgende sake het ook nie juis daarin geslaag 
om hierdie gebrekkige ratio reg te stel nie. 
 
Die hinderlike waarheid is dat die ou gesag waarop die locus classicus 
uispraak gegrond is, bes moontlik nie oor pacta de non cedendo gehandel 
het nie. Dit is dus vreemd dat toe hierdie toedrag van sake deur ‘n 
vooraanstaande skrywer op dié gebied aan die lig gebring was, dit geen 
reaksie uitgelok het nie.  
 
Die gebrek aan reaksie slaan duidelik op ‘n gebrek aan belangstelling in 
die onderwerp in die algemeen. Hierdie stand van sake is deels toe te 
skryf aan die onsekerhede waaronder die pactum de non cedendo 
aanwending vind en deels aan die howe se onwilligheid om die situasie te 
beredder. 
 
Ten spyte van die kwynende belangstelling kom die pactum de non 
cedendo dikwels voor in ‘n verskeidenheid van ooreenkomste, meer 
onlangs in die groeiende faktoreringsindustrie, en kan gevolglik nie sonder 
meer ignoreer word nie. 
 
Hierdie verhandeling dien as ‘n vernuwingskuur vir die pactum de non 
cedendo en kyk na die geldigheid en uitwerking daarvan vanuit ‘n vars 
oogpunt: ‘n kommersiële perspektief met ‘n sterk Amerikaanse inslag. 
 
Hopelik sal dié herbeoordeling van die pactum de non cedendo dien om 
die aandag van beide akademiese skrywers en regters te trek om 
sodoende die geldigheid en uitwerking daarvan van voor af onder die 
soeklig te plaas.  
 
September 2009 
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 INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to fully appreciate the discussions of pacta de non cedendo which 
are to follow, the need for a thorough understanding of the law of cession 
as a whole cannot be over-emphasised.   
 
Different kinds of rights are transferred in different ways.  Real rights, for 
example, where the object of the right is corporeal property, are 
transferred by delivery if the corporeal property is movable, or registration 
if the corporeal property is immovable.  With personal rights, where the 
object is the right to claim performance,1 transfer takes place by way of 
cession. 2 
 
Cession can thus be defined as:  
 
…[A] bilateral juristic act whereby a right is transferred by mere 
agreement between the transferor, termed a cedent and the 
transferee, termed a cessionary.3 
 
After a cession has taken place, the cedent becomes the ‘old’ creditor and 
the cessionary becomes the ‘new’ creditor in his stead.  Where the debtor 
had to perform to the cedent before the cession, he now has to perform to 
the cessionary after the cession.4 
 
Cession fulfils a very useful and convenient commercial function: 
 
                                                    
1 This performance is claimed from a party called the debtor and it is owed to a party 
called the creditor.  The performance may be positive or negative.  See PM Nienaber  
‘Cession’ in LAWSA 2ed vol 2 (2003) para 4. 
2 Nienaber op cit para 2-4. 
3 Nienaber op cit para 1.   
4 S Scott The Law of Cession 2ed (1991) 12; Nienaber op cit para 4; S Van der Merwe 
Van Huyssteen, MFB Reinecke and GF Lubbe Contract General Principles 2ed (2003) 
420. 
 
 
 
 
 It facilitates commerce by enabling a creditor to turn his rights to 
account by selling them instead of enforcing them himself, it avoids 
circuity of actions and it has a number of other practical uses. 5 
 
It must be pointed out at the outset that cession is a method of transfer 
and, although it is brought about by agreement, it is not itself a contract.6 
 
The agreement which brings about a cession is called an ‘obligationary 
agreement’.  It obliges the cedent to transfer the right, or put differently, it 
is the agreement whereby the cedent undertakes to cede the right, and 
constitutes the underlying causa or reason for the cession.7  The 
obligationary agreement can manifest itself in a number of ways, it may 
be, for example, a contract of sale, donation, lease or security.8 
 
The agreement which constitutes the actual transfer of the personal right 
is the cession itself and is known as the ‘real agreement’ or the ‘transfer 
agreement’.9  Although they are two separate acts with different functions, 
the obligationary agreement and the transfer agreement often occur 
simultaneously in one transaction.10  This is probably why a cession is 
often mistaken for a contract. 
 
                                                    
5 RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5ed (2006) 464. 
6 Scott op cit 7-8; Van der Merwe et al op cit 422. 
7 Botha v Fick 1995 (2) SA 750 (A); Scott op cit 8-9, 60, 79 et seq; Nienaber op cit para 8-
9 and para 28; Van der Merwe et al op cit 423.  Were it not for the obligationary 
agreement, cession would take place in a vacuum. The obligationary agreement, 
however, does not effect an actual transfer. 
8 The obligationary contract may even arise ex lege.  Nienaber op cit para 28; Van der 
Merwe et al op cit 423-424.   
9 Botha v Fick supra; Scott op cit 9, note Scott’s reservation when using the term ‘real 
agreement’ in connection with personal rights; Nienaber op cit para 8; Van der Merwe et 
al op cit 428. 
10 Botha v Fick supra; Scott op cit 61; Nienaber op cit para 8; Van der Merwe et al op cit 
423. 
 
 
 
 
 The only substantive requirement for a valid cession is a duly constituted 
agreement either orally and informally or in writing, but in a manner that 
indicates that the parties are ad idem.11 
 
The consequences of a cession are broadly twofold:  
 
First, because cession is a mode of transfer, the personal right will 
consequently vest in the estate of the cessionary. Unless the cession is 
one in securitatem debiti, it brings about complete transfer of the right and 
the cedent will be wholly divested thereof.12  This necessarily means that 
the cessionary is the only person who may administer the right or enforce 
it.13  
 
Secondly, in accordance with the nemo plus iuris rule,14 the cessionary 
only steps into the shoes of the cedent and cannot be in a better or 
weaker position than that in which the cedent was.15  Consequently, the 
right is transferred with all its attributes, be they benefits and privileges or 
defects and disadvantages.16 
 
The free transferability of personal rights may be subjected to certain 
prohibitions.  Cession may be prohibited by statute; for instance s37A of 
the Pension Funds Act17 prohibits the cession of a pensioner’s right to his 
or her pension.18 
 
                                                    
11 Nienaber op cit para 25: ‘…a mere loose understanding will not do’.  Van der Merwe et 
al op cit 430. 
12 Nienaber op cit para 45; Van der Merwe et al op cit 459. 
13 Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates Ltd 1920 AD 600 608; Nienaber op cit para 45-
46; Van der Merwe et al op cit 459-460. 
14 Nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet. 
15 Paiges supra 616; Scott op cit 221; Nienaber op cit para 44; Van der Merwe et al op cit 
460-461. 
16 Scott op cit 221-224; Nienaber op cit para 49-50. 
17 Act 24 of 1956 as amended as well as s2(1) of the Statutory Pensions Protection Act 
21 of 1962. 
18 Nienaber op cit para 35. 
 
 
 
 
 Prohibitions may also stem from the common law, either generally where a 
cession is against public policy, or specifically, for example, where ceding 
the right to maintenance is prohibited.19 
 
Cession may also be prohibited through agreement by the parties 
themselves, the so-called pactum de non cedendo.  Such a prohibition on 
cession is the focus of this dissertation.     
 
It is usually the debtor who would insist on a pactum de non cedendo.  
One is hard pressed to think of an instance where a creditor would 
suggest or insist that the parties should agree to place a restriction on the 
disposal of his rights. 
 
There are various reasons why a debtor may insist on a pactum de non 
cedendo: 
 
a) he fears double payment of the debt (if notice is missed); 
b) he may be prevented from using set-off against the creditor; 
c) he is familiar with the creditor; 
d) he is of the belief that the creditor may be more willing to grant time 
extensions; 
e) he is of the belief that the creditor may be more willing to overlook 
some indebtedness;  
f) a change in creditor may be generally inconvenient. 
  
The current approach in South African law, based on the leading case, 
Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates Ltd,20 is that the debtor has to show 
that he has an interest in the prohibition.  If he can do this, then the 
pactum de non cedendo is valid and binding.  The personal right is 
accordingly rendered non-transferable and a cession in contravention of 
                                                    
19 Nienaber op cit para 36. 
20 Supra. 
 
 
 
 
 the pactum de non cedendo is void.21  If the debtor cannot show that he 
has an interest in the pactum de non cedendo, then the cedent may validly 
cede the personal right. 
 
A pactum de non cedendo, although only a brick in the vast wall called the 
law of cession, may present itself more often than one may realise.22  It 
appears not only in general contracts, but in specific areas of application, 
for example, in the law of insolvency, company law, law of negotiable 
instruments, law of insurance and book debts (factoring).        
  
It has been aptly said that cession ‘straddles the law of property and the 
law of obligations’.23  The legal relationship between the creditor and the 
debtor in terms of which the debtor has a legal obligation to render 
performance and the creditor has a right to receive performance falls 
under the law of obligations.24  The right to receive performance, on the 
other hand, is also an asset in the creditor’s estate which he can transfer 
should he wish to do so.  The transferring of assets thus also falls under 
the law of things or the law of property.25 
 
This dual nature has unfortunately caused numerous uncertainties in 
many areas of the law of cession and the pactum de non cedendo is no 
exception.     
 
At times when the application of the pacta de non cedendo principles 
causes difficulties or problems, the proposed theoretical solution can have 
either a law of property or a law of obligations jurisprudential basis.  In a 
                                                    
21 Scott op cit 206; Nienaber op cit para 37; Van der Merwe et al op cit 443-444.  The 
purported cessionary would probably have an action for damages against the ‘cedent’ for 
breach of contract.   
22 It seems that contractants or their legal representatives include clauses prohibiting 
cession as a matter of standard practice and as a ‘catch-all’ net, without fully 
understanding their purpose and function. 
23 Nienaber op cit para 9. 
24 Scott op cit 4-5. 
25 Scott op cit 5. 
 
 
 
 
 particular instance a law of property solution may be preferred, in another 
instance a law of obligations solution may be preferred.  The outcome is 
that pacta de non cedendo are not governed by a single approach, but are 
instead governed by a kind of mixed approach.26   
 
The dual nature of pacta de non cedendo is the root of other problems, 
viz, academics’ blatant dissatisfaction with the locus classicus, Paiges v 
Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates Ltd,27 which, as mentioned above, laid down 
the rules regarding the validity and effect of pacta de non cedendo. 
 
The feud between academics and our courts regarding how one should 
deal with a pactum de non cedendo has been rather fiery.  The leading 
case has set a precedent that has been passionately criticised by 
academics, yet subsequent cases pay little or no attention to the academic 
outcry, except for one case: Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard Bank of 
South Africa Ltd.28  This case, however, itself attracts debate as to 
whether it has actually departed from the dictum in Paiges or not.   
 
The reason why no court has clearly adopted a different approach is 
probably because the criticisms by academics are so varied in nature. 
 
The most striking criticism is that the foundation upon which the approach 
in Paiges was developed is based on a misunderstanding of the texts of 
the old authorities who wrote on the issue, Sande and Voet.  If this 
submission is indeed correct, it raises the question whether everything 
that has developed from the incorrect interpretation adopted in Paiges is 
also incorrect? 
 
                                                    
26 This mixed approach is a recipe for confusion and uncertainty.  Either a law of property 
approach or a law of obligations approach should be preferred and applied consistently.  
Each will have its own advantages and disadvantages – the ultimate question being 
which is the lessor evil. 
27 Supra.  See Scott op cit 205 et seq; Nienaber op cit para 37; Van der Merwe et al op cit 
443 et seq.  See Chapter 4 for a further discussion. 
28 1968 (3) SA 166 (A). 
 
 
 
 
 If so, which academic’s submissions should be followed?  Perhaps none 
of them. 
 
The practical result is that commercial transactions are hindered and can 
result in litigation, with each party having sufficient literature on the issue 
to substantiate his case, as so many contradictory opinions exist.  
Consequently, the courts usually cannot (or refuse to) decide which 
academic to follow and fall back on the approach of the Appellate Division 
in Paiges.   
 
This happens despite the fact that the case was decided in 1920 and 
might be in need of modernisation; despite the fact that the academics 
vehemently disagree with this decision; and despite the fact that there is a 
persuasive suggestion that the leading case was based on an incorrect 
interpretation of Sande and Voet. 
   
The law governing pacta de non cedendo is convoluted and out of touch 
with modern trends, and this research is well overdue.  In an endeavour to 
clarify the specific uncertainties that arise surrounding the pactum de non 
cedendo, inspiration will be sought from American law to give pacta de 
non cedendo, as a whole, a fresh perspective.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER ONE 
 
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
The Appellate Division in the locus classicus on pacta de non cedendo, 
Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates Ltd,29 relies on the writings of Sande 
and Voet as authority for the ratio as laid down in that case.  This ratio has 
ever since been dutifully followed in numerous other cases, as well as 
confirmed by academics.30    
 
What follows is a brief history and discussion of the specific texts relied on 
by the court in Paiges.  It must, however, be understood from the outset 
that in their writings Johannes à Sande and Johannes Voet were in all 
likelihood not referring to pacta de non cedendo, but rather pacta de non 
aliendo.31  The following discussion nevertheless proceeds on the 
presumption that the Appellate Division’s reliance on these texts was 
correct and critique on the issue has been reserved for Chapter 4.32   
 
1.1 Roman Law 
 
The modern concept of cession was not known in Roman law and 
consequently the pactum de non cedendo was nowhere to be found 
during this time in history.  
 
The transfer of a personal right was not recognised as Roman lawyers 
considered an obligation as something highly personal.33  In fact, Roman 
lawyers adhered to the maxim ‘nomina ossibus inhaerent’: 
                                                    
29 1920 AD 600. 
30 Except for one academic, but see Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion. 
31 That is, not the prohibition on transfer of ownership in incorporeal property, like 
personal rights, but rather the prohibition on transfer of ownership in corporeal property, 
like land.   
32 Although the issue is also touched on in Chapter 3. 
33 R Zimmermann The Law of Obligations:  Roman Foundation of the Civilian Tradition 
2ed (1995) 58.  
 
 
 
 
  
[T]he action arising from an obligation hinges on the bones and 
entrails of the creditor and can be no more separated from his 
person than the soul from the body.34   
 
There was, however, a practical need for cession, so Roman lawyers 
achieved a similar result by using two other legal institutions:  novatio and 
procuratio in rem suam.   
 
The transfer of a personal right by way of novatio is quite different from a 
transfer by way of cession.  Novatio brought about a cancellation of the 
existing obligation between the debtor and the original creditor and 
replaced it with a fresh contract between the debtor and a new creditor 
(the ‘cessionary’) having exactly the same content.35 
 
The ‘cessionary’ was not in a secure position as the substituted agreement 
required the consent and co-operation of the debtor for the transfer to 
function in favour of the ‘cessionary’.36  
   
The transfer of a personal right by way of procuratio in rem suam was 
more complex and even riskier.  In reality the original creditor would take 
on the role of principal and commission (through mandate) the new 
creditor to sue the debtor on his behalf as his agent.  Agency, however, 
was not recognised in Roman law so, although in reality the personal right 
was being transferred by agency, the façade of procurator in rem suam 
(agent in his own name) allowed the procurator or new creditor to sue the 
debtor in his own name and to retain whatever he recovered from the 
debtor.37 
 
                                                    
34 Ibid. 
35 PC Anders Commentary on Cession of Actions by Johannes à Sande (1906) 1 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Cession of Actions’); Zimmermann op cit 60. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Anders op cit 2. 
 
 
 
 
 Although the consent and co-operation of the debtor was not required, the 
‘cessionary’ was therefore in no better a position than a transfer through 
novatio as he was merely a procedural representative of the original 
creditor in the suit against the debtor and the personal right still belonged 
to the original creditor.38  As a result, the original creditor could frustrate 
the arrangement by suing the debtor himself or accepting his performance, 
or alternatively by releasing the debtor from the obligation.39  The situation 
could also be upset by the death of the original creditor, or by his revoking 
his commission (mandatum).40    
 
These two legal institutions clearly had their own shortcomings as the 
‘cessionary’ and sometimes the debtor were very often left in precarious 
and unsatisfactory positions.41  
 
In response to this, Roman law developed an action, the actio utilis, to 
provide the procurator in rem suam with some relief.  This relief came in 
the form of the procurator no longer suing in his own name, but in his own 
right and this right could no longer be frustrated by revocation or death.42  
Effectively, the object of a transfer by way of procurator in rem suam was 
not a personal right, but an action, the actio utilis. 
  
Unfortunately the actio utilis was not nearly a solution to the plight of the 
procurator as it did not actually transfer the original creditor’s claim.  The 
original creditor still retained the actio directa as this action was too 
personal to transfer.  As a result, the creditor could still frustrate the 
situation, for example, by accepting performance from the debtor.43   
 
                                                    
38 Zimmermann op cit 61; Anders op cit 3. 
39 Zimmermann op cit 61. 
40 Anders op cit 3. 
41 Zimmermann op cit 60-62.   
42 Zimmermann op cit 62. 
43 Zimmermann op cit 62; S Scott The Law of Cession 2ed (1991) 12. 
 
 
 
 
 1.2 Roman-Dutch law 
 
Due to the unsatisfactory state of affairs in Roman law, the position 
changed dramatically in Roman-Dutch law, as jurists began to view 
personal rights more from the law of property perspective and less from 
the perspective of the law of obligations.44   
 
This shift in perspective allowed the Roman-Dutch jurists to move away 
from the idea that personal rights are too personal to transfer, and to 
consider a personal right as an incorporeal asset in the estate of the 
owner45 of the right, who may transfer it should he wish to do so.46  
The change was prompted by jurists like Vinnius47 who accepted that a 
cession was the transfer of a right of action by agreement and if the 
‘cessionary’ was appointed procurator in rem suam, the agreement 
transferred the actio utilis in such a way that he (the ‘cessionary’) was also 
entitled to use the actio directa, an action formally reserved for the 
‘cedent’.48  
 
Vinnius, however, cannot be regarded as the ‘father’ of cession as he was 
not prepared to acknowledge an immediate and complete transfer by the 
agreement.49   
The next step in the development of a complete transfer of a right by 
agreement was taken by Sande, a well-respected jurist, who published De 
Cessione Actionum in 1623 and De Prohibita Rerum Alienatione in 1633, 
and Voet who published Commentarius ad Pandectas in 1698.    
                                                    
44 As can be seen from the development of cession.  Jurists thus began to see personal 
rights as a form of property.  
45 I use the word ‘owner’ as opposed to ‘holder’ as the holder of a right may not 
necessarily be the owner thereof. 
46 Scott op cit 3 footnote 9. 
47 Jurisprudentiae Contractae Sive Partitionum Juris Civilis Libri (1624). 
48 LTA Engineering CO Ltd v Seacat Investments (Pty) Ltd 1974 (2) All SA 6 (A) 10.  See 
also Johnson v Incorporated General Insurance Ltd 1983 (1) SA 318 (A) 331C. 
49 LTA Engineering CO v Seacat Investments supra 11. 
 
 
 
 
 Sande wrote: 50   
As a rule every action, real as well as personal, is competent to be 
ceded.51  (Anders’ translation) 
Even an action once ceded may again be ceded by the cessionary 
thereof, for since the ceded action vests in the cessionary, there is 
no doubt but he can transfer the same in turn to another person. 52  
(Anders’ translation)   
 
Voet wrote: 53 
In modern law naked agreements seriously made give rise to actions 
without qualification.  But if these distinctions as to agreements giving 
or not giving shape to an action were not entirely necessary to a true 
understanding of Roman law, and to an explanation of enactments 
which without such prior knowledge are partly obscure and partly 
savouring of injustice, they could surely have been left wrapped in 
silence for all the use they have in court practice.  I say this because 
nowadays it is quite trite and universally admitted that an action arises 
from naked agreements entered into with a grave and determined mind 
just as much as from contracts.  Much more so if they have been 
annexed to the contracts whether bonae fidei or stricti juris.54   (Gane’s 
translation) 
 
From the above it is clear that by the end of the 17th century the use of and 
distinction between the actio utilis and actio directa had disappeared55 and 
                                                    
50 De Cessione V, 1:  ‘Regulariter omnes actiones tam reales, quam personales cedi 
possunt’.   
51 Cession of Actions 58.  
52 Cession of Actions 59.  De Cessione V, 3:  ‘Actio etiam semel cessa, ab eo, cui cessa 
est, cedi potest, cum enim cessa actio fiat cessionari, dubium non est, quin eam rursus in 
alium transferre possit’.  
53 Commentarius 2 14 9:  ‘Caeterum si non hae circa pacta, actionem formantia aut non 
formantia, distinctiones necessariae prorsus essent, ad Romani juris genuinum 
intellectum, legumque sine hoc praecognito to partim obscurarum, partim iniquitatem 
redolentium, explicationem; potuissent sane quantum ad fori usum attinet silentio involvi; 
eo quod nunc tralatitium prorsus est, & passim receptum, ex pactis nudis, serio ac 
deliberato animo interpositis, aeque ac ex contractibus, actionem nasci, multoque magis, 
si contractibus sive bonae fidei sive stricti juris adjecta sint; sive in continenti, sive ex 
intervallo id ipsum contigerit’. 
54 P Gane The Selective Voet being the Commentary on the Pandects by Johannes Voet 
and the Supplement to that work by Johannes van der Linden (1955) 419 (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Commentary on the Pandects’). 
55 Scott op cit 14. 
 
 
 
 
 it was widely accepted that cession effected a complete transfer of 
rights.56 
 
It is thus only after the recognition of a cession as a complete transfer of 
rights that the pactum de non cedendo was born.  It is impossible to 
establish when exactly in history the pactum de non cedendo first 
appeared.   
 
It is, however, clear from the writings of Sande in De Prohibita Rerum 
Alienatione in 1633 that the pactum de non cedendo already existed.  
Some 65 years later, Voet also wrote about restrictions on cession in 
Commentarius and judging by the detailed recordings in their works, these 
two common law writers were clearly authorities on the subject.57  What 
follows is a discussion of the views of Sande and Voet. 
 
1.2.1 The debate  
 
1.2.1.1 Sande 
 
Sande deals with the validity of a pactum de non cedendo in the following 
manner: 58    
 
A pact entered into with the owner, to the effect that he [the owner] 
shall not alienate his own property, is inoperative.  Unless the 
person who makes the agreement [the stipulans] has an interest in 
the property.59  (Webber’s translation) 
                                                    
56 Scott op cit 12. 
57 Once again, it must be remembered that Sande and Voet are the alleged authorities on 
the on the law of cession and particularly on the law governing pacta de non cedendo, 
because from one of the earliest cases to address the validity and effect of pacta de non 
cedendo (Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates Ltd 1920 AD 600) to the most recent 
case dealing with these issues [Capespan (Pty) Ltd v Any Name 451 (Pty) Ltd 2008 (4) 
SA 510 (C)], these two old authorities have been cited as authority.  See Chapter 4 for a 
critique on this issue. 
58 De Prohibita 4 1 Summary:  ‘Pactum initum cum domino, ne is rem suam alienet, est 
inutile.  Nisi paciscentis intersit’.   
59 W Webber A Treatise upon Restraints upon the Alienation of Things (1908) 293.  
(Hereinafter referred to as ‘Restraints upon Alienation’.) 
 
 
 
 
  
From the outset Sande distinguishes between two forms of restraints: 
 
There is a great difference between any one making an agreement 
with the owner that he [the owner] shall not alienate his own 
property; and the owner, when he is alienating his own property by 
gift or sale, imposing this pact on the transfer of the property, that 
the donee or purchaser shall not alienate the property. 60  
(Webber’s translation) 
 
In the former case the pact is useless.  For there is here no causa 
upon which such a pact can be supported; and utility, which is the 
mother of all good and of equity, demands that those pacts shall 
not be valid, which impede all commerce, and take away from us 
without any consideration the use of our own property.  And just as 
we cannot infringe or take away the free use of their property by our 
neighbours by imposing a servitude upon it, unless we have some 
interest upon which to hang this servitude; so also we cannot by a 
pact take away from an owner the power of alienating his own 
property, unless we have some interest in it.  From such an 
agreement, therefore, that the owner shall not be allowed to 
alienate his property, even if the stipulation is a valid one, not even 
a personal action can arise, for obligations and all actions can be 
summed up to this effect, that each person acquires to the extent of 
his own interest.61  (Webber’s translation) 
 
Thus, the first form of pactum de non cedendo is invalid or ‘inutile’ 
(useless) as the agreement has no causa and is contrary to the principle 
of utility – even if the stipulation was valid.  The pactum de non cedendo 
would only be valid if the stipulans (the debtor) has an interest in the 
restraint. 
 
                                                    
60 Restraints upon Alienation 294.  De Prohibita 4 1 Introduction:  ‘Interest utrum quis 
paciscatur cum ipso domino ne rem suam alienet; an vero dominus dum rem suam 
alienat donando, vel vendendo, tale pactum traditioni rei suae apponat, ne donatarius vel 
emptor eam rem alienet’.   
61 Restraints upon Alienation 294.  De Prohibita 4 1 1:  ‘Priori casu pactum est inutile.  
Nam nulla hic subset caussa, qua talis pactio sustineri queat; & utilitas, quae mater est 
boni & aequi, postulat, ne ea pacta valeant, quae rerum commercia omnino & sine 
caussa impediunt, nostrarumque rerum usum nobis adimunt.  Ac quemadmodum 
fervitute aliqua imposita non possumus infringere ac tollere libertatem praediorum 
vicinorum, nisi nostra intersit ea nobis servire:  Ita quoque pacto domino facultatem rei 
suae alienandae adimere non possum, nisi mea intersit.  Ex hac igitur conventione, ne 
domino liceat rem suam alienare, quantumvis stipulatione vallata, ne personalis quidem 
nascitur actio, cum obligationes & actiones omnes ad hoc comparatae sint, ut 
unusquisque, quod sua interest’.   
 
 
 
 
 Sande goes on to emphasise the interest requirement and uses the 
following practical example as an illustration:62 
 
If, therefore, the person making the pact or stipulation has any 
interest in that the owner shall not alienate his own property, a pact 
to the effect that the property shall not be alienated, is valid.63  
(Webber’s translation) 
 
The agreement is therefore valid, if I make a pact with regard to a 
thing to which is not mine, but in which I have some right; for 
instance, that you shall not alienate your land which you have 
mortgaged to me.  For it is to my interest that the land shall not be 
alienated, for instance, to a litigious man, or to any other 
troublesome person, against whom, if I bring a hypothecary action, 
I shall be compelled to adduce more conclusive evidence; for I shall 
then be required to prove that the property has been mortgaged to 
me, and also that it was the property of the debtor.64  (Webber’s 
translation) 
 
Sande also considered the validity of the second form of pactum de non 
cedendo.  He wrote:  
 
Now, in the second case, where a person on the donation, or sale, 
or transfer, or alienation of his property, adds the condition that it 
shall not be alienated, such a pact is wholly valid.  For every man 
has free control and administration over his own property and can 
at the time of alienation place any condition he pleases upon his 
property; and as Gaius says…it is undoubted law that every pact 
made by a person transferring his own property is valid.  And as 
Justinian says…an owner would not wish to transfer his right under 
any condition unless he relied upon such agreement.65  (Webber’s 
translation) 
                                                    
62 See De Prohibita 4 1 4 and 4 1 5 for examples not mentioned herein. 
63 Restraints upon Alienation 294.  De Prohibita 4 1 2:   ‘Quod si igitur paciscentis vel 
stipulantis intersit, ne dominus rem suam alienet, valet pactum de re aliena non 
alienanda’. 
64 Restraints upon Alienation 294-295.  De Prohibita 4 1 3:  ‘Hinc valet conventio, si 
pactus sim de re, quae quidem non est mea; sed in qua jus aliquod habeo, veluti ne 
alienes fundum tuum, qui mihi pignori obligatus est.  Quia interest mea, ne fundus 
alienetur forte in litigiosum, aut alioqui incommodum hominem, contra quem hypothecaria 
acturus gravioribus probationibus onerabor:  cum eo casu & rem mihi obligatam esse, & 
in bonis debitoris fuisse probare tenebor’. 
65 Restraints upon Alienation 296.  De Prohibita 4 1 6:  ‘Posteriori casu: quando quis 
donationi, venditioni, traditioni vel alienationi rei suae eam legem asscribit, ne alienetur, 
pactum omnino utile est.  Est enim quisque rei suae liber moderator & arbiter, & eam 
quam vult legem rei suae, tempore alienationis dicere potest in traditionibus rerum 
 
 
 
 
  
It thus seems that this form of pactum de non cedendo is ‘wholly’ valid as 
it stands, without an interest as a prerequisite since no mention is made to 
the contrary.  In the very next paragraph, however, mention is made of an 
interest and it is unclear whether Sande contradicted himself or whether 
he merely intended to qualify the preceding paragraph. 
 
Now, the interest of the person making such a pact should not be 
too strictly judged; for he has sufficient interest who can in every 
case say that he would not otherwise have alienated his property.66  
(Webber’s translation) 
 
Sande then goes on to deal with the effect of a pactum de non cedendo 
and the distinction between the two forms of pacta de non cedendo is still 
evident.  The effect of the first form is as follows: 
 
A pact concerning the property of another, in which the person who 
imposes the restriction has no interest, is of no effect or moment, 
unless a penalty is also imposed which is to become due in case of 
alienation; for even a person who has no interest in a property can 
make a pact with regard to it, if a penalty is added… but this should 
be understood not as referring to any stipulation, but… to a 
stipulation with a penalty attached; for from such a stipulation an 
action is given to a person, who would otherwise have no interest in 
the property.67  (Webber’s translation) 
 
If the person making the pact or stipulation has some interest in the 
property of another person, then a pact that such person shall not 
sell such property is binding, and when added to a bona fide 
contract, or strengthened by a stipulation, gives rise to an action on 
the contract or stipulation for the amount of such interest against 
                                                                                                                                              
suarum, quodcunque pactum sit, id valere manifesissimum esse, Cajus respondit.  Nec 
alia lege dominus jus suum transferre voluit, nisi tali fretus conventione, ut Justinianus 
loquitur & sub hac conditione minoris vendidit’.   
66 Restraints upon Alienation 296.  De Prohibita 4 1 7:  ‘Nec hic scrupulose inquirendum 
est, an paciscentis intersit:  quia hoc ipso satis interest, quod omni casu is, qui pactus 
est, dicere potest, se non alias rem suam fuisse alienaturum’.   
67 Restraints upon Alienation 299.  De Prohibita 4 2 1:  ‘Pactum appositum rei alienae, si 
paciscentis non interest, inessicax & nullius momenti, est nisi forte ei poena adjecta sit, 
quae in casum alienationis committarur, quia ex stipulatione poenali agit etiam, cujus non 
interest… non accipiendum est de stipulatione quacunque, sed… de stipulatione poenali, 
ex qua datur actio ei cujus alioqui nihil interest’. 
 
 
 
 
 the person who has alienated the property in spite of the 
agreement.68  (Webber’s translation) 
  
 
If an owner promises, upon his oath, to the person with whom he 
makes the stipulation or pact, that he will not alienate his own 
property, the Doctors do not agree as to whether dominium will be 
prevented from passing because of such oath.  The more correct 
view is that it is not so prevented.  For an oath does not change the 
nature of an act on which it is made, but retains all the qualities and 
conditions which such act has; and, therefore, if a person engages 
upon his oath that he will not alienate his property, and then he 
breaks his oath, he is liable for any loss, and if the property be sold, 
the dominium passes to the purchaser by virtue of such sale….69 
(Webber’s translation) 
 
The first form of pactum de non cedendo, therefore, has no effect unless a 
penalty clause is inserted into the agreement, or if the stipulans has some 
other interest in the agreement.  Should a penalty clause or other interest 
exist, the agreement is valid and binding.   
 
Sande emphasises that the effect of such an agreement is not entirely 
settled because the jurists do not agree as to whether ownership passes 
to the cessionary despite the pactum de non cedendo or whether 
ownership fails to pass because of the pactum de non cedendo.  Sande, 
however, believes that the more correct view is that ownership does pass 
to the cessionary, although the cedent will be liable for any loss suffered 
by the debtor (stipulans).   
 
The effect on the second form of pactum de non cedendo is as follows: 
 
                                                    
68 Restraints upon Alienation 299-300.  De Prohibita 4 2 2:   ‘Si interest paciscentis vel 
stipulantis, tunc pactum de non alienando appositum rei alienae utile est, ac adjectum 
contractui bonae fidei, vel stipulatione vallatum producit actionem ex ipso contractu vel ex 
stipulatione in id quod interest contra eum, qui insuper habita conventione alienavit’. 
69 Restraints upon Alienation 304.  De Prohibita 4 2 11:  ‘Si dominus stipulanti vel 
paciscenti juratus promiserit, se rem suam non alienaturum, an vi juramenti impediatur 
dominii translatio, inter Doctores controvertitur?  Non impediri verius est.  Quia 
juramentum non mutat naturam actus, super quo interponitur, sed recipit omnes 
qualitates & conditiones, quas actus habet, & ideo, qui jurato promisit se non alienaturum, 
si contravenerit, tenetur ad id quod interest, & dominium rei traditae non potest non per 
traditionem factam ex titulo habili transire in accipientem…’.   
 
 
 
 
 If an owner on the transfer of his property, for instance when selling 
his property at a sale, makes this a condition of the sale that the 
purchaser shall not alienate or sell to anyone but him; and the 
purchaser, in spite of such condition, does thereafter sell to 
someone other than the former owner, he is liable in an action on 
the sale for the damage which the original vendor has sustained 
through the property being alienated or sold to another than 
himself.70  (Webber’s translation) 
 
There has also been considerable controversy on the point 
whether, if the owner on the sale of his property makes a pact that 
the purchaser shall not alienate it, such a pact is so far effective as 
to prevent the dominium from passing if the new owner does 
alienate the property?  The most common view amongst the 
Doctors is that it will not have such effect….71  (Webber’s 
translation) 
 
From the different arguments that have been given on both sides, it 
appears that the more correct view is held by those who say that 
the passing of the dominium can be prevented by a pact, if only the 
owner imposes this pact at the time of the transfer of his property, 
or makes a condition at the time of the alienation of the property, 
and not subsequently, as by tradition the right has been acquired 
by another person….72  (Webber’s translation) 
 
The effect of this form of pactum de non cedendo is that if the cessionary 
ceded contrary to the pactum de non cedendo, then the cedent would 
have an action for damages against him.   
 
Like the other form of pactum de non cedendo, some debate exists as to 
whether ownership is transferred to the third party when alienation occurs 
contrary to the pactum de non cedendo.  Sande sets out the conflicting 
                                                    
70 Restraints upon Alienation 304.  De Prohibita 4 2 12: ‘Si dominus in transsatione rei 
suae, ut venditor in venditione & traditione rei suae legem dixerit, vel pepigerit, ne emptor 
alienaret, vel ne alii quam sibi venderet, & emptor nihilominus eam alienaverit, vel alii, 
quam priori domino vediderit, imprimis tenetur actione ex vendito in id quod venditoris 
interest, eam esse alienatam vel alii, quam sibi venditam’. 
71 Restraints upon Alienation 306.  De Prohibita 4 2 14:  ‘At quaestionis est multum 
controversae, si dominus in traditione rei suae paciscatur, ne liceat accipienti eam 
alienare, an hoc pactum adeo efficax sit, ut dominii translationem impediat?  Negant hoc 
frequentius Doctores…’.   
72 Restraints upon Alienation 314.  De Prohibita 4 2 26:   ‘Ex his utrinque disputatis72 satis 
liquet veriorem esse sententiam docentium translationem dominii posse impediri pacto, 
dummodo illud dominus apponat traditioni rei suae istam legem dicat in ipsa traditione vel 
alienatione, non postea, cum ex traditione alteri jam jus quaesitum est…’.  
 
 
 
 
 arguments of the jurists and concludes that the more correct view is that 
ownership does not pass, provided that the condition is made at the time 
of alienation and not thereafter. 
 
The consequence of this, as Scott notes, is that the cessionary obtains 
limited ownership as he is unable to make a further transfer.  The 
cessionary thus obtains a limited real right from the cedent as upon 
transfer the right is rendered non-transferable.73 
 
1.2.1.2 Voet 
 
Voet’s writings on the pactum de non cedendo appear to be very similar to 
Sande’s, except for the fact that Voet makes no distinction between 
different forms of pacta de non cedendo and writes only (according to 
Sande’s distinction) of the first form of pactum de non cedendo as if no 
other form exists. 
 
Agreements also by which an owner deprives himself of discretion and 
control as to his own property are without effect whenever no 
advantage accrues from them to the other party.  An agreement does 
not affect things, but binds a person to keep faith.  If he did not stand to 
his promises, by Roman law no action could be given for damages.  
And if, as is the case, an action is now given on an agreement, there 
could be no room at all for it, where no one has an interest.  In this 
sense it is true that no one can by making an agreement bring it about 
that he shall have no power to consecrate his own place, or to bury a 
corpse in his own ground, or that he shall not part with his land without 
the consent of his neighbour.   
But if you assume that the person agreeing has an interest, and 
that such an agreement has been annexed in accord with Roman 
law to a bonae fidei contract such as purchase, the better opinion is 
that it ought to be kept, though there was of old a doubt upon the 
matter.  This is not because things done contrary to the agreement 
would be ipso jure null, or would affect the thing itself… [i]t is 
because a personal action for either damages or penalty (if a 
                                                    
73 S Scott ‘Pacta de non cedendo’ 1981 Tydskrif vir Hendendaagse Romeins-Hollandse 
Reg 158. 
 
 
 
 
 penalty had been annexed to the agreement) would have to be 
given to the other person agreeing.74  (Gane’s translation) 
 
As to the validity of pacta de non cedendo, Voet confirms that an 
agreement depriving an owner of the management of his own property is 
without effect, unless the other party has an interest.   
 
As to the effect of pacta de non cedendo, Voet further confirms that 
alienation in contravention of the prohibitory agreement has no effect on 
the object being alienated, nor would the alienation, in contravention of the 
prohibitory agreement, be void.  This means that ownership is transferred 
despite the pactum de non cedendo.  In effect the pactum de non cedendo 
is merely to enforce that a person remains faithful to his promise, with an 
action for damages arising should he dishonour his promise. 
 
1.3 Conclusion  
 
It is interesting to consider the gaps and incomplete statements of the law 
in the contributions of Sande and Voet.   
 
Both writers recognised that a transfer of a right of action may be 
prohibited by agreement if the stipulans has an interest in the prohibition, 
but neither explains the content of this interest requirement.75 
 
                                                    
74 Commentary on the Pandects 434-435.  Commentarius 2 14 20:   ‘Inutilia quoque 
pacta, quibus dominus sibi de re sua arbitrium ac moderamen adimit, quoties inde nulla 
ad alterum utilitas pervenit:  cum enim pactum res non afficiat, sed personam obstringat 
ad fidem servandam, eo promissis non stante, nulla jure Romano ad id quod interest 
actio dari posset, & si maxime ex pacto detur nunc actio, ei locus esse haud poterit, cum 
nullius intersit.  Eoque sensu verum est, neminem paciscendo essicere posse, ne sibi 
locum suum dedicare liceat; aut, ne sibi in suo mortuum sepelire liceat; aut ne vicino 
invito praedium alienet.  Sed si paciscentis interesse ponas, & pactum tale adjectum ex 
jure Romano bonae fidei contractui, velut emtioni, servandum esse, verius est, licet de eo 
olim dubitatum fuerit.  [N]on, quod contra pactum gesta ipso jure nulla forent, aut rem 
ipsam afficerent… sed quod vel ad id, quod interest, vel ad poenam, (si quae conventioni 
adjecta sit) personalis actio paciscenti danda foret’.   
75 See Chapter 4 for a more detailed discussion of this issue. 
 
 
 
 
 A point to consider regarding the penalty clause is whether the 
enforceability of the agreement hinges on the inclusion of a penalty when 
no interest exits, or whether the agreement remains ineffective due to the 
lack of an interest, becoming effective only if the right is transferred 
contrary to the penalty. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting consideration is why Voet failed to 
distinguish between the two forms of pacta de non cedendo as Sande 
clearly did, especially since Voet published Commentarius 65 years after 
De Prohibita was published; no academic has attempted to explain this.76   
 
A possible explanation for Voet’s failure to make the same distinction is 
that this form of pactum de non cedendo was either not used by 
contractants and/or accepted by other jurists, or the area of its application 
was too narrow to be mentioned.  Since Voet was very thorough in his 
writings, the more convincing reason would be the former. 
 
Another possible reason may be found in the fact that, although Sande 
and Voet were both writing on Roman-Dutch law, they had different 
perspectives on the law.  Sande was born and raised in Friesland and it is 
generally accepted that the old authorities from that part of Holland 
adhered more closely to Roman law.  The Roman-Dutch law which 
prevailed in Friesland thus leaned toward strict Roman law in comparison 
to the Roman-Dutch law that was received in the other provinces of 
Holland where the local law was more prominent.77 
 
Voet, on the other hand, was born and raised in Utrecht and was much 
more focussed on the usus modernus.  The general idea was to reconcile 
                                                    
76 According to Scott ‘Pacta de non cedendo’ op cit 157 in footnote 86, Sande’s second 
form of pactum de non cedendo, where he recognises that a cedent can enter into an 
agreement with a cessionary to prevent the cessionary from ceding the right further, is 
not possible in any other legal system. 
77 JW Wessels History of the Roman-Dutch Law (1908) 239-240.  See also GF Kotze Die 
Leerstuk van Onherroeplike Volmag in die Suid-Afrikaanse Verteenwoordigingsreg 
(1985) LLM thesis University of Stellenbosch 38. 
 
 
 
 
 Roman law with the practice of his time.  Thus it may be said that Voet 
failed to make the same distinction as that of Sande because such a 
distinction was out-moded by the modern practice of that time.78     
 
  
 
  
                                                    
78 Wessels op cit 320-330; Kotze op cit 38. 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER TWO 
 
FOREIGN LAW PERSPECTIVE 
 
This Chapter investigates how the English and American legal systems 
deal with the validity and effect of the pactum de non cedendo.  
 
2.1 English Law 
 
2.1.1 English law of assignment in general 
 
English law uses different terminology in this area of the law to that which 
is generally used in South Africa.  ‘Cession’ in English law is called 
‘assignment’, the cedent is referred to as the ‘assignor’ and the cessionary 
is the ‘assignee’.  The ‘debtor’ is also often referred to as the ‘obligator’.  
English law also terms a ‘personal right’ a ‘chose in action’.79 
 
Much like Roman law, the English common law originally did not recognise 
an assignment of a chose in action, as choses in action were considered 
to be strictly personal.  Only the person who had the right could sue on it 
and it could not be transferred to a person not party to the original 
obligation.80 
 
The rule was initially based on the difficulty to comprehend that an 
intangible thing could be transferred.  Later, the rule was said to be based 
on the fear that assignment of choses in action might lead to 
‘maintenance’, a term used to describe ‘intermeddling’ where ‘the 
intermeddler has no concern’ in the matter.81 
 
                                                    
79 PH Pettit ‘Choses in Action’ in Halsbury’s Laws of England 4ed vol 6 (2003) 3. 
80 A Wood Renton and MA Robertson Encyclopaedia of the Laws of England vol 3 (1907) 
49; J Salmond and J Williams Principles of the Law of Contracts 2ed (1945) 456; GH 
Treitel The Law of Contract 9ed (1995) 590; Pettit op cit 11.  
81 Treitel op cit 590. 
 
 
 
 
 The rule preventing a transfer of a right was further upheld by the doctrine 
of privity of contract, whereby a person could not become a party to a 
contract which he was originally not a party to.82   
 
In an attempt to effect a transfer of a right, English law made use of 
novation, acknowledgment and power of attorney.83  These alternatives, 
however, like in Roman law, had their own shortcomings.84  
 
Consequently, from a very early period (17th century) the equitable 
jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery began to view choses in action as 
property and came to realise the commercial importance of 
transferability.85  As a result equitable assignments were freely permitted, 
although in reality only equitable ownership vested in the assignee, with 
the assignor still retaining legal ownership. 86   
 
Enforcement of the assignee’s equitable title posed a problem.  Although 
the Courts of Chancery recognised the assignee’s equitable title, they did 
not commonly exercise jurisdiction to enforce claims arising ex contractu.87  
The Courts of common law refused to recognise the assignee’s equitable 
title, so neither could he sue for performance in the Courts of common 
law.88  
 
To overcome this problem the Courts of Chancery imposed a duty on the 
assignor to allow the assignee to sue in his name in the Courts of common 
                                                    
82 GF Kotze Die Leerstuk van Onherroeplike Volmag in die Suid-Afrikaanse 
Verteenwoordigingsreg (1985) unpublished LLM thesis University of Stellenbosch 2. 
83 Treitel op cit 590-591; Kotze op cit 2 et seq. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Salmond and Williams op cit 456-457. 
86 Wood Renton and Robertson op cit 50; Salmond and Williams op cit 456-457; Treitel 
op cit 591; Pettit op cit 11.  
87 Salmond and Williams op cit 457. 
88 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 law – ostensibly on behalf of the assignor as legal owner, but in reality for 
himself.89 
 
Later, the common law somewhat relaxed the rules regarding assignment 
as the common law was influenced by mercantile custom, which 
disregarded the common law and allowed negotiable instruments to be 
freely assigned.90  Further, statutes were also enacted that allowed certain 
classes of choses in action to be assigned.91   
 
It was only in 1873 that legislation was passed to transform the law in a 
more drastic manner.  This transformation was brought about by the 
Judicature Act, specifically s25(6), which made choses in action 
assignable at law.92  Substantial portions of this Act were later re-enacted 
by the Law of Property Act in 1925 with s25(6) being replaced by s136.93 
 
The English law now provides that an assignment of a chose in action 
transfers legal ownership and all the rights and remedies attached thereto, 
to the assignee, who may sue the debtor in his own name.94   
 
According to s136 of the Law of Property Act, an assignment amounts to a 
legal assignment if three requirements are met.95  The requirements under 
the Act are first, that the assignor must reduce the assignment agreement 
to writing.  Secondly, the assignment must be absolute and not ‘by way of 
charge only’.96  An assignment is not absolute if the assignor retains an 
                                                    
89 Salmond and Williams op cit 457; Pettit op cit 11.  
90 Wood Renton and Robertson op cit 51-52; Salmond and Williams op cit 457. 
91 Wood Renton and Robertson op cit 52, for example, Bills of Lading Act of 1855, 
Policies of Assurance Act of 1867 and Marine Insurance Act of 1868. 
92 Salmond and Williams op cit 458; Treitel op cit 593; Pettit op cit 11. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Pettit op cit 12. 
95 Pettit op cit 13. 
96 Pettit op cit 15.  It seems that there is no fixed test to determine if an assignment is by 
way of charge only.  Rather, a holistic approach should be adopted taking into account 
the intentions of the parties and the terms of the agreement.  An example of an 
assignment by way of charge only is where a document assigned only gives the 
 
 
 
 
 interest in the subject matter97 or if the assignment is conditional.98  
Thirdly, express notice in writing must be given to the debtor either by the 
assignor or the assignee.  This is an important requirement as assignment 
is said to operate as from the date when such notice was received by the 
debtor.99  If an assignment fails to comply with these requirements it will 
not, as a consequence thereof, be considered a legal assignment.  It may, 
however, still amount to an equitable assignment.100 
 
The Law of Property Act is still in force in England at present and the law 
of assignment has not changed significantly since the passing of the Act.  
 
2.1.2 Unassignable contracts through the cases 
 
English law, like South African law, also prohibits the assignment of 
certain choses in action. Some of these prohibitions101 include 
assignments contrary to public policy,102 rights arising from personal 
contracts (otherwise known as delectus personae), pensions, a wife’s right 
to spousal maintenance, rights to social security benefits and bare rights 
of action.103 
 
English law also recognises pacta de non cedendo as possible 
prohibitions on assignment, although the term ‘pactum de non cedendo’ is 
                                                                                                                                              
‘assignee’ a right to payment out of a particular fund or property, and does not absolutely 
transfer the fund or the property. 
97 Salmond and Williams op cit 468-469; Treitel op cit 593. 
98 Pettit op cit 15.  For example, if the assignment was made only for such time as money 
advanced is repaid, the assignor retains an interest.  Or, if an insurance policy is 
assigned with the condition that the assignee shall be entitled to the insurance money 
only if the assignor predeceases the assignee, the assignment is a conditional one. 
99 Treitel op cit 596; Pettit op cit 18. 
100 Treitel op cit 596. 
101 Treitel op cit 610-613; Pettit op cit 53-62. 
102 Pettit op cit 53. 
103 As described in Pettit op cit 57, a bare right of action is a right of litigation for damages 
for defamation or personal injury. 
 
 
 
 
 not used.  Phrases like an ‘unassignable contract’ or a ‘non-assignment 
clause’ are used instead. 
 
In English law, an unassignable contract is regarded as completely valid 
and not much dispute has arisen in this regard.  The debtor does not have 
to show that he has an interest in the restriction, nor does public policy 
place any kind of hindrance on the rights of parties wishing to make a 
contract unassignable.104  
 
On the other hand, the effect of an unassignable contract on a subsequent 
cession has caused quite a stir.  What follows is a discussion of the 
historical development of the effect of an unassignable contract through 
the cases.105   
 
Brice v Bannister106 was decided soon after the Judicature Act was 
passed.  In that case Bramwell LJ made the following statement: 
 
… it does seem to me a strange thing and hard on a man, that he 
should enter into a contract with another and then find that 
because the other has entered into some contract with a third, he, 
the first man, is unable to do that which it is reasonable and just 
he should do for his own good. But the law seems to be so; and 
any one who enters into a contract with A must do so with the 
understanding that B may be the person with whom he will have 
to reckon. Whether this can be avoided, I know not; may be, if in 
the contract with A it was expressly stipulated that an assignment 
to B should give no rights to him, such a stipulation would be 
binding. I hope it would be.107 
 
As to the effect of a contravention of a non-assignment clause, Bramwell 
LJ seems to favour absolute invalidity of the purported assignment.  The 
                                                    
104 Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenestra Sludge Disposals Ltd [1993] 3 All ER 417. 
105 This discussion focuses solely on cases considering the effect of an unassignable 
contract that has been assigned in contravention thereof.  Other cases which have 
considered some other aspect of unassignable contracts have thus not been included. 
106 [1878] 3 QBD 569. 
107 Supra 580-581. 
 
 
 
 
 result is that the agreement between the assignor and debtor remains 
completely unscathed, while the assignee obtains nothing under the 
assignment agreement, barring presumably, an action for damages 
against the assignor for breach of contract.  
 
The next case that considered the effect of a contravention of an non-
assignment clause was Shaw & Co v Moss Empires Ltd and Bastow,108 
where Darling J held that the non-assignment clause in the contract 
between the debtor and assignor:  
…could no more operate to invalidate the assignment [between 
the assignor and the assignee] than it could to interfere with the 
laws of gravitation.109 
 
As to the effect of a contravention of a non-assignment clause, Darling J 
seems to favour partial invalidity.  The result is that the right of ownership 
passes to the assignee, while still allowing the debtor to perform as he 
would have, had no assignment taken place. 
 
Seventy years later, in the case of Helstan Securities Ltd v Hertfordshire 
County Council,110 the council employed Renhold Road Surfacing Ltd, a 
firm of contractors, to carry out some road works.  One of the clauses in 
their contract provided that Renhold Road Surfacing Ltd was prohibited 
from assigning the contract or any benefit thereunder or interest therein, 
without the written consent of the council.   
 
During the currency of the contract Renhold Road Surfacing Ltd 
experienced severe financial difficulties and consequently assigned the 
debts owing to it by the council to Helstan Ltd without first obtaining the 
council’s consent.  The council refused to recognise the assignment due 
                                                    
108 [1908] 25 TLR 190. 
109 Supra 191. 
110 [1978] 3 All ER 262. 
 
 
 
 
 to the existence of the non-assignment clause, and claimed that the 
assignment was invalid, even as between the assignor and the assignee.  
 
The case was decided by Croom-Johnson J, who reviewed both the 
earlier cases on the issue (as I have done above) but passed very little 
comment, if any.  Croom-Johnson J did, however, express himself very 
clearly in response to an argument advanced by Helstan Ltd.   
 
Helstan Ltd argued that a very different rule regarding unassignable 
contracts applies in the case of leases.  According to the argument, when 
a lessee assigns his lease in contravention of the non-assignment clause, 
the assignment is valid with the result, in the worst case scenario, being 
that the lessor may sue the assignor for breach of contract.  The 
assignment, however, is still valid as between assignor and assignee. 
 
Croom-Johnson J refused to recognise any comparison between the two 
areas of unassignable contracts and stated that ‘the law concerning 
covenants running with the land is not something which is readily 
adaptable to choses in action’.111  He failed to give a satisfactory 
explanation for this refusal and simply stated that: 
There are certain kinds of choses in action which, for one reason 
or another, are not assignable and there is no reason why the 
parties to an agreement may not contract to give its subject-
matter the quality of unassignability.112 
 
Croom-Johnson J was further of the opinion that a debtor should not be 
forced to deal with an unknown assignee when he has specifically 
contracted to avoid this occurrence.113  In concluding that the non-
assignment clause rendered the assignment in contravention thereof 
invalid, the judge also added that there was no injustice in expecting 
                                                    
111 Supra 265. 
112 Supra 265-266. 
113 Supra 266. 
 
 
 
 
 Helstan Ltd to make proper enquires before agreeing to take assignment 
of the debts.114 
 
As to the effect of a contravention of a non-assignment clause, Croom-
Johnson J, like Bramwell LJ mentioned above, thus also seems to favour 
absolute invalidity. 
 
The next case, Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd 
and others and another appeal,115 is to date the most authoritative case on 
the issue.   
 
In this case Stock Conversion and Investment Trust plc (Stock 
Conversion) were the owners of a leasehold of certain property.  Stock 
Conversion entered into an agreement with McLaughlin & Harvey plc (the 
second defendant) for the removal of asbestos from the property. 116  
Clause 17 of their contract contained a non-assignment agreement 
whereby neither party could assign the contract without the other’s 
consent. 
 
After McLaughlin & Harvey plc carried out its work of removing the 
asbestos, more asbestos, which it should have removed, was discovered.  
Stock Conversion consequently entered into a contract with Ashwell 
Construction Co Ltd (the third defendant) for the removal of the said 
discovered asbestos.  This contract also contained a non-assignment 
clause. 
 
                                                    
114 Ibid. 
115 [1993] 3 All ER 417. 
116 It must be noted, for the sake of completeness and to explain the presence of Lenesta 
Sludge Disposals Ltd as a party to the action, that the latter company was the nominated 
sub-contractor for the removal of the asbestos and was of no significance to the legal 
proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 Some time later Stock Conversion began to institute legal proceedings 
against Lenestra Sludge Disposal Ltd for breach of contract.  In the course 
of instituting the latter Stock Conversion assigned to Linden Gardens Trust 
Ltd (Linden Gardens) its interest in the leasehold as well as all its rights 
under the two asbestos removal contracts (which necessarily included the 
right to take over and continue the action against Lenesta Sludge Disposal 
Ltd).  At no time, however, was the consent of McLaughlin & Harvey plc 
and Ashwell Construction Co Ltd ever sought or given. 
 
Subsequently, yet more asbestos was discovered on the premises and 
Linden Gardens incurred the cost of its removal.  Consequently, Linden 
Gardens as assignee in the present action, sought to sue the defendants 
for breach of contract. 
 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who delivered the majority judgment in the House 
of Lords, noted that two questions arose from the case:117  First, whether 
the assignment to Linden Gardens was effective, considering the non-
assignment clauses and secondly, whether Linden Gardens, as assignee, 
could recover damages (incurred after assignment) for the cost of 
removing more asbestos.118  
 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson thought it wise to consider the opinion of 
Goode,119 one of the more prominent English writers on the law of 
assignment, and pointed out that where a contract prohibits assignment of 
contractual rights, the effect of such a prohibition depends on the 
construction of the contract.  Goode proposed as early as 1979 that there 
are four possible constructions.120 
                                                    
117 Supra 423. 
118 The second issue, however, is not relevant for the purpose of this discussion. 
119 RM Goode ‘Inalienable rights?’ 1979 Modern Law Review (vol 42) 553. 
120 Supra 428.  See below for a more detailed discussion. 
 
 
 
 
  
The judge also considered whether non-assignment clauses were against 
public policy.  The rationale for this enquiry was that usually it is against 
public policy to render property inalienable.121  He noted that neither in 
Helstan Securities Ltd v Hertfordshire County Council nor in other cases 
was public policy advanced as an argument.  In fact, the cases accepted 
the validity of non-assignment clauses.122  The court was referred to 
Scottish, American and even South African cases (Paiges v Van Ryn Gold 
Mine Estates) to illustrate that in these legal systems a contract prohibiting 
assignment is also not against public policy. 
 
In concluding, the judge could see no good reason for declaring such 
contracts as against public policy and stated the following: 
In the case of real property there is a defined and limited supply 
of the commodity and it has been held contrary to public policy to 
restrict the free market. But no such reason can apply to 
contractual rights: there is no public need for a market in choses 
in action. A party to a building contract, as I have sought to 
explain, can have a genuine commercial interest in seeking to 
ensure that he is in contractual relations only with a person whom 
he has selected as the other party to the contract. In the 
circumstances, I can see no policy reason why a contractual 
prohibition on assignment of contractual rights should be held 
contrary to public policy.123 
 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson thereafter considered the effect of an assignment 
made contrary to a transfer prohibition.  Relying on, inter alia, Shaw & Co 
v Moss Empires Ltd, Linden Gardens submitted that even if the 
assignments constituted a breach of the clause in question, the clause 
could not prevent a cause of action from vesting in the assignee.124 
                                                    
121 Supra 430. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Supra 431.  This quotation seems to be a reflection on the doctrine of privity of 
contract. 
 
 
 
 
  
Even though the judge criticised Shaw & Co v Moss Empires Ltd as being 
inadequately reported and felt that the ratio was ambiguous, he held: 
…a prohibition on assignment normally only invalidates the 
assignment as against the other party to the contract so as to 
prevent a transfer of the chose in action: in the absence of the 
clearest words it cannot operate to invalidate the contract as 
between the assignor and the assignee and even then it may be 
ineffective on the grounds of public policy.125 
 
The judge also considered Helstan Securities Ltd v Hertfordshire County 
Council and noted that:  
Croom-Johnson J did not follow the Shaw case and held that the 
purported assignment in breach of the contractual provision was 
ineffective to vest the cause of action in the assignee…. 
Therefore the existing authorities establish that an attempted 
assignment of contractual rights in breach of a contractual 
prohibition is ineffective to transfer such contractual rights. I 
regard the law as being satisfactorily settled in that sense. If the 
law were otherwise, it would defeat the legitimate commercial 
reason for inserting the contractual prohibition, viz, to ensure that 
the original parties to the contract are not brought into direct 
contractual relations with third parties.126 
 
The action brought by Linden Gardens was accordingly dismissed.  The 
House of Lords, therefore, declared that the contractual relationship as 
between the assignor and assignee remains intact, but only in the sense 
that the assignee may have recourse to damages for breach of contract 
and not for an action of specific performance.  Ownership, however, still 
appears to vest in the assignor.  
 
It seems that no subsequent case has departed from this ratio.127  
                                                    
125 Supra 431. 
126 Supra 431-432. 
127 Yeandle v Wynn Realisations Ltd (in administration) [1995] 47 Con LR 1, CA; Flood v 
Shand Construction Ltd [1996] 54 Con LR 125, CA; Don King Productions Inc v Warren 
[1998] 2 All ER 608; Hendry v Chartsearch Ltd [1998] CLC 1382, CA; Quadmost Ltd v 
 
 
 
 
  
2.1.3 The English academics’ opinions  
 
The English academics started their debate around 1945 when Salmond 
and Williams were of the opinion that there was no reason why a contract 
should not be made unassignable.128  Their view to the effect of such a 
prohibition was that every assignee was bound by the terms of the 
contract so assigned to him, and the assignee could, therefore, not 
attempt to enforce his rights against the debtor, as this was something that 
the terms of the contract specifically prohibited.129 
 
The authors added that if the assignment of a contract was prohibited, and 
it was assigned in contravention of the agreement, it would be difficult for 
the assignee to find a legal ground on which to base such a defiance so 
that he might enforce performance from the debtor.130 
 
Salmond and Williams also noted that a contractual prohibition on 
assignment seems to be strictly construed, requiring express terms to 
ensure its intended application.131 
 
In 1979, one year after Helstan Securities Ltd v Hertfordshire County 
Council was decided, the debate continued when two more articles on 
non-assignment clauses were published. 
 
In his exploration of the effect of an assignment in contravention of a non-
assignment clause, Goode points out that a non-assignment contract can 
                                                                                                                                              
Reprotech (Pebsham) Ltd [2001] BPIR 349.  Contra A Trukhtanov ‘Trust of a non-
assignable contractual benefit: Barbados Trust Company v Bank of Zambia’ 2007 Modern 
Law Review (vol 70) 484 although the issue under discussion in this article and the case 
considered therein is somewhat off the topic. 
128 Salmond and Williams op cit 477. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 appear in four different constructions. 132  Each construction will 
necessarily have a different result on the effect of such a transfer.  Further, 
the application of any one of the possible constructions depends entirely 
on the words used to form the contract.133  
 
The first construction is that the prohibition constitutes a mere personal 
undertaking or promise not to assign.  An assignment in contravention 
thereof is not rendered ineffective as against the debtor; the assignee 
would acquire rights against the debtor.  The debtor’s only remedy would 
be to sue the assignor for breach of contract.134 
 
Goode states that this construction is simple enough and needs no 
comment,135 but in Linden Gardens Lord Browne-Wilkinson remarked that 
in his opinion this construction is very unlikely to occur.136  
 
The second construction is that assignment in contravention of the 
prohibition is indeed rendered ineffective against the debtor.  As a result 
the debtor is permitted to ignore the notice of assignment, and he may 
continue to pay the assignor and set up equities (raise defences) against 
him as if no assignment has occurred.  The status of ‘ineffectiveness-as-
against-the-debtor’ does not interfere with the assignor’s right to assign 
the fruits of the contract after he has received it from the debtor.137 
 
Goode remarks that this construction is a valid one and that the law would 
give effect to it.  The result, however, would not be a statutory assignment 
                                                    
132 RM Goode ‘Inalienable rights?’ 1979 Modern Law Review (vol 42) 553. 
133 Goode op cit 554.  Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta 
Sludge Disposals Ltd approved of Goode’s submissions.    
134 Goode op cit 554. 
135 Ibid 
136 Linden Gardens supra 428.  One wonders why the judge thought that this construction 
would be unlikely.  No reasons were advanced for this opinion. 
137 Goode op cit 554. 
 
 
 
 
 for the purposes of s136 of the Law of Property Act, as the Act allows an 
assignee to sue in his own name.138 
 
Goode asserts that in Helstan Securities Ltd v Hertfordshire County 
Council,139 the argument advanced by the council went a step further as it 
was argued there that the prohibition rendered the assignment ineffective 
even as between the assignor and assignee.140   
 
Goode is alarmed at the judge’s agreement with this argument.141  He 
submits that the difficulty in determining the effect of a prohibited transfer 
lies, inter alia, in the failure to differentiate between the concept of 
ineffectiveness against the debtor and the concept of invalidity between 
the assignor and assignee.142  A debtor may stipulate that he will accept 
counter-performance only from the assignor and that he will make 
payment only to the assignor.  The interest in the monies handed over to 
the assignor, however, vests in the assignor.  Whether and to whom the 
assignor transfers such monies, is of no concern to the debtor.  It cannot 
affect him in any way and terms of this nature (that is, bringing about such 
invalidity) should not be readily construed as purporting to do this.143 
 
If Croom-Johnson J had kept the above distinction in mind, then according 
to Goode’s line of reasoning, the judge would have exercised a little more 
caution and would not have been so ready to accept the council’s 
argument. 
 
The third construction is that the assignor is prohibited from assigning the 
fruits of the contract even after he has received them from the debtor, with 
                                                    
138 Ibid. 
139 Supra 263-264. 
140 Goode op cit 554-555. 
141 Goode op cit 555. 
142 Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 the result that the assignee can obtain no rights even as between himself 
and the assignor.144 
 
Goode is of the opinion that this construction is ‘repugnant to the creditor’s 
[purported assignor’s] ownership and ought not to be countenanced’.145   
As a result it should be devoid of effect.   In support of this view he refers 
to the famous words of Darling J in Shaw & Co v Moss Empire.146 
 
The fourth construction is that an assignment in contravention of the 
prohibition constitutes a breach of the contract entitling the debtor to 
terminate the contract and claim damages from the assignor thereby 
reducing or extinguishing the assignor’s right of payment.147 
 
Goode states that this construction would have to be tested against the 
rules of equity governing forfeiture and would probably be struck down as 
an unconscionable forfeiture.148  Lord Browne-Wilkinson also believed that 
this construction was very unlikely to occur.149 
 
Goode then turns to discuss the possible reasons why a debtor may insist 
on prohibiting assignment.  Goode admits that a debtor may have good 
and legitimate reasons for including a non-assignment clause in a 
contract.150  These reasons may include the situation where a debtor 
overlooks receipt of the notice of assignment and pays to the assignor.  
Such a payment does not warrant the debtor to a ‘good discharge’ of the 
debt and he may be compelled to pay again (to the assignee).151  Another 
                                                    
144 Goode op cit 554. 
145 Goode op cit 556. 
146 Goode op cit 556.  The judge’s famous words are that such a term ‘could no more 
operate to invalidate the assignment than it could interfere with the laws of gravitation’. 
147 Goode op cit 554. 
148 Goode op cit 554 and 557. 
149 Supra 428. 
150 Goode op cit 553. 
151 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 reason for including a non-assignment clause is that a debtor cannot set 
up equities (raise defences) as against the assignee, if such equities arise 
after he receives the notice of assignment.152 
 
Despite admitting these benefits, Goode is critical of the decision in 
Helstan Securities Ltd v Hertfordshire County Council from the viewpoint 
of commercial efficacy.  He is of the opinion that to expect an assignee to 
make proper enquiries before buying debts (as was argued in this case 
and accepted by Croom-Johnson J) ignores commercial realities.153 
 
The rationale of this criticism is that where there is a continuous flow of 
receivables as between assignor and assignee, especially when one of 
the parties carries on business as a factoring company or finance house, 
scrutinising individual contracts is very impractical.154 
 
Goode appreciates the concern of the commercial world and believes that 
if Helstan Securities Ltd v Hertfordshire County Council is to be literally 
interpreted, it would threaten the security of receivables financing as a 
whole.155 
 
It is also interesting to note that Goode often makes reference to American 
law.  In particular, he states that in America the courts became 
increasingly hostile to attempts made to prohibit the transfer of receivables 
so that eventually legislation was passed to render ineffective any term 
prohibiting the assignment of receivables.156 
 
Goode’s article was published in 1979 and factoring or the transfer of 
receivables had been steadily on the rise since before this date.  Goode’s 
                                                    
152 Ibid. 
153 Goode op cit 556. 
154 Ibid. 
155 Ibid. 
156 Goode op cit 557 footnote 11. 
 
 
 
 
 concerns thus correctly reflected the realities beginning to bear down on 
the commercial world at that time. 
 
Although Goode mentions that in America legislation was passed in order 
to do away with hindering non-assignment clauses, upon a closer 
inspection of his concerns, it is neither the approach that the English 
courts adopt nor the provisions in the Property Act that he finds 
unsatisfactory.  Goode’s primary concern was that he did not think it wise 
that a factoring firm or finance house should first have to make enquiries 
before receiving assignment of debts – as would be the case if the ratio in 
Helstan Securities was literally followed. 
 
Goode’s concerns were insightful, but he did not advance or purport to 
advance a radical solution or any kind of revamp of the law governing non-
assignment clauses.  He merely desired of the English courts to refrain 
from interpreting Helstan Securities literally. 
 
Munday157 questions the refusal of Croom-Johnson J to apply, as an 
analogy, the law governing the assignment of leases to the assignment of 
choses in action.  Munday believes that there are equally strong 
commercial reasons for applying it to choses in action.158 
 
Munday argues that the prohibition on assignment, as illustrated in 
Helstan Securities Ltd v Hertfordshire County Council, is a standard 
clause automatically included in a variety of contracts, specifically 
government contracts.  Thus, firms employed by the government, 
especially small to medium firms, may temporarily fall on hard times if they 
cannot sell their debts to raise finance.159  Further, as the argument goes, 
                                                    
157 RJC Munday ‘Prohibition against assignment of choses in action’ 1979 Cambridge 
Law Journal (vol 38) 50. 
158 Munday op cit 53.  Many years later in Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge 
Disposals Ltd Lord Browne-Wilkinson, after careful consideration, also rejected this 
analogy. 
159Munday op cit 53. 
 
 
 
 
 the ramifications of this are massive, since the annual turnover in England 
from the sale of debts runs into millions, and since obtaining finance in this 
manner was on the rise at that time.160 
 
Munday looks further afield to American law where legislation was passed 
to allow those engaged in government contract work to finance their 
undertakings by assigning their debts.161 
 
Munday is of the opinion that because Helstan Securities Ltd v 
Hertfordshire County Council directly upheld the non-assignment clause, 
serious implications await those in the commercial world.162 
 
Munday’s concerns echo those of Goode and it is remarkable to read that 
already in 1979 the annual turnover of factoring ran into millions of 
pounds.  Considering the magnitude of this commercial industry, one 
would have thought that Munday might have suggested some drastic 
solutions to improve that situation for these commercial entities.  Apart 
from mentioning the import of legislation in American law which prohibits 
the inclusion of non-assignment clauses, Munday, however, is not 
forthcoming with suggestions. 
 
Allcock has considered the position of all the parties involved in a non-
assignment contract and questions whether the answer lies in 
legislation.163   He firstly contemplates the position as between the 
assignor and the assignee.  Allcock claims that even if a non-assignment 
                                                    
160 Ibid.  In 1979 Munday recorded the annual turnover in England to be over £1000 
million. 
161 Munday op cit 53. 
162 Ibid. 
163 B Allcock ‘Restrictions on the assignment of contractual rights’ 1983 Cambridge Law 
Journal (vol 42) 328.  
 
 
 
 
 clause can prevent an assignee from acquiring rights against the debtor, it 
cannot prevent rights arising between the assignee and the assignor.164   
 
Secondly, he reflects upon the position as between the debtor and the 
assignee.165  Unfortunately Allcock’s discussion of the position is unhelpful 
in taking the matter any further.  He reviews past cases on the issue and 
impliedly draws a conclusion.166  For Allcock, therefore, a non-assignment 
clause does not deprive the assignee of all rights, but it can prevent him 
from enforcing rights directly against the debtor.167  
 
Allcock also discusses the possibility of introducing legislation to create 
legal certainty.  He asserts that most disputes revolve around the payment 
of a sum of money.  The task, he says, is to weigh the commercial 
desirability of freely assignable debts against the harm or inconvenience 
that the debtor may suffer if the chose in action were freely assignable.168 
He submits that a monetary debt is not of such a personal nature and the 
difficulties an assignment might cause a debtor are not serious.169 
 
He, regrettably, does not come to any express conclusions on whether or 
not legislation is needed in England, but he does mention that sound 
arguments can be raised both for and against such a solution, probably 
resulting in a polarisation of views.170  
 
                                                    
164 Allcock op cit 329-330.  Surely this must depend on whether the assignee was aware 
of the non-assignment clause?  If the assignee was aware of the non-assignment clause 
would an action for damages still arise? 
165 Allcock op cit 337-339.  From his examination it appears that the assignee is only 
deprived of some rights, viz, the right to claim performance from the debtor.  The 
assignee, however, does not lose the right to claim damages against the assignor. 
166 Allcock op cit 337-339. 
167 Allcock op cit 342.   
168 Allcock op cit 345. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Allcock op cit 346.  He does not, however, elaborate on the possible arguments that 
may be raised. 
 
 
 
 
 Even though Allcock does not say it expressly, it appears as though he 
favours the idea that debts should be freely assigned.  I say this because 
he discusses the position in America where legislation has been passed 
that renders ineffective any terms that prohibits the assignment of 
accounts.171  Further, he brings his article to a close by stating that: 
 
It will be interesting to see whether the suppliers of commercial 
credit in England can prompt legislation similar to that in America 
making all debts assignable regardless of any restriction.172   
 
Although these words do not strictly advocate the importation of legislation 
as a possible solution to the problem faced by factoring firms and finance 
houses, it is the closest thing to such an assertion that could be found in 
the writings of English academics. 
 
Since the decision in Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge 
Disposals Ltd, it seems as though the academics are more or less 
satisfied with the position as to the effect of an assignment made in 
contravention of a non-assignment clause. 
 
Burrows, who wrote in 1994, one year after the House of Lords’ decision in 
Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd, maintains that 
if rights are assigned contrary to a prohibition, the assignment will be 
invalid as against the debtor.173 
 
Relying on Tom Shaw & Co v Moss Empires Ltd and Linden Gardens 
Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd, Burrows adds that a prohibited 
assignment can still be effective as between assignor and assignee.174 
 
                                                    
171 Allcock op cit 345. 
172 Allcock op cit 346. 
173 AS Burrows Chitty on Contracts 27ed vol 1 (1994) 971. 
174 Burrows op cit 971-972. 
 
 
 
 
 Tettenborn,175 who welcomed the decision of the House of Lords, has said 
only that he favours the finding that a non-assignment clause is not 
against public policy.  He is of the opinion that legislation will do a better 
job of amending the law than the ‘blunt instrument of public policy’.176 
 
Wallace177 wrote on the ratio in Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta 
Sludge Disposals Ltd in the context of damages, but unfortunately did not 
have any new ideas to add to the issue of the effect of a prohibited 
transfer. 
 
Treitel’s account, which was written in 1995, is very brief.178  He states that 
if rights are assigned where the assignment is prohibited, not only would 
this amount to a breach of contract between the assignor and the debtor, 
but it would also be ineffective in that it would not give the assignee any 
rights as against the debtor.  He adds, however, that the contract may still 
be binding between the assignor and the assignee.179 
 
More recently, the account by Pettit, which was written in 2003, is also 
very brief. 180  He writes that an assignment made contrary to a contractual 
prohibition will make the assignment invalid as regards the debtor, but 
cannot operate to invalidate the contract as between the assignor and the 
assignee unless it is couched in the clearest of words.181 
 
 
 
                                                    
175 A Tettenborn ‘Loss, damage and the meaning of assignment’ 1994 Cambridge Law 
Journal (vol 53) 24. 
176 Tettenborn op cit 25. 
177 IND Wallace ‘Assignment of rights to sue: Half a loaf’ 1994 Law Quarterly Review (vol 
110) 42. 
178 Treitel op cit 610. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Pettit op cit 61. 
181 Ibid.  Although even then it may still be invalid on the grounds of public policy as held 
in Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge Disposals Ltd.   
 
 
 
 
 2.1.4 Conclusion 
 
It seems as though the issue in English law is no longer the subject of hot 
debate.  The earlier academics voiced their concerns in relation to the 
effect of non-assignment clauses in the commercial arena and hinted at a 
solution being found in legislation.  The hints have fallen on deaf ears, as 
no such legislation was enacted.   
 
Instead, it seems that the relief has come in the form of the authoritative 
decision from the House of Lords in Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta 
Sludge Disposals Ltd.  This long awaited elucidation on the issue as 
between private individuals in general contract is all good and well, but the 
ratio does not actually address or solve the problems in the commercial 
arena that academics earlier highlighted.  
 
What is striking is that not much has been written about this simple 
observation.  It begs the question whether all the English academics have 
given up striving for a more liberal state of affairs in the world of 
commerce?  Or have they just accepted that commercial entities will be 
stuck with the outcome of Linden Gardens Trust Ltd v Lenesta Sludge 
Disposals Ltd?   
 
Whatever the case may be, I am of the opinion that English law can offer 
little to assist South African law in overcoming the problems surrounding 
the pactum de non cedendo.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2.2 American law 
 
2.2.1 American law of assignment in general 
 
The early stages of the development of the law of assignment in the 
United States of America followed the same development as the English 
law of assignment as the American states received the English law as part 
of their common law.182   
 
The history of assignment thus followed the same pattern of being invalid 
at first, then experiencing a relaxation in the courts of equity (which were 
influenced by mercantile custom), after which statutes were passed with 
the effect that choses in action were assignable.183   
 
The only difference in the development is that different legislation was 
passed at slightly different intervals.  The legislation had the effect of 
relaxing the old common law rule which eventually resulted in assignments 
being effectual in law and allowing the assignee to sue in his own name.184   
 
Subsequently, the American Law Institute was formed, not to create new 
law, but to state the law as it already existed, in a document called the 
Restatements of Law.185  It was a codification of common law judge-made 
legal principles that developed over time through stare decisis and 
covered various areas of law including contracts, torts, property and 
agency.186  The Restatement of Contracts was published in 1923.  It had 
                                                    
182 EA Farnsworth Contracts 3ed (1999) 707. 
183 WHE Jaeger Williston on Contracts 3ed vol 3 (1960) 7-16; Farnsworth op cit 704-707; 
JE Murray Corbin on Contracts revised ed vol 9 (2007) 133-137.  
184 Farnsworth op cit 707. 
185 Http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Restatement (accessed on 27 January 
2009); http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/restatements_of_the_Law (accessed 27 January 
2009); http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/vlibrary/outlines/restatements.html (accessed on 27 
January 2009). 
186 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 the effect of setting out a single set of rules without distinguishing between 
law and equity.187   
 
By this time the assignment of choses in action was fully recognised at 
common law as it had made its way into the Restatements as an 
established legal principle accepted by judges without hesitation.  This 
was followed by the Second Restatement of Contracts in 1952 which 
refined and updated the rules as set out in the previous Restatement.188 
 
The Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter referred to as UCC) is another 
development unique to American law.  The UCC is a body of statutory law 
that governs certain types of contracts dealing with commercial 
transactions and payment.189  It was developed by the American Law 
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws.  These two organisations began drafting the UCC in the 1940’s.  A 
final draft was ready in the early 1950’s and it was finally enacted in the 
1960’s.190 
 
The UCC was created in the same spirit as the Restatements of Law as its 
purpose was to compile a single coherent document where all the legal 
principles on commercial transactions could be found.  Further, different 
laws had developed in different states which had the result of making 
cross-state commercial transactions complicated and risky.191   
 
The UCC thus endeavoured to unify the laws of commercial transactions 
across all the states of America.  Slowly but surely each state (except for 
one or two) adopted the code, with only some making alterations.  
                                                    
187 Farnsworth op cit 707.  See also footnote 20. 
188 Murray op cit 137. 
189 DE Litowitz Perspectives on the Uniform Commercial Code 2ed (2007) xi. 
190 Litowitz op cit xii-xiii. 
191 Litowitz op cit xiii. 
 
 
 
 
 Consequently, the United States of America has succeeded in unifying its 
commercial laws across the states.192 
 
The current position in America generally favours the free assignability of 
contractual rights, so much so that no formalities, not even writing, need to 
be complied with in order to effect an assignment.193 
 
2.2.2 Anti-assignment contracts 
 
In American law, like South African law and English law, certain rights are 
prohibited from being assigned, either because they are against public 
policy,194 or because they are prohibited by statute,195 or because they are 
of a personal nature (delectus personae).196  
 
American law also recognises pacta de non cedendo, although the 
terminology used is ‘an anti-assignment clause’ or ‘anti-assignment 
contract’.  The UCC as well as the Second Restatement of Contracts 
govern anti-assignment clauses.  The relevant provisions are as follows: 
 
• Regulation under the Uniform Commercial Code: 
 
o Article 2 of the UCC covers assignments of rights in contracts of a 
general nature.   Article 2-210(1)(a) of the UCC provides that such 
                                                    
192 Litowitz op cit xi. 
193 Murray op cit 147.  Formalities need only be complied with if prescribed by statute or a 
contractual provision.  See also DJ Brussel and EA Friedler ‘The limits on assuming and 
assigning executory contracts’ 2000 American Bankruptcy Law Journal  (vol 74) 321 333: 
‘But in modern times, responding to the needs of commercial society, courts and 
legislatures have not only abandoned the medieval common law presumption against 
assignment of contract rights, they have reversed it.  Today there is a strong presumption 
in favor of the free assignability of contract rights’. 
194 TL Leming ‘Assignments’ in American Jurisprudence 2ed vol 6 (2004) 186.  In some 
states a chose in action arising out of a tort cannot be assigned before judgment. 
195 Leming op cit 199.  The Uniform Consumer Credit Code states that buyer or lessee 
may not assign his earnings to a seller or lessor as payment or as security for payment of 
a debt arising from a consumer credit sale or a consumer lease.  
196 Leming op cit 170.  An agreement to render professional services, such as those 
rendered by a physician, a lawyer or an architect cannot be assigned. 
 
 
 
 
 anti-assignment clauses are valid.  Article 2 of the UCC, however, 
does not dedicate a section to the effect of an assignment in 
contravention of an anti-assignment clause when it appears in a 
general contract.  
 
o Article 9, a completely separate article, was created to govern 
assignments of a commercial nature, resulting in different law being 
applicable to different types of assignments.197  Article 9-406(d)(1) 
states that notwithstanding any agreement between the debtor and 
creditor (assignor) an anti-assignment clause will be ineffective if it 
prohibits assignment of an ‘account’ (as defined in the UCC), or if it 
prohibits the creation of a ‘security interest’ (as defined in the UCC),  
or if consent is required to effect an assignment of such an account 
or required to create such a security interest.  
 
• Regulation under the Restatement of Contracts: 
 
The Restatement of Contracts also covers assignments of rights in 
contracts of a general nature. 
 
o Section 332(1) of the Second Restatement of Contracts provides 
that unless the circumstances indicate the contrary, a contract term 
purporting to prohibit assignment of ‘the contract’ is construed as 
prohibiting the delegation of performance of a duty or condition and 
does not prohibit the transfer of rights.198 
 
o Section 332(2)(b) states that if a contract prohibits the assignment 
of rights and a contracting party assigns the rights regardless of the 
prohibition, then, unless a different intention is manifested, the 
                                                    
197 See below for a further discussion regarding anti-assignment clauses appearing in 
commercial contracts.  It is interesting to note that South African law does not distinguish 
between general or commercial cessions.  See generally PM Nienaber ‘Cession’ in 
LAWSA 2ed vol 2 (2003); S Scott The Law of Cession 2ed (1991).   
198 Restatement of the Law (Second):  Contracts 2ed vol 3 (1981) 31-32. 
 
 
 
 
 debtor is entitled to damages for breach of the contract, but the 
breach does not render the assignment ineffective.199  
 
o Section 332(2)(c) states that a contract prohibiting the assignment 
of rights is for the benefit of the debtor and, unless a different 
intention is manifested, the assignee is not prevented from 
acquiring rights against the assignor, nor is the debtor prevented 
from rendering performance as if there were no prohibition.200   
 
Thus, the effect of an assignment in contravention of an anti-assignment 
clause is that ownership of the right passes to the assignee, forcing the 
debtor to perform to a stranger and leaving him only with a claim for 
damages against the assignor.201  This, however, may not be the situation 
if the contract indicated that the intentions of the parties were otherwise. 
 
The position seems simple enough, yet there are differences in the 
opinions of American academics.  The more noticeable inconsistency is 
with regard to the lack of consensus at a judicial level concerning which 
interpretative approach should be adopted202 as can be seen from the 
following discussions.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
199 Restatement op cit 32. 
200 Ibid. 
201 Although s322(2)(c) seems to leave open the possibility of the debtor performing to the 
creditor (assignor) as per the original agreement regardless of the cession and the 
assignee would presumably have a right of action against the creditor (assignor) to 
recover such performance. 
202 See J Anderson ‘Contracts looking for “something”: Minnesota’s new rule for 
interpreting anti-assignment clauses in Travertine Corp. v. Lexington-Silverwood’ 2006 
William Mitchell Law Review (vol 32) 1435 1445 where she states that ‘the rule for anti-
assignment contracts is anything but consistent; the case law is filled with quirks and 
caveats that depend on the wording of the contract, any applicable statutes, and possibly 
public policies, apart from the general approach adopted by the state’. 
 
 
 
 
 2.2.2.1 General assignments 
 
2.2.2.1.1 The approach of the courts203 
 
In Allhusen v Caristo Construction Corp204 Caristo Construction was a 
general contractor which subcontracted Kroo Painting Company for the 
carrying out of certain painting work in New York City public schools.  The 
contract contained the following clause: 
 
The assignment by the second party [Kroo] of this contract or any 
interest therein, or of any money due or to become due by reason 
of the terms hereof without the written consent of the first party 
[defendant] shall be void.205 
 
Kroo Painting Company subsequently assigned ‘moneys due and to 
become due’ to it under the contract to Marine Midland Trust Company of 
New York, which in turn assigned the rights to Allhusen. When Allhusen 
attempted to claim the moneys owing under the contract for work done by 
Kroo Painting Company, Caristo Construction objected on the basis that a 
valid anti-assignment clause had been included in the agreement between 
it and Kroo Painting Company. 
 
In a unanimous judgment Froessel J pointed out that the effect of an anti-
assignment clause is an issue that ‘has troubled the courts’ in many 
jurisdictions.206  He further pointed out that the particular construction of 
                                                    
203 The older case law (before 1952) dealing with anti-assignment clauses has not been 
included in this discussion since much confusion existed as to their effect.  The general 
tendency of the courts during this time was to decide a case on a kind of ad hoc basis, 
where the reasons for the effect of an anti-assignment clause appear almost arbitrary and 
without any adherence to a general approach or theory.  It was only with the case of 
Allhusen v Caristo Construction Corp that a specific approach was adopted and 
subsequently followed by later courts.  Thereafter, other specific approaches or theories 
have been developed and followed.  Allhusen v Caristo Construction Corp and 
subsequent cases can thus be described as the case law reflecting the modern view and 
I have restricted my discussion accordingly.  See Anderson op cit 1439-1440; Murray op 
cit 213-214. 
204 303 N.Y 446 (1952) decided in the Court of Appeals in New York.   
205 Supra 499. 
206 Supra 450. 
 
 
 
 
 the anti-assignment clause in the provision in question had never in the 
past come before the court.207  
 
Froessel J explained that in the past anti-assignment clauses have been 
held to be a ‘personal covenant’ or a promise whereby the promisee 
obtains a right to claim damages should the promisor breach his 
promise.208  Alternatively, courts have often held that an anti-assignment 
clause is ‘ineffectual’ because unclear language has been used by the 
parties in the contract.209 
 
The judge, however, emphasised that these past decisions merely indicate 
that in the absence of clear language stating otherwise, a claim for 
damages arises in favour of the debtor.  He explained that an anti-
assignment clause may indeed be enforced so that an assignment in 
contravention confers no rights on the assignee, but the contract language 
would have to be clear in order for a court to adopt this interpretation.210  
He added that in casu, the words used by the parties were in fact clear. 
 
Froessel J held that: 
 
[W]hile the courts have striven to uphold freedom of assignability, 
they have not failed to recognize the concept of freedom to 
contract. In large measure they agree that, where appropriate 
language is used, assignments of money due under contracts 
may be prohibited. When ‘clear language’ is used, and the 
‘plainest words have been chosen’, parties may ‘limit the freedom 
of alienation of rights and prohibit the assignment’….  We have 
now before us a clause embodying clear, definite and appropriate 
language, which may be construed in no other way but that any 
attempted assignment…shall be ‘void’ as against the obligor [the 
debtor]. One would have to do violence to the language here 
employed to hold that it is merely an agreement by the 
                                                    
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid.  For the sake of clarity ‘ineffectual’ in this context means without effect.  Because 
the language of the parties is unclear, no effect can be given to a clause which may or 
may not amount to an anti-assignment clause.  
210 Supra 450. 
 
 
 
 
 subcontractor not to assign. The objectivity of the language 
precludes such a construction.211 [My emphasis] 
 
It can clearly be seen that the court distinguished between a restriction on 
the right to assign (the promise not to assign), where a contravention 
thereof would lead to damages for breach of contract; and a prohibition on 
the right to assign where the right becomes non-transferable.  Due to the 
latter being a restriction on the freedom of assignability, the contract would 
have to be couched in clear language. 
 
The approach adopted in Allhusen seems to have been followed in Pravin 
Banker Associates Ltd v Banco Popular Del Peru.212 Banco Popular was a 
bank owned by the Republic of Peru.  Peru had borrowed funds from 
various foreign financial institutions in order to aid the functioning of Banco 
Popular.  One of the foreign financial institutions from which Peru had 
borrowed was Mellon Bank, Pittsburgh, USA. 
 
Banco Popular was subsequently unable to pay back its debts and 
entered into various negotiations with its creditors.  Banco Popular and 
Mellon Bank agreed that the due date for repayment of the moneys 
borrowed was to be extended by 360 days (the so-called ‘Mellon Letter 
Agreement’).  The Mellon Letter Agreement contained the following 
clause: 
 
This letter agreement shall be binding upon you [Banco Popular], 
your successors and assigns, and shall inure to the benefit of us 
[Mellon], our successors, transferees and assigns. We [Mellon] 
may assign all or any part of our interest in this letter agreement 
to any financial institution.213 
 
Due to Banco Popular’s financial position it only managed to make interest 
payments to Mellon Bank.  Mellon Bank subsequently assigned the right to 
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 claim the debt from Banco Popular to Pravin Banker Associates Ltd.  
Initially Banco Popular began making interest payments to Pravin Banker, 
but later stopped payment altogether.  Pravin Banker made a demand for 
the principal debt and the unpaid interest, but the payment was still not 
forthcoming.   
 
Pravin Banker consequently instituted legal action and Banco Popular 
defended the action by arguing that the assignment to Pravin Banker was 
invalid on the basis that Pravin Banker was not a ‘financial institution’.214 
 
Referring to Allhusen, Calabresi J, who delivered the brief unanimous 
judgment declared that: 
 
[T]o reveal the intent necessary to preclude the power to assign, 
or cause an assignment violative of contractual provisions to be 
wholly void, [a contractual] clause must contain express 
provisions that any assignment shall be void or invalid if not made 
in a certain specified way.215  [My emphasis] 
 
Calabresi J explained that the language used in the Mellon Letter 
Agreement did not expressly restrict assignment in any manner.  It in fact 
expressly permitted assignment to financial institutions, but did not limit 
assignment to these entities.  An investigation into whether or not Pravin 
Banker was a financial institution was accordingly unnecessary and the 
assignment was held to be valid.216 
 
Although the Allhusen approach was followed in Pravin Banker a 
difference can be noted.  Both courts recognise the distinction between 
prohibiting the assignor’s right to assign and extinguishing his power to 
assign, but there appears to be a disparity in the interpretation thereof. 
 
                                                    
214 Ibid. 
215 Ibid. 
216 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 Froessel J was of the opinion that if the contract states that the assignor 
shall not assign and ‘clear language’ or the ‘plainest of words’ are used the 
assignor’s power to assign is contracted away and he can transfer nothing 
to the assignee.  Calabresi J, on the other hand, stated that if the power to 
assign was to be extinguished the clause must state that a contravention 
thereof would be ‘void’ or ‘invalid’.  Thus one judge was satisfied to 
extinguish the power to assign by general words provided they are clear 
and plain, but the other judge required the words ‘void’ or ‘invalid’ to 
appear in the contract. 
 
Herein lies the main problem experienced by the American courts:  The 
vast majority agree that a difference exists between restricting an 
assignor’s right to assign and his power to assign.  The courts further 
agree that both alternatives are valid and that the effect of the former is an 
action for breach of contract and the effect of the latter is that nothing 
would pass to the assignee, since the right would be rendered non-
transferable.  The debate surrounds the interpretation of the contract.   
 
Two interpretative theories have so far arisen:  Requiring general words as 
decided in Allhusen or requiring specific words as decided in Pravin 
Banker. 
 
Rumbin v Utica Mutual Insurance Co217 is a typical example illustrating 
judicial inconsistency, as judges of the same jurisdiction, deciding upon 
the same set of facts, favoured different interpretations.  
 
In this case Rumbin and Utica Mutual Insurance entered into a settlement 
agreement to resolve a personal injury claim whereby Rumbin was to 
receive a lump sum payment from Utica Mutual Insurance followed by a 
sequence of periodic payments over 15 years.  The structured part of the 
settlement agreement was funded by another insurance company, Safeco 
Life Insurance, by way of an annuity contract.  
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About six months after the conclusion of the settlement agreement 
Rumbin lost his employment and could not afford to pay the mortgage on 
his home.  As a solution to his financial difficulties, he assigned his right to 
the remaining annuity payments under the settlement agreement to JG 
Wentworth.  
 
Safeco objected to the assignment, inter alia, on the basis that the annuity 
contract contained a clause stating that ‘[n]o payment under this annuity 
contract may be… assigned…in any manner by the [plaintiff]’.218  
 
The appeal was decided by five judges, two agreeing with the majority 
judgment delivered by Vertefeuille J and one agreeing with the minority 
judgment handed down by Norcott J. 
 
Relying on the Second Restatement of Contracts, Vertefeuille J stated that 
parties may make use of express language in a contract to limit 
assignments and such anti-assignment clauses would generally be upheld 
by the courts.219  He explained that: 
 
In interpreting antiassignment clauses, the majority of jurisdictions 
now distinguish between the assignor's ‘right’ to assign and the 
‘power’ to assign (modern approach). For example, in Bel-Ray 
Co. v. Chemrite (Pty.) Ltd., 181 F.3d 435, 442 (3d Cir.1999), the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recognized 
that numerous jurisdictions followed the general rule ‘that 
contractual provisions limiting or prohibiting assignments operate 
only to limit [the] parties' right to assign the contract, but not their 
power to do so, unless the parties manifest an intent to the 
contrary with specificity….  The court acknowledged that 
contracting parties could limit the power to assign by including an 
assignment provision [that] generally state[s] that nonconforming 
                                                    
218 Supra 529.  It must be stated for the sake of completeness that Utica Mutual 
Insurance was cited as a party to the case, but it was the structured part of the settlement 
agreement that was assigned – the part that was funded by Safeco.  Further, Utica 
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Utica Mutual Insurance also did not challenge the appeal nor was it a party thereto; 
hence Safeco appealed the decision of the court a quo. 
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 assignments (i) shall be ‘void’ or ‘invalid,’ or (ii) that the assignee 
shall acquire no rights or the nonassigning party shall not 
recognize any such assignment.’ Id., at 442. Without such 
express contractual language, however, “the provision limiting or 
prohibiting assignments will be interpreted merely as a covenant 
not to assign.... Breach of such a covenant may render the 
assigning party liable in damages to the non-assigning party. The 
assignment, however, remains valid and enforceable against both 
the assignor and the assignee. 220  
 
Vertefeuille J dedicated about four and half pages of his judgment to citing 
case law and quoting the relevant extracts that supported his view.  A 
quotation of note was from Pravin Banker Associates Ltd where it was 
held that to preclude the power to assign, a contractual clause must 
expressly state that an assignment in contravention would be ‘void’ or 
‘invalid’.221  Pro Cardiaco Pronto Socorro Cardiologica, SA v Trussell,222 
was also referred to where the court held that ‘assignments are 
enforceable unless expressly made void’.223 
 
This approach, which Vertefeuille J called the ‘modern approach’ has 
apparently been adopted by the ‘majority of jurisdictions’ in the courts of 
America as a result of its ‘evenhandedness’.224  The modern approach, he 
argued, allows for assignability of rights together with full protection of the 
debtor by way of damages should he suffer a loss.  Should the parties 
have a different intention the right may be rendered non-transferable and 
an assignment in contravention of an anti-assignment clause would be 
ineffective.225   
 
The judge pointed out that the modern approach is not adopted by some 
courts, where anti-assignment clauses are upheld if a general intention to 
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221 Supra 532. 
222 863 F.Supp.135 138 (1994). 
223 Supra 532.  
224 Supra 534. 
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 restrict or prohibit assignment has been ascertained.226  He was in 
agreement in so far as that parties are free to contract to exclude 
assignment if ‘appropriate contractual language’ is used.227   
 
The judge, however, did not agree as to the contractual language that 
must be employed to exclude assignment.  For the power to assign to be 
extinguished he was of the opinion that very specific language must be 
used – that is – the parties must actually stipulate that an assignment in 
contravention would be ‘void’, ‘invalid’ or ‘otherwise ineffective’.228  A 
prohibition in general terms would not be sufficient and would in his 
opinion only restrict the right to assign leading to an action for damages.229   
 
Due to the fact that the anti-assignment clause in the annuity contract was 
couched only in general terms: ‘[n]o payment under this annuity contract 
may be… assigned…in any manner by the [plaintiff]’, Vertefeuille J 
decided that only the right to assign was restricted and the power to 
assign had not been extinguished, as no express language in accordance 
with the modern approach had been used.230   
 
Consequently, the assignment by Rumbin to Wentworth was valid and 
enforceable and Safeco was invited to sue Rumbin for any damages that it 
may have sustained as a result of the breach of the anti-assignment 
clause.231   
 
In the minority judgment, Norcott J recognised that contractants may 
validly agree to limit free assignability, but held that the majority did not, 
                                                    
226 Supra 533. 
227 Ibid. 
228 Supra 533 read with 532 and all the cases relied on therein, inter alia, Jacquette v 
CNA Insurance Cos, civil action 98-1601 (N.H.P) (D.N.J November 16, 1998) 
[unreported].  
229 Supra 533.  According to Vertefeuille J a prohibition in general terms would be, for 
example, ‘[i]nterest in this policy may not be assigned without our written consent’. 
230 Supra 535. 
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 inter alia, strictly adhere to the Second Restatement of Contracts.  He 
explained that the default position in the Restatements is that an 
assignment contrary to an anti-assignment clause would give rise to 
damages ‘unless a different intention is manifested’. The debate thus 
involved an interpretation of this intention. 232  
 
Norcott J acknowledged that such an intention can either restrict the right 
to assign or extinguish the power to assign and had no quarrel as to the 
effect of each alternative.  He, however, did not agree with the 
interpretative standard that the majority used in order to determine into 
which category the contractants’ intention falls.233  According to the judge: 
 
[T]hat standard imposes on contracting parties an illogical and 
arbitrary set contractual mantra that must be recited…234  
  
The judge, while admitting that cases supporting the majority view do 
exist, pointed out that there were also many cases which supported his 
view.  He also dedicated some time to consider the ratio of these cases.  A 
case of note that did not insist on the use of particular phraseology, but 
which upheld the anti-assignment clause where the language used by the 
parties was clear and unambiguous was Henderson v Roadway 
Express,235 where it was explained that ‘the plain language… clearly 
indicates that the parties intended to forbid [assignment of the rights]’.236  
Portland Electric & Plumbing Co. v Vancouver237 was another case 
illustrating this, where it was held that: 
 
[w]hen a contract prohibits assignment in ‘very specific’ and ‘unmistakable 
terms’ the assignment will be void against the obligator [the debtor].238 
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233 Supra 537. 
234 Ibid. 
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236 Supra 538. 
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Norcott J explained that ‘at the heart’ of the rule of freedom of contract is 
that different parties may employ different language to express their 
intentions, but provided such language is clear, a court is bound to enforce 
such intentions.239  He added that the imposing of ‘formulaic restraints’ on 
the contract language which some courts do and which the majority has 
done ‘flies in the face of decades of our jurisprudence’.240   
 
The judge therefore concluded that the words of the anti-assignment 
clause in the annuity contract were ‘sufficiently clear’ and ‘unambiguous’ 
so that the assignment to Wentworth in contravention thereof was 
ineffective.241  
 
Norcott J makes some good points, but he fails to address one issue.  By 
his own admission he finds favour with the view that an assignment can 
either restrict the right to assign or extinguish the power to assign and he 
agrees with the effect thereof.  He proceeds to explain that in order to 
extinguish the power to assign ‘formulaic’ or ‘contractual mantra’ (like the 
words ‘void’, ‘invalid’ or ‘ineffective’) need not be recited by the parties, 
they need only clearly and plainly express their intention that assignment 
is not to occur. 
 
How then, according to his approach, would the parties only restrict the 
right to assign?  If the parties need only employ general language to 
extinguish completely the power to assign, how much more general should 
their language be, or how should their intentions be couched only to 
restrict the right to assign?242   
                                                    
239 Supra 539. 
240 Ibid. 
241 Supra 540. 
242 The court in In re Kaufman 37 P.3d 845 (2001) decided by the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma provides a short discussion of the two different interpretative approaches thus 
far discussed and favours the Allhusen approach, or the approach adopted by the 
minority in Rumbin v Utica supra, but does not address this issue.  
 
 
 
 
  
In Bank of America, NA v Moglia243 yet a different interpretative approach 
was adopted.  In this case a company called Outboard Marine Corporation 
was bankrupt and in the process of being liquidated.  Among its assets, 
was a rather valuable asset worth 14 million US Dollars known as a ‘rabbi 
trust’.244  The trustee of Outboard’s bankrupt estate attempted to attach 
the assets under the rabbi trust for distribution amongst the unsecured 
creditors.   
 
The Bank of America, however, objected to this on the basis that, inter 
alia, the assets under the rabbi trust were assigned to it as security for 
credit which was extend to Outboard.  The trustee argued that the security 
assignment was void since the rabbi trust contained an anti-assignment 
clause:  ‘[Outboard] shall not create a security interest in the Trust Corpus 
in favour of the Executives, the Participants or any creditor’.245 
 
Posner J, delivering the unanimous judgment, recounted the Bank of 
America’s line of reasoning.  The bank argued that because the rabbi trust 
did not specifically state that the creation of a security interest in the 
assets would be void or ineffectual, the power to assign had not been 
extinguished.  Outboard could still validly assign the assets as security, 
although an action for damages would arise in favour of the creators of the 
trust.246  
 
To this the judge’s response was as follows: 
Nothing would have been added to the trust agreement but empty 
verbiage had it said ‘and not only is Outboard forbidden to create 
a security interest in these assets in favor of any creditor, but if it 
tries to do so its action shall be null, void, and of no effect.’ Of 
course, if Illinois required those magic words, as many states still 
do, see Rumbin v. Utica… and cases cited there, to rebut the 
                                                    
243 330 F.3d 942 (2003) decided by the Court of Appeals in Illinois.  
244 Supra 943. 
245 Supra 946. 
246 Supra 947. 
 
 
 
 
 presumption of nonassignability, then Bank of America could 
argue persuasively that it had relied on their absence when it 
signed the security agreement. But Illinois does not require 
them.247  [My emphasis] 
 
Posner J explained that Illinois follows the ‘modern view’ as expressed in 
the Second Restatement of Contracts where an anti-assignment clause is 
unenforceable against an assignee ‘unless a different intention is 
manifested’.248  ‘Magic words’ the judge held, are not required.  Relying on 
comment ‘c’ in the Restatement, he lastly added that: 
 
Where there is a promise not to assign but no provision that an 
assignment is ineffective, the question whether breach of the 
promise discharges the obligor's duty depends on all the 
circumstances.249 [My emphasis] 
 
Posner J accordingly considered ‘all the circumstances’ and the 
circumstance which convinced him on the outcome was that the 
alternative remedy would be damages for breach of contract.  He held that 
the anti-assignment clause should be upheld and that the Bank of America 
consequently had no security interest in the assets under the rabbi trust. 
 
It is interesting to note that the court in Bank of America v Moglia criticised 
the modern approach (as discussed in Pravin Banker and Rumbin v Utica) 
as being a ‘magic words’ approach and instead labelled its approach as 
the ‘modern view’.  Further, it can be seen that the court leans more in 
favour of the Allhusen or Rumbin v Utica minority approach than the now-
termed magic words approach.  
 
                                                    
247 Supra 948. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 This case, like many of the others, relied on the Second Restatement of 
Contracts, except Posner J specifically mentions comment c.250  Comment 
c reads as follows: 
 
The rules stated in this Section do not exhaust the factors to be 
taken into account in construing and applying a prohibition against 
assignment.  ‘Not transferable’ has a clear meaning in a theatre 
ticket; in a certificate of deposit the same words may refer to 
negotiability rather than assignability.  Where there is a promise 
not to assign but no provision that an assignment is ineffective, 
the question whether breach of the promise discharges the 
obligator’s duty depends on all the circumstances.251  [My 
emphasis]    
  
It appears that the Illinois approach or so-termed ‘modern view’ is in line 
with the guidelines of the Restatements, although the court may have 
narrowly construed the meaning of ‘all the circumstances’.  Was an action 
for damages as an alternative remedy, such a circumstance as envisaged 
in comment c?  Surely the circumstances referred to in comment c are the 
surrounding circumstances of the particular facts of the case, gathered not 
only from written agreements and documents, but also from witness 
testimony?  
 
To sum up, all the cases from Allhusen are seen as following a modern 
approach, since a distinction between restricting the right to assign and 
extinguishing the power to assign is clearly made, with both having a 
different effect.  The case law indicates judicial uncertainty as to the 
interpretative methods or approaches to be adopted when applying this 
modern approach.  Three interpretative approaches can be distinguished:   
 
First, the Allhusen approach or Rumbin v Utica minority where only 
general terms are sufficient to extinguish the power to assign, provided the 
general terms are plain, clear and unambiguous.  Secondly, the so-called 
                                                    
250 In the Restatements it is customary for there to be comments, examples and 
references to decided cases to illustrate the functioning or meaning of the various 
sections. 
251 Restatement op cit 33. 
 
 
 
 
 ‘magic words’ approach where the power to assign is only considered to 
be extinguished if specific words are used, for example, that an 
assignment in contravention would be ‘void’, ‘invalid’ or ‘of no effect’.  
Thirdly, the approach used by the court in Illinois in Bank of America v 
Moglia, the so-called ‘Illinois approach’, where such a strong emphasis 
should not be placed on specific words used or not used by the parties, 
and all the surrounding circumstances and factors need to be taken into 
account when determining whether or not the power to assign has been 
extinguished.    
 
2.2.2.1.2  Academic opinion 
 
It has been noted that anti-assignment contracts have caused confusion 
over the years stemming from the ratio of the older cases. 252  As opposed 
to these outdated principles, the modern law of assignment favours the 
free assignability of rights and frowns on restrictions or prohibitions 
thereof.253  Parties may, of course, agree to prohibit assignment, but such 
agreements are usually narrowly construed.254 
 
Academics have pointed out that American courts, relying on the Second 
Restatement of Contracts, have distinguished between two categories of 
anti-assignment clauses.  Either an anti-assignment clause has an ambit 
only wide enough to create a duty not to assign by the assignor making a 
promise to that effect, or the ambit may extend further to the assignor 
completely surrendering the power to assign.255   
 
                                                    
252  Murray op cit 213. 
253 Murray op cit 214.   
254 Murray op cit 214.  See also Farnsworth op cit 717 and footnote 28.  He uses the case 
of Munchak Corp v Cunningham 457 F.2d 721 (1972) as an example.  In this case a 
contract of a professional basketball player prohibited the club from assigning its rights to 
another club without the basketball player’s consent.  The club subsequently assigned its 
rights to another owner of the club.  On determining the validity and effect of the 
assignment, the court held that the anti-assignment clause did not prevent the club from 
assigning its rights to another owner of the same club. 
255 Murray op cit 215.  See also Anderson op cit 1440-1442. 
 
 
 
 
 Although this approach to anti-assignment clauses is the general 
approach that all courts use, when using this approach, the courts have 
shown inconsistency when deciding if an anti-assignment clause 
sufficiently manifests an intention to relinquish the power to assign, or 
whether it merely constitutes a duty not to assign.256 
 
It has rightly been observed that perhaps fault is not to be found with the 
courts in its inconsistency in applying different interpretative approaches, 
as the Second Restatement of Contracts only speaks of ‘unless a different 
intention is manifested’257 and that: 
 
It is unclear what kind of evidence should be required to 
demonstrate the manifestation of a different intention. In 
particular, a question exists whether attention should be focused 
primarily on the precise language of the clause at issue - drawing 
very fine distinctions among, for example, clauses that merely 
state that assignments are ‘prohibited’, clauses that instead 
describe assignments as ‘void’ or ‘invalid’, and clauses which may 
specify that non-assignment is a condition precedent of the 
obligor's duties - or instead should be focused more upon the 
circumstances surrounding negotiations and the light they shed 
upon probable intentions of the parties.258 
 
Further, each interpretative approach may be criticised for different 
reasons.  The Allhusen or Rumbin v Utica minority approach has been 
criticised for not being realistic enough.259  
 
Regardless of the criticisms and shortcomings of this approach, it is 
apparently a very popular and frequently-used approach.260  
 
                                                    
256 Anderson op cit 1442. 
257 GS Crespi ‘Selling Structured Settlements: The Uncertain Effect of Anti-Assignment 
Clauses’ 2001 Pepperdine Law Review (vol 28) 787 799. 
258 Crespi op cit 799-800. 
259 Notably by G Gilmore ‘The commercial doctrine of good faith purchase’ 1954 Yale Law 
Journal (vol 63) 1057 1119, where Gilmore stated that this approach is ‘a monument to 
the purest type of conceptualism, untainted by a breath of the workaday world’. 
260 Anderson op cit 1441.  See Chapter 6 for a further discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 The ‘magic words’ interpretative approach has been said to give effect to 
s332(2)(b) of the Second Restatement of Contracts, as that subsection 
begins by stating ‘unless a different intention is manifested’.  Accordingly, 
if the magic words are used, then such a different intention has been 
manifested.261 
 
This approach has also met with some criticism,262 and one such objection 
has been that a court should not interpret an anti-assignment clause solely 
by looking at ‘fine verbal distinctions’ of the contract language.263  Often 
anti-assignment clauses are standard clauses and not ‘individually 
tailored’ to the parties, neither are these standard clauses meaningful to 
the ‘particular circumstances’ of the parties.264   
 
From an American law perspective I would imagine the magic words 
approach to be a clear, certain and simple approach.  If the parties intend 
the assignment to be ineffective they include the magic words, if they 
intend the assignment to constitute merely a breach giving rise to 
damages, then they do not include the magic words.  The only problem I 
foresee is that parties who are ignorant of this would be forced to bear 
consequences that they did not intend or agree to.265  
 
The ‘Illinois approach’ as discussed in Bank of America v Moglia, which is 
said to express the modern view, follows the Second Restatement of 
Contracts exactly.  Magic words are not required and a ‘different intention’ 
being present depends upon all the circumstances.266 
 
                                                    
261 Murray op cit 216.  See also footnote 15. 
262 As can be seen from the cases, Bank of America v Moglia described the magic words 
approach as ‘empty verbiage’ and consequently rejected it.  The minority in Rumbin v 
Utica described the magic words approach as an ‘illogical and arbitrary set of contractual 
mantra’ and as imposing ‘formulaic restraints on contract language’. 
263 Crespi op cit 815. 
264 Crespi op cit 815-816. 
265 See Chapter 6 for a further discussion. 
266 Murray op cit 216-217. 
 
 
 
 
 This is probably the more flexible approach as it views the situation 
holistically and is guided not only by the words or contract language used 
by the parties, but also by the surrounding circumstances.267   
 
Murray’s comments on the general position as can be seen in the 
following passage: 
 
The case law reflects an accommodation of the tensions between 
a strong policy of free assignability and the classic desire to fulfil 
the intention of the parties by a traditional common law approach 
of insisting upon clear manifestations of intention in the form of 
contract language if the favored policy of avoiding restrictions on 
assignments is to be overcome.268   
 
Similarly, Anderson holds the view that: 
 
In general, restraints on alienation, such as assignments, are 
disfavored because they increase transaction costs, keeping 
property out of the hands of the user to whom it is most valuable.  
Because the obligor [the debtor] is unlikely to incur extra expense, 
the modern approach of enforcing assignments unless the parties 
expressly agreed to invalidate them makes economic sense….  
[T]he modern approach [in general, that is, without any specific 
interpretative approach] allows contracting parties who truly 
believe they would be disadvantaged by an assignment to bargain 
for and enforce an anti-assignment clause. The modern approach 
does not infringe on the parties’ freedom to contract, it executes 
what the parties literally agreed.  On occasion, the rule might 
upset the expectations of obligors [debtors] who believed the 
other party did not have the power to assign the contract, but if 
the obligor [debtor] actually suffered any injury, those damages 
still would be recoverable.269 
 
2.2.2.2 Commercial assignments 
 
2.2.2.2.1 The approach of the courts 
 
                                                    
267 See Chapter 6 for a further discussion. 
268 Murray op cit 217. 
269 Anderson op cit 1461-1462. 
 
 
 
 
 One may have though that American courts would have objected to article 
9-406(d)(1) of the UCC, as parties are stripped of their freedom of 
contract.  This, surprisingly, is not the situation.  From the case 
discussions that follow it will be seen that article 9-406(d)(1) has been well 
received by the American courts and they have been eager to clarify its 
operation and praise its overall purpose.   
 
In CGU Life Insurance Co of America v Metropolitan Mortgage & 
Securities Co,270 Mr and Mrs Lytle entered into a settlement agreement 
with Home Insurance Co (acting on behalf of DP Eddy and Delaney 
Moving Inc) whereby they were to receive an immediate lump sum and 
period payments over a certain time span.  In terms of the settlement 
agreement Home Insurance Co had the right to effect a qualified 
assignment of its liability to make the period payments to CGU Annuity 
Service Corporation.  CGU Annuity Service Corporation, in turn, was 
entitled to purchase an annuity policy from CGU Life Insurance Company 
of America in order to fund its obligation.  
 
Although Home Insurance Co was entitled to make an assignment under 
the settlement agreement, Mr and Mrs Lytle were not permitted to do so: 
 
Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Periodic Payments cannot be 
accelerated, deferred, increased or decreased by the Plaintiffs or 
any Payee; nor shall the Plaintiffs or any Payee have the power to 
sell, mortgage, encumber, or anticipate the Periodic Payments, or 
any part thereof, by assignment or otherwise.271    
 
About a year after the settlement agreement was concluded the Lytle’s 
experienced some financial difficulties and they required an immediate 
lump sum.  They consequently assigned the right to claim some of the 
periodic payments to Woodbridge Sterling Capital LLC, which 
subsequently assigned its rights to Metropolitan Mortgage & Securities Co. 
 
                                                    
270 131 F.Supp.2d 670 (2001) decided in the District Court in Pennsylvania. 
271 Supra 673. 
 
 
 
 
 Sometime thereafter the Lytle’s stopped forwarding the periodic payments 
to Metropolitan and the company took legal action.  The court a quo held 
that the assignment was valid and enforceable and ordered that 
Metropolitan was entitled to collect the payments due and owing directly 
from CGU Life Insurance Company of America. 
 
CGU Life Insurance Company of America appealed the decision on the 
basis that the assignment to Woodbridge and then to Metropolitan was 
invalid due to the anti-assignment provision contained in the settlement 
agreement.  Metropolitan, on the other hand, argued inter alia that the 
assignment to it should be upheld since the anti-assignment clause in the 
settlement agreement was unenforceable under the Uniform Commercial 
Code. 
 
Joyner J, who delivered the decision in this case, reflected on article 9-
318(4) of the UCC: 
 
A term in any contract between an account debtor and an 
assignor is ineffective if it prohibits assignment of an account or 
prohibits creation of a security interest in a general intangible for 
money due or to become due or requires the consent of the 
account debtor to such assignment or security interest.272 
 
CGU Life Insurance Company of America asserted that certain 
transactions are excluded from the application of article 318(4), one being 
when an interest or claim in or under an insurance policy is transferred, 
barring, however, the transfer of the proceeds thereof.273 
 
The judge pointed out that article 9-104 of the UCC excludes about 12 
types of transactions and such exclusions could broadly be categorised as 
follows:  Firstly, transactions subject to ‘overriding governmental interests’.  
                                                    
272 Supra 676-677.  This section is replaced by article 9-406(d) in the revised version of 
the UCC.  The corresponding provision in Pennsylvania law is 13 Pa.C.S.A s9318(d). 
273 Supra 677.  Article 9-104 [9-109(d)(8) of revised UCC] equivalent to13 Pa.C.S.A 
s9104(7). 
 
 
 
 
 Secondly, transactions which are ‘nonconsensual’ and thirdly, transactions 
which are ‘out of mainstream commercial financing’.274  [My emphasis]  
 
The judge held that the transaction in this case fell into the third category 
of exclusions and it was thus only necessary to determine whether it could 
be argued that the period payments could be construed as ‘proceeds’.  
The period payments to which the Lytle’s were entitled were originally 
funded by a liability insurance policy, where consent had then been given 
to fund under an annuity policy after an assignment had occurred.  In 
terms of applicable Pennsylvania law,275 although the Lytle’s had an 
interest under the insurance policy, no security interest in the payments or 
annuity existed.  It was for this reason that Joyner J concluded that the 
periodic payments did not amount to the meaning of ‘proceeds’.  The anti-
assignment clause was accordingly not rendered ineffective by the article 
9 of the UCC. 
 
Notwithstanding the exclusions in the other two categories, the third 
category of exclusions as mentioned by the court makes it patently clear 
what type of transactions article 9-406(d)(1) seeks to cover – it only affects 
a specific type of transaction.  Article 9-409(d)(1) will not feature in a 
transaction between parties where ‘mainstream commercial financing’ is 
not the focus.  
 
This sentiment was unmistakably echoed in Riley v Hewlett-Packard 
Co.276  In this case Clover Technologies Inc and Hewlett-Packard entered 
into a sub-contractor agreement whereby Clover Technologies was to 
provide labour, materials and technical services to Hewlett-Packard.  The 
contract contained an anti-assignment clause that read as follows: 
                                                    
274 Supra 677. 
275 Supra 677, 13 Pa.C.S.A s9306(a):  ‘…whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, 
collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by reason of 
loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds except to the extent that it is payable to a 
person other than a party to the security agreement. Money, checks [cheques], deposit 
accounts and the like are “cash proceeds”. All other proceeds are “noncash proceeds”.’ 
276 36 Fed.Appx. 194 (2002) decided in the Court of Appeals in Michigan. 
 
 
 
 
  
Unless otherwise agreed in writing by HP, Subcontractor shall not 
assign its rights or delegate its responsibilities under this 
Agreement. Any purported assignment or delegation by 
Subcontractor, including the attempted subcontracting of all or 
any portion of the work to provided [sic] under this Agreement, 
shall be null and void.277 
  
During the existence of the subcontract, disputes arose as to whether 
Hewlett-Packard was liable to pay for certain work performed by Clover, as 
Hewlett-Packard argued that some of the work carried out was beyond the 
scope of their agreement.  
 
Sometime during this dispute, Riley, the majority shareholder, sold Clover 
to Ameritech.  The uncollected accounts receivable were assigned to 
Ameritech as part of the purchase.  The parties agreed that any accounts 
receivable not collected within 15 months would be re-assigned to Riley. 
 
After this time had elapsed the Hewlett-Packard accounts receivable 
remained uncollected due to the dispute that existed before Clover was 
sold, and the accounts receivable were re-assigned to Riley.  Riley 
subsequently sued Hewlett-Packard for payment, yet Hewlett-Packard, 
relying on the anti-assignment clause, objected to liability.   
 
The court held that the anti-assignment clause had clearly been violated 
and the only remaining issue was whether there was anything in law that 
would render it unenforceable.  Riley argued, inter alia, that the anti-
assignment clause was invalided by article 9-318(4) of the UCC.  The 
court thus had to determine whether the anti-assignment clause fell within 
the ambit of article 9.278 
 
                                                    
277 Supra 194-195. 
278 This section is replaced by article 9-406(d) in the revised version of the UCC.  The 
equivalent section in Michigan law is Mich. Comp. Laws s440.9318(4). 
 
 
 
 
 Upon recounting article 9-318(4) of the UCC, the court pointed out that an 
anti-assignment clause will be rendered ineffective if the assignment of an 
account is prohibited or if the creation of a security interest in a general 
intangible is prohibited, or if consent is required to make an assignment or 
create a security.279   
 
Article 9-318(4) of the UCC is subject to certain exclusions which can be 
found in article 9-104.  According to the court, article 9-318(4) does not 
apply to a ‘sale of accounts’ or ‘chattel paper’ when they are sold as a part 
of a business.280  The court held that: 
 
The purpose of the…exclusions was to ensure that Article 9 did 
not become entangled with transactions that have nothing to do 
with commercial financing. The sale of accounts attached to the 
sale of a business differs widely from, for example, the sale of 
accounts to factoring companies that is the meat and drink of the 
accounts receivable market.281  [My emphasis] 
 
The court consequently came to the conclusion that the anti-assignment 
clause was not rendered ineffective by article 9-318(4) of the UCC. 
 
In Bank of America N.A. v Moglia,282 it will be remembered that Outboard 
Marine Corporation was bankrupt and there was a dispute between the 
trustee of the bankrupt estate and the Bank of America over certain assets 
under a so-called ‘rabbi trust’ which Outboard had assigned to the bank as 
security.  The rabbi trust, however, was subject to an anti-assignment 
clause, and in addition to other assertions, the Bank of America argued 
that the anti-assignment clause was ineffective due to article 9-406(d)(1). 
 
                                                    
279 Supra 196. 
280 Supra 197.  The exclusion being article 9-109(d)(4) under the revised version of the 
UCC.  The equivalent section in Michigan law is Mich. Comp. Laws s440.9104(f). 
281 Supra 197. 
282 Supra (discussed above). 
 
 
 
 
 Posner J remarked that this argument was ‘thoroughly frivolous’.283  Surely 
it was obvious to Bank of America that the rabbi trust could not be seen as 
an ‘account’ so as to bring it under article 9-406(d)(1) of the UCC?  The 
judge nonetheless took the opportunity to clarify the position as follows: 
 
Accounts and other simple written promises to pay are important 
collateral in modern commercial transactions, and their value as 
collateral is maximized by stripping them of encumbrances, such 
as an antiassignment clause unlikely to be noticed in the haste of 
transacting.284 
  
Posner J held that the trust was not the kind of instrument that could be 
brought under article 9-406(d)(1), and besides that, the trustee could not 
have been seen as Outboard’s debtor.   
 
The ‘frivolous’ argument of course failed, but this dictum confirms that 
American courts accept that anti-assignment clauses appearing in 
commercial transactions are ineffective. 
 
2.2.2.2.2 Academic opinion 
 
As mentioned above, article 2 of the UCC covers anti-assignment clauses 
concluded in contracts of a general nature.  Article 9 of the UCC covers 
anti-assignment clauses concluded in contracts of a commercial nature.  
The most common of these commercial contracts is the factoring contract.  
 
This occurs when the accounts of a business are ceded to a factoring 
house or finance company for the purpose of commercial financing or as 
security for a loan.  In other words instead of a business enforcing its own 
claims (‘book debts’ or ‘accounts’) against its debtors, it cedes them to a 
factoring house who immediately provides the business with a percentage 
of their face value.  In this way the business can obtain a quick source of 
finance.  The factoring house, now the owner of the accounts, 
                                                    
283 Supra 948. 
284 Supra 948-949. 
 
 
 
 
 consequently enforces them against the debtors for their full value thereby 
making a profit. 285   
 
Article 9 provides that no matter how clearly an anti-assignment clause is 
phrased in a contract falling within the ambit of article 9, it will be rendered 
ineffective.286  Murray notes that the American legislators have drafted 
article 9 in this manner as a ‘modern credit economy’ requires contractual 
rights to be freely assignable in order to function properly. 287 
 
Murray explains the situation as follows: 
 
When goods are sold to consumers or merchant buyers on credit, 
the seller has a contractual right called an ‘account’ that can be 
assigned.  An ‘account’ is defined as a right to payment of a 
monetary obligation, earned or not yet earned by performance, for 
property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, 
assigned, or otherwise disposed of, for services rendered or to be 
rendered, or for other obligations.288  Typical sellers have neither 
the means nor the expertise to finance the sales they must make 
on credit.  Sellers require funds to pay for their inventories and 
other expenses.  They are not in the finance business.  Their 
principal assets are accounts – the monetary obligations of their 
buyers that will mature over a certain period.  The sellers borrow 
money from commercial lenders to whom they provide their 
accounts as collateral to secure their repayment of the loans.  
                                                    
285 See Chapter 5 for a more detailed explanation of the definition and operation of the 
factoring contract.  See Murray op cit 219-220:  ‘The paradigmatic assignment of 
accounts under Article 9 is the sale of accounts to a “factoring” firm that buys accounts at 
a discount, thereby assuming the risks of delay or loss in their collection.  As the lifeblood 
of commercial financing, such factoring assignments of accounts are precisely the kind 
that may not be prohibited under Article 9.  Prohibiting assignments of the rights to 
accounts that are part of the sale of one’s business, however, does not interfere with 
commercial financing’.   
286 Farnsworth op cit 718; Murray op cit 218. 
287 Murray op cit 149. 
288 Murray op cit 149 footnote 4.  The other obligations include a right to payment for a 
policy of insurance issued or to be issued, a secondary obligation incurred or to be 
incurred, for energy provided or to be provided, for the use or hire of a vessel under a 
charter or other contract, obligations arising from the use of a credit or charge card or 
information contained on or for use with the card, winnings in a lottery or other state-
sponsored gaming, and health care insurance receivables.  The definition of ‘account’ 
does not include rights to payment evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument, 
commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, investment property, letters of credit or rights 
thereunder, or rights to payment for money or funds advanced or sold other than rights 
out of the use of a charge or credit card.  See article 9-102(2).   
 
 
 
 
 They may grant security interests in these accounts to their 
lenders, but they will often sell (assign) these accounts.  Such a 
financing arrangement is often carried on for many years between 
the same parties.289 
 
Thus, an account, provided it falls within the definition of article 9, may not 
be prohibited from being assigned.  If an account is prohibited from being 
assigned, such an assignment is rendered ineffective by article 9-
406(d).290 
 
It has also been pointed out that should anti-assignment clauses 
applicable to factoring contracts or mainstream commercial financing 
transactions be enforced, it would have a ‘chilling effect’ on the economy 
as it would require an assignee to scrutinise each and every contract it 
acquires to determine if the rights thereunder are subject to anti-
assignment clauses.  This, it is argued, is impractical if rights are assigned 
in bulk. 291  It has been further argued that any loss which a debtor may 
suffer due to the violation of the anti-assignment clause seems not only 
preventable, but ‘highly speculative’ and ‘probably outweighed by the 
benefit’ of assignability.292 
 
Anderson makes the noteworthy observation that because American 
courts try to uphold anti-assignment clauses in the interest of giving effect 
to the intention of the parties, they will not willingly invalidate anti-
assignment clauses in the absence of legislation specifically invalidating 
the clauses.293  Thus article 9 does not have as its purpose the 
interference of anti-assignment clauses when appearing in contracts of a 
                                                    
289 Murray op cit 149-150. 
290 In the revised post-1999 version of the article 9-406(d) has replaced article 9-318(4). 
291 BD Hull ‘Symposium on revised article 1 and proposed revised article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Harmonization of rules governing assignments of right to payment’ 
2001 Southern Methodist University Law Review (vol 54) 473 483. 
292 Ibid. 
293 Anderson op cit 1444. 
 
 
 
 
 general nature.  An anti-assignment clause will only be ineffective due to 
article 9 under limited and specific circumstances. 
 
2.2.3 Conclusion 
 
American law differentiates between assignments involving general 
contracts, which are usually once-off transactions and assignments 
between business and factoring houses or finance companies, which 
serve a ‘continuous commercial financing purpose’.294   
 
The former is governed by the Second Restatement of Contracts and by 
Article 2 of the UCC.  Such anti-assignment clauses are usually valid and 
their effect depends upon which interpretative approach a court in a 
particular state prefers.  This uncertain variable matters little, as although 
none of the three approaches are perfect, all are workable and relatively 
equitable, and one can be confident that justice will prevail in every case, 
regardless of the approach adopted.  
 
The latter type of assignment is governed by article 9 of the UCC and is 
incapable of being prohibited or restricted in any way.  Such anti-
assignment clauses are accordingly invalid and ineffective.  The treatment 
of anti-assignment clauses in this instance is extremely fitting, as the 
commercial financing industry in America relies on assignment to function 
– without assignment the commercial financing industry would not exist.  It 
would be ludicrous, to say the least, to impede the very mechanism that 
drives this industry.   
 
The manner in which American law differentiates between the types of 
assignments and deals with them accordingly is very effective. 
 
Earlier it was mentioned that South African law does not distinguish 
between general and commercial cessions.  Perhaps the problems in the 
                                                    
294 Murray op cit 220. 
 
 
 
 
 South African law of pacta de non cedendo can be remedied by looking to 
American law.295  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
295 See chapter 6 for further discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE PACTUM DE NON CEDENDO THROUGH THE CASES 
 
In this Chapter the pactum de non cedendo as it appears in South African 
case law will be considered. 
 
3.1 Early South African cases 
 
The first case in South African courts dealing with a pactum de non 
cedendo was the case of South African Railways v The Universal 
Stores Ltd.296  In this case the Universal Stores sued the South African 
Railways for certain wages (including other wages not relevant to this 
discussion) that had been ceded to it by the employees of South African 
Railways.   
 
South African Railways argued that the Railway Board, acting under Act 
20 of 1908, passed certain regulations on 28 May 1912, which were 
published by the General Manager of South African Railways in the 
weekly circular of 21 June 1912.  These regulations prohibited railway 
employees from ceding their wages.  Act 20 of 1908 provided that:  
 
[T]he Board may from time to time make regulations not 
inconsistent with this Act with respect to, inter alia, the pay and 
the conditions of employment….297    
 
Curlewis J handed down the judgment.  After scrutinising the minutes of 
the Board’s meeting, Curlewis J held that the Board did not intend to make 
such a regulation as, if such a regulation had been intended, the minutes 
                                                    
296 1914 TPD 280. 
297 Supra 283. 
 
 
 
 
 would have been differently and more clearly worded.298  The cessions of 
wages to The Universal Stores were therefore valid.  
 
Curlewis J was, however, of the opinion that the prohibition of cession was 
a reasonable prohibition, as it protected the employer from conflicting 
claims in respect of employees’ wages and saved him from the 
‘inconvenience and annoyance’ that would accompany a large number of 
employees ceding their wages.299   
 
The prohibition was also considered to be in the interest of the employees, 
as it prevents imprudent employees, who earn very little, from getting into 
debt by being able to obtain credit through ceding their wages.300 
 
This case is the earliest known case that deals directly with a pactum de 
non cedendo.  It is interesting to note that the court makes reference to the 
‘interest requirement’ without referring to Sande and Voet.301  When 
passing comments on the interest requirement the judge merely seems to 
have drawn the remarks from common sense. 
 
3.2 The watershed case:   Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mines Estates Ltd 
 
In Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mines Estates Ltd,302 Mr Klein was employed 
by Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates on 27 August 1919.  Upon employment, Mr 
Klein signed a contract containing the following clause (clause 8):  
                                                    
298 Supra 284.  The minute in question read as follows:  ‘Powers of attorney, cessions, or 
other equivalent documents issued by railway servants.  Noted and approved 
recommendation by General Manager that the terms of Weekly Notice 425 of 16th April, 
1910, paragraph 6015, and Weekly Notice 432 of 21st May, 1910, paragraph 6145 be re-
issued to the staff employed in the Transvaal and Orange Free State Provinces.’ 
299 Supra 286 
300 Ibid. 
301 That is, that the pactum de non cedendo will be valid if the debtor (the employer in this 
case) can show that he has an interest in the prohibition.  In this case the interest would 
be preventing the inconvenience and annoyance that would accompany many employees 
ceding their wages.  See Chapter 4 for a further discussion on the interest requirement. 
302 1920 AD 600. 
 
 
 
 
  
Save as herein otherwise provided from and after the date of this 
agreement the employed except with the consent in writing of the 
management, may not, and he hereby undertakes not to cede or 
assign his right and claim to any wages or moneys due or to 
become due hereunder, and it is agreed that any wages earned 
by the employed, or money due to him under this agreement shall 
only be paid to the employed personally….303  
 
The only exception to this clause was if the employee was absent due to 
authorised leave of absence, illness or death. 
On 23 June 1919, before Mr Klein was employed by Van Ryn Gold Mines 
Estates, he ceded to Paiges, a general dealer, his salary or wages then 
due or which thereafter may become due, as security for a debt. 
On 5 September 1919 Paiges gave notice of the cession to Van Ryn Gold 
Mine Estates, but it invoked clause 8 and refused to recognise the 
cession.  Paiges consequently sued Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates in the 
magistrate’s court for the money ceded to him by Mr Klein, and was 
successful.  The magistrate was of the opinion that every right of action 
can be ceded and, if a cession occurs, the cessionary cannot be 
prejudiced by an ‘underhand’ agreement between the cedent and the 
employer.304  
3.2.1  The Transvaal Provincial Division 
Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates appealed to the Transvaal Provincial Division, 
which overturned the earlier judgment of the magistrate’s court and 
decided against Paiges.   
The majority judgment was given by Gregorowski J, with Curlewis J 
concurring and Wessels J dissenting.  
                                                    
303 Ibid. 
304 Supra 601. 
 
 
 
 
 Gregorowski J disagreed with the reasoning of the magistrate as the 
cessionary would, as a result of the cession, be put in a better position 
than that of the cedent and would be entitled to claim something other 
than that which was ceded to him.305  He continued to state that the 
‘underhand’ agreement:   
… is the only agreement under which the debtor is bound, and it 
is of this agreement that the cessionary has obtained the cession, 
it is part and parcel of what has been ceded to him.306  
 
The judge pointed out that Paiges did not object to clause 8 because it 
was prejudicial to him, but that stipulations such as clause 8 were illegal or 
against public policy.  Gregorowski J rejected this argument.  His reasons 
are threefold.   
First he argued, a pactum de non cedendo is not against public policy as 
the right of cession is a right that an employee may elect to exercise or not 
to exercise – it is a voluntary act that cannot be forced by a creditor and 
should an employee elect not to exercise this right, but to waive it instead, 
he is fully entitled to do so.307  He explained that: 
As a rule parties are free to contract as they please. The law 
permits perfect freedom of contract. Parties are left to make their 
own agreements, and whatever the agreements are the law will 
enforce them provided they contain nothing illegal or immoral or 
against public policy.308  
Gregorowski J could see no reason why an employer (the debtor) should 
be barred from concluding a pactum de non cedendo as contained in 
clause 8, as an employer can:  
…employ the workman or not as he pleases and surely he can 
engage him on his own conditions, and if the workman agrees, it 
                                                    
305 Ibid. 
306 Ibid. 
307 Supra 603. 
308 Supra 601. 
 
 
 
 
 is difficult to understand on what grounds a third person can 
interfere and complain and upset the terms of the contract and 
bind the employer in a manner in which the employer has 
expressly stipulated he should not be bound.309  
He substantiates this by adding that the cessionary still has all available 
remedies at his disposal, for instance the cessionary can sue the cedent 
and obtain a garnishee order from the court.310  
Secondly, according to the judge, a pactum de non cedendo is not against 
public policy because a cession would force the employer (the debtor) to 
endure the inconvenience of performing to the cessionary, a party with 
whom he did not contract and probably would never have contracted. The 
cession consequently ‘creates a privity [between the debtor and the 
cessionary] which did not previously exist’.311   
This inconvenience, as the argument went, can translate into a serious 
burden, especially if the employer employs a large number of workers.  
Further, the cessionary may turn out to be an unscrupulous person who 
causes disorder where disorder would not have otherwise occurred.312  
Thirdly, the judge continued, a pactum de non cedendo is not against 
public policy as it was not against public policy for the Government to put 
into place legislation preventing mine workers from ceding their wages.  
Further, it was similarly not against public policy for the Railway 
Department to pass bylaws which prevented the railway employees from 
ceding their wages.313  
Gregorowski J reasoned that if Government and the Railway Department 
could validly include a pactum de non cedendo into the employment 
contract of employees, then there is nothing to prevent large companies 
                                                    
309 Supra 603. 
310 Supra 602. 
311 Ibid. 
312 Supra 603. 
313 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 from doing the same since the benefit of the pactum de non cedendo in 
both cases would be the same.  He used the following quote from 
Curlewis J in South African Railways v The Universal Stores,314 as 
authority for this view: 
It does not seem an unreasonable provision that an employer 
shall stipulate that one of the conditions of the servant's 
employment will be that he shall receive his wages personally and 
the employer will not recognise any power to receive or any 
cession of such wages when the servant is able to attend and 
draw his wages in person.315  
 
The benefit of the pactum de non cedendo, as mentioned above, is not 
only for the employer, but also for the employee, in the form of protection.  
The judge stated that the pactum de non cedendo prevents the employee 
from losing interest in his job, as he would if he had already ceded his 
earnings before they were due; it protects the employee against 
improvidence at the hands of unscrupulous moneylenders; it protects the 
employee from obtaining credit to dabble in matters in which he cannot 
afford to dabble, like racing or gambling; and generally, it prevents the 
employee from overwhelming himself with avoidable debt.316        
 
After stating his reasons as to why the pactum de non cedendo was not 
against public policy, he turned to consider authority on the issue and 
noted that:  
 
…[t]here does not appear to be much authority upon the question 
in our law. I would imagine that the reason is that it was always 
accepted that a person could renounce a right in his own 
favour.317  
 
                                                    
314 South African Railways supra 286. 
315 Supra 604. 
316 Supra 603-604. 
317 Supra 604. 
 
 
 
 
 Fortunately, the lack of case law on the issue did not convince the judge to 
stop his investigation, as he turned to consider the common law writers.  
With reference to Sande De Prohibita Gregorowski J stated that:   
 
If therefore the person making the pact or stipulation has an 
interest in that the owner shall not alienate his own property, a 
pact to the effect that the property shall not be alienated is 
valid.318  
 
The judge summed up Sande’s words by concluding that:  
 
…[W]e cannot by pact take away from an owner the power of 
alienating his own property unless we have some interest in it.319   
 
Gregorowski J pointed out that on the facts of the case Van Ryn would 
have a very substantial interest in including a pactum de non cedendo in 
the contract.320 
 
He subsequently considered the English case of Brice v Bannister,321 
where Bramwell LJ explained the legal position as follows: 
 
It does seem to me a strange thing and hard on a man that he 
should enter into a contract with another and then find that 
because the other has entered into some contract with a third, he, 
the first man, is unable to do that which is reasonable and just he 
should do for his own good. But the law seems to do so, and 
anyone who enters into a contract with A must do so with the 
understanding that B may be the person with whom he will have 
to reckon – whether this can be avoided I know not; may be, if in 
the contract with A it was expressly stipulated that an assignment 
to B shall give no rights to him such a stipulation would be 
binding. I hope it would be.322  
                                                    
318 Ibid. 
319 Ibid. 
320 Ibid. 
321 [1878] 3 QBD 569 580. 
322 Supra 604. 
 
 
 
 
  
Gregorowski J concluded his investigation into authority on the issue by 
mentioning that he could not find any other references, although there did 
exist authorities that seemed to assume that a pactum de non cedendo 
would not be null and void.323   
 
He lastly mentioned the American case of William Barringer v Bes Line 
Construction Co324 and extracted the following quotation: 
 
The purpose for this statute (providing for assignment of contract) 
was not to prohibit parties from contracting that their contracts 
shall not be assignable. The intention of the statute and of similar 
statutes as they exist in other states is to remove the restriction of 
the common law rule upon choses in action which prevented their 
transfer, and to permit the assignee to maintain suit in his own 
name.325  
 
According to Gregorowski J this case illustrated that American courts have 
held that parties to a contract of service or other contract are not 
prevented from restricting the transfer of rights of action which are capable 
of being ceded.326  
 
Wessels J, who delivered the dissenting judgment in the Transvaal 
Provincial Division, held that there was no difference between the cession 
of wages and the cession of any other debt.327  The authorities do not 
distinguish between different kinds of debt, unless the element of 
personality is involved.  According to Wessels J, a claim for wages is no 
more personal than a claim for money that was lent or paid as rent.328   
                                                    
323 Ibid.  The judge did not mention these authorities and his failure to investigate them 
can be seen as a crucial shortcoming of the judgment. 
324 L.R.A 1909 vol 21 N.S 597. 
325 Supra 605-606. 
326 Supra 605. 
327 Supra 606. 
328 Supra 608. 
 
 
 
 
  
Consequently, when answering the question of validity of the pactum de 
non cedendo in respect of wages, the scope of the enquiry should be 
extended to cover the general question of whether any prohibition with 
regard to any debt would be valid.329  
 
Wessels J asserted that he could see no difference between a restraint on 
alienation of a corporeal and a restraint on alienation of an incorporeal, 
and submitted that he did not think that our law recognised a restraint on 
alienation where the restriction is not in favour of a particular person.330  
 
Relying on Sande De Prohibita331 he stated that: 
 
A pact entered into with the owner of property to the effect that he 
shall not alienate his own property is of no legal effect.332   
 
The judge then used the following passage from Sande De Prohibita333 as 
an explanation for the general rule: 
 
For there is no causa upon which such a pact can be supported: 
and utility which is the mother of all good and equity demand that 
those pacts shall not be valid which impede all commerce and 
take away from us without any consideration the use of our own 
property; so also we cannot by a pact take away from an owner 
the power of alienating unless we have some interest in it… From 
such an agreement therefore, that the owner shall not be allowed 
to alienate his property, even if the stipulation is a valid one, not 
even a personal action can arise.334  
 
                                                    
329 Supra 606. 
330 Ibid. 
331 4 1 1. 
332 Supra 607. 
333 4 1 1. 
334 Supra 607. 
 
 
 
 
 Wessels J is emphatic in his belief that no authority could support a finding 
that if a right of action was ceded contrary to a pactum de non cedendo, 
the cessionary would be unable to enforce his right against the creditor.335  
The more likely case would be that if the right was ceded contrary to the 
pactum de non cedendo, the cessionary would acquire the creditor’s right 
against the debtor and would enforce this claim against him as opposed to 
the creditor.336   
 
According to the judge, the provision that the creditor must claim 
personally from the debtor is not part of the debt itself, but rather a 
subsidiary right, which, if enforceable, could only give rise to damages at 
most.337  
 
From the above Wessels J abruptly concluded that:  
 
… [A]ccording to our law it is contrary to public policy to enforce a 
pact by which a person agrees not to alienate or cede part of his 
property. A fortiori therefore it would be contrary to public policy to 
prevent the cessionary of a debt, especially one who is ignorant of 
the fact that the cedent has contracted not to cede it, from 
recovering such debt from the debtor.338 
 
Wessels J then turned to consider English law and noted that the 
difference between South African law and English law was that where 
English law regards all pacta de non cedendo as valid, South African law 
regards all pacta de non cedendo as invalid and against public policy 
unless the pactum de non cedendo is in favour of a particular party.339 
 
                                                    
335 Ibid. 
336 Ibid. 
337 Ibid. 
338 Ibid.  Would the situation then be different if the cessionary was aware of the pactum 
de non cedendo? 
339 Supra 607. 
 
 
 
 
 Returning to discuss the position under South African law and relying on 
Voet and Sande as authority, Wessels J asserted that if a right to claim 
monies is ceded, once the monies become due, the rights and interests of 
the cedent cease.  The rights and interests are accordingly transferred to 
the cessionary who becomes the only person entitled to claim the monies.   
 
Further, a cession would still be completely valid even if the cession was 
made without the knowledge of the debtor, against his will or without 
giving him notice.340 
 
Using the above as a basis, Wessels J concluded that once wages have 
accrued to an employee, a cession of the wages will effect the passing of 
the right to claim such wages to the cessionary, regardless of the fact that 
the employer might object to the cession by reason of it being a breach of 
contract between the employer and the employee.341   
 
The judge continued to explain that if by ceding his wages, the employee 
breaches the contract that he concluded with his employer, the employer 
may have recourse to an action for damages against the employee,342 but 
a contractual prohibition of cession cannot deprive the cessionary of the 
right to claim the wages from the employer.343  
 
It is interesting to compare these conflicting judgments in the Transvaal 
Provincial Division.  It appears that Gregorowski J was of the opinion that 
a pactum de non cedendo is generally valid and not against public policy, 
                                                    
340 Supra 608.  It is interesting to note that a cession against the will of the debtor would 
be valid, but if the debtor’s will is evidenced in a pactum de non cedendo, a cession 
would be invalid (unless an interest exists). 
341 Supra 608. 
342 Supra 609. 
343 Supra 608.  Why did Wessels J not refer to the authorities who ‘seem to assume that a 
provision against assignment would not be null and void’ in support of his argument which 
Gregorowski J mentioned, but failed to investigate?  See Paiges supra 604 and footnote 
323. 
 
 
 
 
 yet Wessels J viewed a pactum de non cedendo as invalid and against 
public policy unless it is in favour of a particular person.   
 
Also, as to the effect of pacta de non cedendo, Wessels J argued that a 
cession contrary to the pactum de non cedendo would indeed transfer 
ownership of the right to the cessionary, leaving the debtor (the employer) 
with an action for damages for breach of contract.  Gregorowski J on the 
other hand, was of the opinion that a valid pactum de non cedendo had 
the effect of rendering the personal right non-transferable, thus resulting in 
the cessionary receiving nothing from the cession.  
 
3.2.2  The Appellate Division 
 
Paiges, having been unsuccessful in the High Court consequently 
appealed.  The unanimous judgment, in favour of Van Ryn Gold Mine 
Estates in the Appellate Division, was delivered by De Villiers JA. 
 
De Villiers JA held that there was no direct prohibition of pacta de non 
cedendo in Roman or Roman-Dutch law, so a finding that such pacta de 
non cedendo are invalid, must be based on a principle restricting the 
freedom of contract,344 or on a principle rendering it contrary to public 
policy.345 
 
De Villiers JA considered, first, whether a pactum de non cedendo can be 
rendered invalid due to a principle restricting freedom of contract.  In doing 
so he referred to Sande and Voet respectively:346  
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 [A]n agreement with the owner that he shall not alienate his own 
property, is without force (inutile), for the reason that the person 
who imposes the restriction has no interest in it.347  
 
And: 
 
 [A]greements which take away from the owner the free right of 
dealing with his property are of no effect.348 
 
The judge explained that the general rule, that pacta de non cedendo are 
invalid, only applies in cases where the debtor has no interest in the 
restriction.349  If, however, the stipulation can be shown to ‘serve a useful 
purpose’ to the debtor, it is valid and binding upon the parties to the 
contract.350 
De Villiers JA concluded that Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates had a ‘very real 
interest’ in the pactum de non cedendo.351  Following the ratio in South 
African Railways v The Universal Stores,352 the reason for this conclusion 
is that: 
 
[t]o a company employing numbers of workmen it may be a 
matter of serious concern whether it is only liable to its own 
workmen or whether it can be called upon by strangers to pay the 
workmen's wages. All kinds of difficult and complicated questions 
of law and of fact may arise, which in its own interests an 
employer might legitimately wish to avoid.353  
 
The answer, therefore, to the first enquiry is that pacta de non cedendo 
cannot be rendered invalid due to a principle restricting freedom of 
                                                    
347 Supra 615. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Ibid. 
350 Ibid.  Thus ‘an interest’ and a ‘useful purpose’ have been used synonymously.   
351 Supra 615. 
352 South African Railways supra 286. 
353 Supra 615.  One wonders exactly what these ‘complicated questions of law’ really are. 
 
 
 
 
 contract if the restriction is for the benefit of the party imposing the 
interest.  In this case the employer had a ‘very real interest’ so the pactum 
de non cedendo was not invalid on this basis. 
 
De Villiers JA considered, secondly, whether pacta de non cedendo are 
contrary to public policy.  He noted that the explanation put forward for this 
argument is that a pactum de non cedendo is ‘highly detrimental’ to the 
employee as ‘it places him at the mercy of the employer’ if he requires an 
advance on his wages.354   
 
The judge admitted that this argument does indeed carry some weight, but 
pointed out that the pactum de non cedendo may actually provide distinct 
advantages to the employee (as Gregorowski J before him also pointed 
out).355  In this regard he referred to the fact that the East and West India 
Companies imposed such a pactum de non cedendo on their employees, 
as well as the fact that legislation and by-laws were passed which 
prevented mine workers and railway employees from ceding their 
wages.356   
 
De Villiers JA was of the opinion that the advantage to the employee 
waters down the argument that the pactum de non cedendo is against 
public policy and balances the outcome in favour of enforcing the 
restraint.357  He continued, however, that the presence or absence of an 
advantageous gain to the employee by the inclusion of a pactum de non 
cedendo is not the conclusive answer to the question of whether the 
restraint is contrary to public policy.358   
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According to De Villiers JA, the answer was to be found in the fact that a 
court cannot declare an agreement that was freely entered into by the 
parties as contrary to public policy.359  Albeit large employing companies 
may abuse their contracting power by including certain terms, like a 
pactum de non cedendo, into an employment contract, this would be a 
matter for the legislator to address and not the court.360 
 
The answer, therefore, to the second enquiry is that a court cannot render 
pacta de non cedendo against public policy and thus invalid if the parties 
freely entered into a contract containing such a restriction, only the 
legislator may intervene to this extent.  An advantage or benefit of the 
pactum de non cedendo to the creditor (the employee), although not 
compelling, is apparently considered to be persuasive.  On this point the 
Appellate Division thus preferred the view of Gregorowski J in the court a 
quo.   
The facts of this case show that the parties freely entered into an 
employment contract which contained a pactum de non cedendo and the 
creditor himself also derived some benefit from the restraint, or so it was 
argued.  The pactum de non cedendo was thus not against public policy 
and was consequently not invalid on this basis either. 
 
De Villiers JA went on to state that a cession places the cessionary at 
most in ‘the shoes of the cedent’361 and albeit the cessionary may be 
prejudiced by a pactum de non cedendo of which he had no knowledge, 
the cessionary ‘can have no greater rights than the cedent himself has’.362     
 
De Villiers JA summed up this point as follows: 
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When the cedent [creditor] therefore has parted with the right to 
cede the debt, no other party can obtain any rights to it. The right 
which the creditor obtains, being circumscribed by the terms of his 
agreement with the debtor, becomes by the agreement between 
the parties a strictly personal right, and cannot be ceded.363 
 
In determining the effect of a cession in contravention of a pactum de non 
cedendo De Villiers JA relies on Windscheid, a German authority, as 
according to the judge ‘the question is not dealt with in the Roman law’.364  
The view of Windscheid and of the judge is that a cession in contravention 
of a pactum de non cedendo is void.365   
 
The reason for De Villiers’ JA opinion is evident from the following 
passage: 
 
The stipulation against cession is part and parcel of the 
agreement creating the right, and the right is limited by the 
stipulation.366 
 
In other words, a contract and the pactum de non cedendo included 
therein would be so closely linked that the one cannot be separated from 
the other.  The result is that the pactum de non cedendo is considered as 
an overarching stipulation which prevents the transfer of ownership, as the 
party benefiting from the pactum de non cedendo (the debtor) no doubt 
intended.   
                                                    
363 Ibid.  Has De Villiers JA not erred in this passage?  As a general rule all personal 
rights can be ceded, barring a few exceptions. 
364 Supra 616.  Of course the effect of a cession in contravention of a pactum de non 
cedendo was an issue not dealt with in Roman law – cession was a concept that was not 
recognised in Roman law and authority on the pactum de non cedendo was accordingly 
non-existent.  Surely what the judge meant to say was that the question is not dealt with 
in the Roman-Dutch law? 
365 Supra 617.  De Villiers JA mentions in passing that Seuffert, another German 
authority, has a different opinion, viz, that a cession in contravention of such a prohibition 
is not void. 
366 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
  
The pactum de non cedendo is thus not treated as a mere term of the 
contract, where ownership nevertheless passes to the cessionary and 
where the debtor is left with an action for damages, but the result is the 
personal right being rendered non-transferable.     
 
The approach that the Appellate Division adopted consequently enforces 
the fundamental purpose of including a pactum de non cedendo in a 
contract; as to do otherwise, the court probably reasoned, would result in 
cession-prohibiting-agreements that do not, in fact, prohibit cessions.   
 
In terms of this approach, it is the cessionary who suffers the loss of a right 
of action which he bona fide contracted to acquire and it is the cessionary 
who is forced to be satisfied with an action for damages against the cedent 
for breach of contract.  Once more, the Appellate Division confirmed the 
opinion of Gregorowski J in the court a quo, ignoring the view of Wessels 
J.   
 
Despite the fact that I have a different view to that of the Appellate Division 
regarding the validity and effect of pacta de non cedendo (which will be 
discussed in later Chapters), it is important to point out here already that 
the authorities upon which the court so heavily relies, are not properly 
adhered to.  
 
Sande clearly wrote that the jurists were undecided as to whether 
ownership passes to the cessionary, but expressly stated that the more 
correct view was that ownership did pass, leaving the debtor with an 
action for damages against the cedent.367   
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 Voet also wrote that ownership passes to the cessionary despite the 
inclusion of a pactum de non cedendo.  For Voet, the purpose of the 
pactum de non cedendo is to enforce that a person remains faithful to his 
promise, with an action for damages arising should he dishonour it.368  
 
Strangely enough the court in Paiges forsakes the views of Sande and 
Voet and prefers the writings of German authorities, even though Wessels 
J in the court a quo was of the opinion that the Roman-Dutch writers were 
worth adhering to. 
 
What is also surprising, as will be seen from the case studies that follow, is 
that none of the cases after Paiges challenged or even expressly 
questioned the Appellate Division’s failure to properly adhere to the 
principles laid down by Sande and Voet. 
 
3.3 Cases after Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mines Estates Ltd 
 
In the case of Northern Assurance Company Ltd v Methuen,369 a 
Southern Rhodesian case, Franco and Baglietto carried on business as 
motor transporters and insured their vehicles with Northern Assurance 
Company.  The insurance policy contained a third party risk clause in 
respect of accidental bodily injury caused to any person caused by the 
insured vehicles.   
 
Mr Methuen was fatally injured by one of the insured vehicles and his 
widow was successful in an action for damages against Franco and 
Baglietto.  The latter ceded to Mrs Methuen their rights under the contract 
of insurance so that she could claim her damages from Northern 
Assurance Company.   
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 Northern Assurance Company refused to recognise Mrs Methuen’s claim 
and argued that the cession was not valid on the basis of clause 14 
contained in the insurance policy.  Clause 14 read as follows:   
 
Nothing contained herein shall give any rights against the 
Company to any person other than the insured, and the Company 
shall not be bound by any passing of the interest of the insured 
otherwise than by death, unless and until the Company shall by 
endorsement hereon declare the insurance to be continued.370   
 
The issue, inter alia, was whether clause 14 could be construed as a 
pactum de non cedendo. 
 
The insurance company argued that if clause 14 was found to be a 
pactum de non cedendo, then it would be void as such restrictions were 
against public policy.371     
The presiding judges McIlwaine and Lewis, held that clause 14 could not 
be construed as a pactum de non cedendo.  They both agreed on this 
point, but had slightly different reasons for their finding. 
 
The basis of the judgment of McIlwaine ACJ was simply that clause 14 
could not by its general terms prohibit the common law right of 
assignment, as it contained no specific provision to that effect, especially 
when it is the duty of the insurance company to make its terms clear.372  
The judge continued that if the insurance company genuinely wanted to 
prohibit a cession, it would have been easy to include a passage in the 
contract making their wishes instantly recognisable and unambiguous. 
Thus, clause 14 was too general in its construction to be construed as a 
pactum de non cedendo.373   
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 Lewis J, in turn, held that clause 14 could not be construed as a restraint 
prohibiting cession as the construction of clause 14 merely emphasised 
the insurance company’s right to insist on its delectus personae and it thus 
prohibited substitution.374   
According to the judge, clause 14 did not signify that rights of action which 
had accrued to the insured could not be transferred.  If this interpretation 
was not the intention of the insurance company then, according to the 
judge, it should have used appropriate words to express its intentions in a 
manner that made the intended meaning clear.375   
Lewis J noted that the pactum de non cedendo in this case could serve a 
useful purpose to the insurance company.  The provision would ensure 
that the company could avoid defending actions against unknown parties 
who might not be able to pay the costs of the action should they be 
unsuccessful.376  
The judge also pointed out that another possible benefit of the pactum de 
non cedendo to the insurance company would be to have as an opponent 
in a legal action the party with whom it contracted, as it is this party who 
can best address the matters at issue in a disputed claim.377  
Citing Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates, Lewis J stated that:  
I am satisfied that under Roman-Dutch law such a pact is not 
void, provided that it can be shown to serve a useful purpose to 
the debtor, and in English law it is also valid apparently without 
such proviso.378  
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 Lewis J added that even if clause 14 could be construed as a pactum de 
non cedendo it would not be invalid on the ground of public policy.  The 
rationale for this finding was based on an analogy of one of the writings of 
Sande.379  The judge reasoned that Sande380 was of the opinion that if the 
cession was fraudulent, or if the cessionary was a ‘quarrelsome or a 
pettifogging’ person, the debtor could refuse to litigate with him and 
demand that the cedent bring the action himself.381   
In such a situation, therefore, it would be allowable to overlook the fact 
that the right of action was no longer the property of the cedent, but to 
force him nevertheless, to bring the action himself so that the debtor was 
protected.   
From the aforementioned Lewis J concluded that if Sande’s submission, 
which affords protection to the debtor,  
…be good law to-day, how much more valid would be the right to stipulate 
in advance [that is through a pactum de non cedendo] to secure a similar 
protection.382   
 
The court in this case seems to have simply applied the ratio in Paiges.  A 
few years after this case, however, the Appellate Division had the 
opportunity to revisit the principles governing the pactum de non cedendo. 
 
In Estate Fitzpatrick v Estate Frankel and others; Denoon and another 
v Estate Frankel and others,383 Frankel leased certain premises subject 
to a clause (clause 8) which stated that he was prohibited from assigning 
the lease or sub-letting the premises without the consent of the lessor. 
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 Frankel, after obtaining the consent of the lessor, sub-let the premises.  
He also ceded the right to claim rent to a creditor, Fitzpatrick, as security 
for the repayment of a loan with interest, but this he did without obtaining 
the consent of the lessor.  The sub-lessee was notified and duly paid rent 
to Fitzpatrick. 
 
Thereafter, Fitzpatrick ceded its rights to claim rent to a third party, 
Denoon.  The sub-lessee was notified and duly paid to Denoon. 
 
Soon thereafter Frankel’s estate was sequestrated and Frankel’s trustee 
and lessor, who was in fact a creditor in his estate since Frankel had 
defaulted on rent payment, brought actions for, inter alia, declaring the 
cession by the lessee null and void and of no effect as the cession was 
made contrary to clause 8 of the lease agreement. 
 
Unanimous judgment was delivered by Centlivres JA. 
 
The judge, using Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates as authority, held 
that rights may be freely ceded, but that this principle may be subject to 
certain qualifications.384   
 
The judge noted that the argument was raised that clause 8 operated to 
prevent only voluntary assignments and sub-leases, but not assignments 
brought about by the operation of law through sales in execution or in 
liquidation.385  
 
Centlivres JA held a forced sale would not result in a breach of the lease 
agreement because the parties to the lease did not construct the 
agreement so as to extend the application of clause 8 to sales that were 
involuntary.386 
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The judge concluded that:  
 
…[T]he cases cited show that the words ‘the lessee shall not 
assign his lease’ must be interpreted as referring only to voluntary 
assignments.387 
 
Interestingly, the judge was asked to extend the interpretation of the above 
to include a voluntary act by the lessee which eventually results in an 
involuntary assignment.388 Centlivres JA refused to do so, stating that 
‘such a wide interpretation’ would not be ‘justified’.389 
 
Turning to consider the validity of the cession, the judge held that what 
Frankel actually ceded was the right to claim rent from the sub-lessee.  He 
did not cede the lease itself.  Since clause 8 only referred to the ceding of 
the lease itself and not the rent, Frankel had not breached the lease 
agreement and the cessions were held to be valid.390 
 
One year later the Appellate Division had another occasion to consider the 
principles governing pacta de non cedendo, this time in a contract of sale. 
 
In the case of Friedlander v De Aar Municipality,391 Wulf Friedlander and 
Isaac Friedlander were co-owners of a farm which they converted into 
building plots for the purpose of laying out a township.  In 1907 the 
Friedlanders had entered into a contract of sale with the municipality of De 
Aar, whereby the former sold to the latter two pieces of land known as the 
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 Commonage.  The municipality was to hold the Commonage in trust for 
the erfholders of the Friedlander township.  
 
The cause for dispute arose primarily from clause 3 of the contract of sale 
which stated that the municipality was prohibited from alienating or 
disposing of any portion of the land without the prior written consent of the 
Friedlanders or their ‘heirs, executors or assigns’.392 
 
In 1940 the municipality wanted to sell a portion of the Commonage and 
entered into long and complicated negotiations with Johanna Friedlander 
in her capacity as a cessionary of the rights of the Friedlander partnership, 
as executrix of the deceased estate of one of the deceased partners and 
as a representative of the heirs of the deceased estate of a deceased 
partner.   
 
The negotiations eventually led to an agreement of sale for consideration 
where Johanna Friedlander ceded to the municipality the rights that were 
reserved in clause 3 of the contract. 
 
Certain conditions first had to be fulfilled before the agreement was 
binding.  During the course of fulfilling these conditions, the municipality 
received legal advice that it was entitled to alienate any portion of the 
Commonage, subject only to the approval of the Administrator in terms of 
ss170 – 173 of Ordinance 10 of 1912.393 
 
The court a quo ruled in favour of the municipality and Johanna 
Friedlander consequently appealed.     
 
Greenberg JA handed down the unanimous judgment.  The issue before 
the court was, inter alia, whether the municipality was entitled to alienate 
the Commonage, subject only to the approval of the Administrator and if 
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 not, whether such alienation was valid with the consent of Johanna 
Friedlander.  
 
Greenberg JA, whose discussion of the pactum de non cedendo was very 
brief, relied mostly on Sande as authority for his judgment.394  The judge 
held that since prohibitions on alienations were valid and since the 
Friedlanders had an interest in the prohibition, it was valid.395   
 
Further, said the judge, the rights of the Friedlanders were transmissible 
as the nature of the contract did not involve a delectus personae and the 
contract itself expressly alluded to this.396 
 
Greenberg JA concluded, inter alia, that the municipality indeed required 
the consent of Johanna Friedlander in order to alienate the property and 
the alienation was void.397 
 
Unfortunately the Appellate Division once again missed an opportunity to 
establish certainty on the pactum de non cedendo and for the next 24 
years, these were the principles applied to pacta de non cedendo. 398 
 
In the case of Richter N.O v Riverside Estates (Pty) Ltd,399 the late 
Richter was the registered owner of 1000 ordinary shares in Riverside 
Estates.  No money passed between the parties upon purchase of the 
shares, but Richter passed a bond over his farm to the value of the 
purchase price of the shares as security for payment.400   
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 Upon excussion of the security there remained an unpaid balance owing 
to Riverside Estates under the bond.  The executrix testamentary of 
Richter’s deceased estate sold the shares to one Goodrick.  Goodrick paid 
the purchase price and the transfer form was delivered to him.  The 
company, however, refused to accept or register the transfer of the 
shares.401 
 
The executrix testamentary applied to the court for, inter alia, an order 
declaring that the company was not entitled to decline to register transfer 
of the shares to Goodrick.402 
 
The unanimous judgment was written by Van den Heever AJP.  His point 
of departure was to refer to the company’s articles of association which 
provided that: 
 
The Director or Directors may, at any time in their absolute and 
uncontrolled discretion and without assigning any reason therefor, 
decline to register any proposed transfer of a share or shares in 
the company.403 
 
Van den Heever AJP implied that this article amounted to a pactum de 
non cedendo because Richter, he pointed out, had become a member of 
the company subject to this express condition.404  Against the background 
of Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates he held that: 
 
If the pactum de non cedendo is valid…then there can be no 
question of the validity of a pact, not against the alienation of the 
bonitary rights to a share, but against the registration of its 
transfer which entails the admission of an unwanted member of 
the company.405 
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 According to Van den Heever AJP, the English case of In re Smith and 
Fawcett Ltd,406 dealt with a similar dispute.407  In that case Lord Green 
refused to read a non-assignment clause into a document that was drafted 
in such wide terms.408  Van den Heever AJP pointed out that there was no 
reason why the ratio of the court could not be applied in South Africa and 
dismissed the application.  
 
It is evident that this court, following the style of the recent cases in the 
Appellate Division, was not too forthcoming with notes and commentary on 
the pactum de non cedendo.  In the next case, however, the judge made 
an interesting observation.   
 
In Du Plessis v Scott,409 Scott entered into a contract with Swanepoel in 
terms of which the latter was to build Scott a house.  Swanepoel failed to 
complete the house and the parties consequently agreed that Scott would 
complete it and deduct the cost of completion from the contract price.   
 
As an express or implied term of the new agreement, Scott was to render 
a complete and full account of the cost of completion to Swanepoel.  Scott 
completed the building of the house and drew up an account; by this time 
Swanepoel had ceded his right of action under the contract (as varied) 
against Scott to Du Plessis.410   
 
Du Plessis claimed that Scott had generally not rendered a full and 
complete account and denied two items appearing therein.  Scott, in his 
declaration, excepted to the claims made by Du Plessis on the ground that 
they, inter alia, failed to disclose a cause of action considering the 
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 inclusion of clause 10 in the contract which, as the argument went, 
amounted to a pactum de non cedendo. 
 
Clause 10 read as follows:  
 
Die kontrakteur mag nie enige van sy regte hieronder oormaak of 
onderverhuur nie, nog enige sessie uitreik, of enige orders aan 
die werkgewer oordra waaronder enige gelde wat aan die 
kontrakteur verskuldig is, deur enige persoon volgens wet kan 
word nie.411 
 
The case was decided by Blackwell J, who pointed out that Du Plessis 
argued that clause 10, or the pactum de non cedendo, was not 
enforceable unless the party claiming to enforce it could prove that the 
restriction served a ‘useful purpose’ to the debtor.412   
 
Du Plessis’ argument was based on the following words of De Villiers JA in 
Paiges v van Ryn Gold Mines Estates Ltd:413  
The principle therefore only has application in the case where the 
debtor has no interest in the matter. In other words, if the 
stipulation can be shown to serve a useful service to the debtor, it 
is valid and binding on the parties to the contract.414 
This argument prompted Blackwell J to investigate the ratio in Paiges and 
that court’s reliance on Voet and Sande.  His understanding of the old 
authorities is clear from the following passage: 
It was in relation to these two authorities that the passage from 
the judgment of De Villiers JA, quoted above, followed. I read the 
passages from Sande and Voet as meaning that the Courts will 
not enforce an agreement which I may make with a stranger 
which fetters my right to dispose of my own property, but, if the 
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 agreement is made with a person who has an interest in the 
matter, it may be binding. 415  
Blackwell J then proceeded to ask two questions:416 
1. Did the Court of Appeal intend to lay down the same rule in 
regard to agreements not to cede or assign, as Sande and Voet 
appear to indicate in regard to restraints upon the alienation of 
property generally?  
[A]nd  
2. Assuming that question 1 is answered in the affirmative, does a 
person seeking to enforce a prohibition against cession have to 
allege and prove that the prohibition served a useful purpose to 
him, or can the Court, especially in a case like the present, look to 
the contract itself, and form its own conclusions upon the matter, 
if there are sufficient data?  [My emphasis] 
 
Blackwell J failed to answer question one expressly and it is a pity that the 
judge did not take his question any further.  Unfortunately he assumed 
that there is no difference between restraints on the alienation of 
corporeals and restraints on the alienation of incorporeals.  The fact that 
the judge asked this question, however, can surely be interpreted to mean 
that he had some doubt that the right under discussion in Paiges and the 
right that Sande and Voet wrote about were not the same, otherwise why 
would he pose the question?  
As to question two, even though he admits it is unclear, Blackwell J 
believed that evidence was taken in the magistrate’s court in Paiges and 
was used by the appeal court.417  He concluded that:  
If therefore the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Paiges’ case 
means that an agreement by one of the parties to a contract not 
to cede his rights thereunder cannot be enforced without some 
proof that it was made for the benefit, not of a stranger, but of an 
interested party, then I hold that the Court is entitled to look to the 
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 nature of the contract itself in order to determine this point, and if 
this appears sufficiently from the contract then formal averment 
and proof is unnecessary.418 
Blackwell J was thus of the opinion that without other evidence, but by 
looking at the contract itself, the reason for the prohibition of cession in 
clause 10 of the contract was obvious, as Scott had a ‘genuine interest’ in 
limiting his dealings to Swanepoel alone.419  The exception was 
consequently allowed.   
The Appellate Division decision in the following case may have departed 
from the ratio in Paiges.  
In the case of Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard Bank of South 
Africa Ltd,420 Mrs Davidoff was a customer of Trust Bank and from time to 
time she deposited money with Trust Bank.  In respect of each of these 
deposits, Trust Bank issued Mrs Davidoff with a deposit voucher recording 
the terms of the transaction.  The deposit vouchers were standard in form 
and identical, barring information relating to the date and the amount 
deposited.  Clause 5 of the deposit vouchers stated that the deposit 
voucher was issued subject to the conditions endorsed overleaf.421   
 
There were three conditions overleaf, but only condition one is relevant to 
this discussion.  Condition one stated that the deposit voucher was 
‘neither transferable nor negotiable’.422   
 
Subsequently, Mrs Davidoff became indebted to Trust Bank and 
undertook to repay this debt in monthly instalments.  Mrs Davidoff also 
executed a deed of pledge in favour of Trust Bank as security for 
repayment of the debt.  The pledged items were eight deposit vouchers 
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 which were ceded, pledged and delivered to Trust Bank.  Some time later 
the deposit vouchers were released to Mrs Davidoff without any 
endorsements being made on them.   
 
Mrs Davidoff thereafter required credit facilities in her capacity as director 
of Chermedine Clothing Corporation (Pty) Ltd and she approached 
Standard Bank in this regard.  Standard Bank agreed to extend credit 
facilities to Mrs Davidoff and as security she ceded, pledged and delivered 
the eight deposit vouchers. Standard Bank was at all material times 
unaware that Mrs Davidoff had already ceded and pledged the deposit 
vouchers to Trust Bank. 
 
Trust Bank argued, inter alia, that condition one referred to in clause 5 
constituted a pactum de non cedendo which consequently precluded Mrs 
Davidoff from conferring any rights upon Standard Bank. 
 
Hill J, in the court a quo, held in favour of Standard Bank and did not 
pursue the pactum de non cedendo argument.423  Trust Bank successfully 
appealed.    
 
Ogilvie Thompson JA, who gave the dissenting judgment, discussed the 
possibility of condition one amounting to a pactum de non cedendo and 
admitted that all rights of action may be ceded unless parties contract to 
restrict cession.424  Mentioning Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates, he 
added that a pactum de non cedendo ‘will, in appropriate cases, be 
enforced’, but because of its restricting nature, it must be expressed in 
‘clear and unequivocal terms’.425   
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 Ogilvie Thompson JA held that the words of condition one were not 
sufficiently clear and unequivocal so as to render the condition a pactum 
de non cedendo and therefore it did not invalidate the cession.426  
 
His reasons were twofold.  First, if it was genuinely the intention of Trust 
Bank that condition one should amount to a pactum de non cedendo, then 
Trust Bank should have used more explicit language so as to convey that 
intention.427    
 
Secondly, the words ‘deposit voucher’ pertained to the document itself and 
not the rights recorded therein and ‘neither transferable nor negotiable’ 
should be understood as meaning that mere transfer of the document itself 
confers no title against Trust Bank.  However, although the judge did not 
spell this out, transfer of the rights therein by way of cession can confer 
such a claim against the bank.428  
 
Botha JA gave the majority judgment.  He held that the pactum de non 
cedendo argument that Trust Bank raised was indeed a valid and 
complete defence to Standard Bank’s claim.429   
 
The judge came to this conclusion by establishing from the outset that Mrs 
Davidoff ceded the deposit vouchers to Standard Bank in securitatem 
debiti and that the only question which arose therefrom was whether the 
cessions were valid considering that the deposit vouchers were ‘neither 
transferable nor negotiable’.430  
 
With reference to Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates, the judge 
explained the law in the following dictum:   
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The rule of our law is that all rights in personam…can be freely 
ceded, but an owner’s right of free disposal of his property may be 
restricted by a pactum de non cedendo.  The effect of such a 
pactum depends upon the circumstances.  Voet 2.14.20 and 
Sande, Restraints, 4.1.1, and 4.2.1, point out that an agreement 
whereby an owner deprives himself of the free right to deal with 
his own property, is without effect unless the other contracting 
party has an interest in the restriction….  These principles do not, 
however, apply where the right is created with a restriction against 
alienation, and the restriction is contained in the very agreement 
recording the right, for in such a case the right itself is limited by 
the stipulation against alienation and can be relied upon by the 
debtor for whose benefit the stipulation was made.431 [My 
emphasis] 
 
Thus, according to Botha JA, an interest is not required to be present 
when the pactum de non cedendo is created at the same time that the 
contractants enter into the agreement.  
 
Botha JA concluded that condition one did constitute a pactum de non 
cedendo as Trust Bank, for whose benefit the condition was made, had a 
clear interest in the prohibition and the bank could raise this defence 
against any action instituted by the cessionary.432  
 
That question having been answered, Botha JA turned to answering the 
next question of whether the prohibition, subject to which the deposit 
vouchers were issued, related only to the document recording the right, or 
whether it could also be said that the prohibition related to the rights 
evidenced in the vouchers.433  
 
The judge’s response to this question was that condition one of the 
deposit vouchers did, indeed, reflect an attribute of the rights recorded 
therein, viz, that they are ‘neither transferable nor negotiable’.434  The 
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 reason was that if it were not the case, ‘…it would be difficult to appreciate 
what object the appellant intended to achieve with the stipulation against 
transfer’.435  
 
Botha JA further added that:  
 
…[T]he words ‘neither transferable nor negotiable’…should be 
given their ordinary literal meaning, namely that they are not to be 
transferred – in the only way in which they are capable of being 
transferred in law, i.e. by cession under the common law – from 
one person to another.436  
 
Is the judgment of Botha JA a departure from the ratio as laid down by the 
Appellate Division in Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates?  Can the 
interest requirement be disregarded if the pactum de non cedendo is 
created in the agreement recording the right?  This question is not settled 
as can be seen from the cases that follow.437  
 
In Italtrafo SpA v Electricity Supply Commission,438 Escom was 
successful in its application to attach ad fundandam jurisdictionem a 
personal right which Italtrafo had against Escom.  Italtrafo subsequently 
applied for the setting aside of this attachment on the ground that at the 
time Escom made the application for attachment, the right was no longer a 
part of Italtrafo’s estate, since it had ceded the right in securitatem debiti to 
the Bank of Naples.  
 
Escom, however, argued that the contract between Italtrafo and Escom 
contained a pactum de non cedendo in terms of which:  
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 …[Italtrafo] shall not assign or make over the contract or any part 
thereof or any share or interest therein to any other person 
without the written consent of Escom which may be refused 
without any reason being given.439   
 
Escom asserted that no written consent was given to Italtrafo and that the 
cession to the Bank of Naples was consequently invalid. 
 
King AJ, who presided over the case, summarised the ratio of Paiges v 
Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates as follows:  
 
…[S]uch a restraint will be enforced against a party claiming to be 
a cessionary if the debtor had a material and reasonable interest 
in making the stipulation.440    
 
King AJ subsequently looked at the facts of the case and pointed out that 
Escom employed the services of a skilled manufacturer for the production 
of large pieces of equipment.  Escom would use that equipment for the 
production of its goods and services and it would cause Escom great loss 
if such equipment was defective.441  The judge thereafter concluded that 
Escom ‘must have a material and reasonable interest’ in the pactum de 
non cedendo.442 
 
With reference to Trust Bank v Standard Bank, King AJ summed up the 
possible departure made therein as follows: 
 
…[W]here the restriction against the transfer of the rights formed 
part of the contract in question, the person claiming to be the 
cessionary could not acquire the cedent’s rights without the 
debtor’s consent.  Any rights obtained by the person claiming to 
be the cessionary would be subject to such a restraint.443  
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 The judge also expressly stated that Trust Bank v Standard Bank seemed 
to have departed from the interest test as established in Paiges.444  King 
AJ offered no further comment on the issue and in one simple sentence 
followed the new precedent: 
 
As I have already found as a matter of probability that the restraint 
against cession formed part of the contract in respect of the 
transformer… the cession is not a valid one.445  
 
The court in Italtrafo SpA is clearly of the opinion that the ratio in Trust 
Bank v Standard Bank amounted to a departure from Paiges.  Having said 
that, it has to be mentioned that Italtrafo SpA has itself deviated slightly, in 
a different way, from the ratio in Paiges.   
 
In Paiges, Gregorowski J in the Transvaal Provincial Division explained 
that for the pactum de non cedendo to be valid the debtor had to have 
‘some interest’.446 Wessels J, in turn, stated that the restriction must be ‘in 
favour of a particular person’447 or that the restriction had to be to the 
‘benefit’448 of the debtor.  In the Appellate Division De Villiers JA, citing 
Sande and Voet with agreement, held that the debtor must have ‘an 
interest’449 and further stated that the restriction must serve a ‘useful 
purpose’.450 To emphasise the degree of Van Ryn Gold Mine Estate’s 
interest, De Villiers JA described it as a ‘very real interest’.451 
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 In the same vein, with reference to Paiges, Lewis J in Northern Assurance 
Company Ltd v Methuen spoke of the restriction serving a ‘useful 
purpose’.452 
 
In keeping with the trend and with reference to Paiges, Blackwell J in Du 
Plessis v Scott held that the debtor must have ‘an interest’.453 To 
emphasise the degree of Scott’s interest, Blackwell J described it as a 
‘genuine interest’.454 
 
Similarly, Botha JA in Trust Bank v Standard Bank, citing Sande and Voet 
with approval, held that the debtor must have ‘an interest’455 or that the 
restriction must be to the debtor’s ‘benefit’.456  To emphasise the degree of 
Trust Bank’s interest, Botha JA described it as a ‘clear interest’.457 
 
King AJ in Italtrafo SpA did not speak of the interest requirement in any of 
the abovementioned terms, but instead held that the debtor must have a 
‘material and reasonable interest in making the stipulation’.458  It is 
interesting to note that the judge made that statement with direct reference 
to Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates.   
 
The term ‘material and reasonable’ interest, however, does not appear 
anywhere in Paiges, nor does the term appear in any of the cases that 
follow.  Further, Sande and Voet spoke of ‘an interest’, ‘some interest’, and 
‘any interest’. 459   Sande also expressly stated that:   
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 Now, the interest of the person making such a pact should not be 
too strictly judged; for he has sufficient interest who can in every 
case say that he would not otherwise have alienated his 
property.460  
  
Surely ‘material and reasonable’ does not mean the same as ‘an interest’, 
‘some interest’, ‘any interest’, ‘in favour of’, ‘useful purpose’, ‘to the benefit 
of’.  The question may rightfully be asked whether this is a new 
interpretation of the interest requirement?  If so, has it effectively 
increased the standard of proof?   
 
Where the debtor could ordinarily show that he had an interest or at least 
some interest in the restriction, must he now go further and prove that the 
degree of this interest is in fact material and reasonable.  Is this new 
interpretation not judging the interest too strictly – something Sande 
expressly advised against?461  
 
Two years after Italtrafo SpA the pactum de non cedendo came under 
discussion again in the Transvaal Provincial Division where three 
concurring judges decided the case; and the outcome was rather 
noteworthy. 
 
In Vawda v Vawda and others,462 the Community Development Board 
sold Mr Vawda certain immovable property, the purchase price of which 
was to be paid off in instalments.  Clause 11 of the agreement read as 
follows: 
 
During the currency of this agreement the purchaser shall be 
bound and obliged personally to occupy the property hereby sold, 
and he shall not, without the written consent of the seller having 
been first had and obtained, let, lease, mortgage, assign or 
pledge or in any way encumber the property or any part thereof, 
nor pass any general bond or any bond containing a general 
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 clause or cede, transfer, or make over his rights under this 
agreement.463 
 
After purchasing the property Mr and Mrs Vawda occupied the property 
and Mrs Vawda paid some of the monthly instalments.  Some time later 
matrimonial difficulties arose between the couple and Mrs Vawda learned 
that her husband was attempting to sell the property to finance his 
emigration.   
 
To prevent the sale, Mrs Vawda agreed to give Mr Vawda R2000 in 
exchange for him ceding all rights and interest in the property to her.  
Despite having ceded all rights and interest in the property, Mr Vawda sold 
the property to a third party.   
 
Upon becoming aware of this information, Mrs Vawda applied for an 
interdict prohibiting transfer to the third party.   
 
The application was dismissed by Nicholas J in the court a quo on the 
ground that the cession to Mrs Vawda was not valid.464  Mrs Vawda 
consequently appealed to the full bench where Boshoff AJP delivered the 
unanimous judgment. 
 
Boshoff AJP considered Mrs Vawda’s argument, which centred around the 
viewpoint that clause 11, the pactum de non cedendo, was invalid and 
ineffective.465  Relying on Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates, Trust 
Bank v Standard Bank and Italtrafo SpA v Electricity Supply Commission, 
Mrs Vawda contended that a pactum de non cedendo is only binding if it 
can be shown that the restriction serves a ‘useful purpose’ to the debtor.466 
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 The argument continued that the onus of proving the nature and degree of 
the interest rests upon the party seeking to enforce the pactum de non 
cedendo.467  According to Du Plessis v Scott, so the argument went, the 
court may look at the contract itself to determine if an interest exists.  It 
was contended that if the present contract was carefully examined, no 
reason could be found upon which an interest for the Community 
Development Board could exist.468   
 
Further, the party in a position to claim an interest was not Mr Vawda, but 
the Community Development Board and the latter had made no attempt to 
establish such interest.  Thus, due to the fact that no interest was present, 
the pactum de non cedendo should be held to be invalid and ineffective.469  
 
Relying on Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates, Boshoff AJP’s point of 
departure to this argument was that the entire agreement of sale must be 
looked at in order to determine the extent of Mr Vawda’s rights 
thereunder.470   
 
The judge however felt that, although Mrs Vawda’s argument regarding 
the interest requirement was correct, the defect therein was that it 
considered the pactum de non cedendo to be something separate from 
the agreement of sale, when in fact, the pactum de non cedendo is ‘part 
and parcel of the agreement creating the right, and the right is limited by 
the stipulation’. 471 472  
 
Boshoff AJP held that apart from the interest requirement, one should also 
keep in mind the contents of 4 1 1, 4 1 6 and 4 1 7 in Sande’s De 
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 Prohibita.473  With reference to the views of Botha JA in Trust Bank 
Boshoff AJP subsequently added that: 
 
… [the judge] recognised this difference and did not depart from 
the test of material and reasonable interest laid down in Paiges’ 
case as suggested by King AJ in Italtrafo SpA v Electricity Supply 
Commission.474    
 
The judge thereafter concluded that clause 11 indeed amounted to a valid 
and enforceable pactum de non cedendo and the cession to Mrs Vawda 
was consequently invalid and unenforceable.  
 
Two noteworthy points can be learned from this case.  The first is that the 
judge followed the new precedent of ‘material and reasonable’ interest as 
expressed by King AJ in Italtrafo SpA.   
 
The second is that contrary to what was held in Italtrafo SpA, Boshoff AJP 
was of the opinion that Trust Bank v Standard Bank did not, in fact, 
amount to a departure from Paiges. 
 
In the same year that Vawda v Vawda was decided, the pactum de non 
cedendo was again before the Appeal Court in the MTK Saagmeule case.  
Perhaps the time was right for the Appeal Court to provide clarity on the 
standard of the interest requirement and shed some light on the question 
of whether Trust Bank was a departure from the ratio in Paiges. 
 
In MTK Saagmeule (Pty) Ltd v Killyman Estates (Pty) Ltd,475 the 
Department of Forestry accepted a tender by Killyman Estates to 
purchase wood from two farms that was to be harvested and removed. On 
18 July 1973 the parties entered into a contract of sale which was subject 
to numerous written conditions.  One such condition was contained in 
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 clause 27 and stated that the purchaser was prohibited from ceding his 
rights under the contract without the written consent of the seller.476 
 
 The operation of the contract was from 1 August 1973 to 31 July 1975.   
 
On 11 January 1974 Killyman Estates entered into a contract with MTK 
Saagmeule.  In terms of the contract, Killyman Estates was to assign to 
MTK Saagmeule all rights, obligations and liabilities under its contract with 
the Department of Forestry.  Killyman Estates was to continue making 
payments to the Department and MTK Saagmeule was to pay Killyman 
Estates a certain sum of money and to harvest and remove the wood.  
 
The Department was unaware of the cession and thus did not give its 
written consent thereto.  MTK Saagmeule subsequently fell behind 
schedule in its harvesting and removal of the wood.  Killyman Estates 
approached the Department requesting an extension of the contract.  It 
was during this time (around April 1975) that the Department became 
aware of the cession.  The Department refused to grant Killyman an 
extension on the ground that Killyman Estates had breached their contract 
by contravening clause 27. 
 
The court a quo held that the agreement between the parties was valid 
and enforceable, that they had never intended a full substitution and 
consequently gave judgment in favour of Killyman. 
 
MTK Saagmeule appealed, alleging that the intention of the parties was 
that a cession would be effected.  MTK Saagmeule’s argument was that 
because the Department did not give its consent to the transfer, the 
contract between MTK Saagmeule and Killyman Estates was void.477   
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 It argued further that the effect of a pactum de non cedendo in this case 
was that a cession without the written consent of the debtor would be 
invalid.  There were however, as MTK Saagmeule’s argument went, two 
exceptions.478   
 
The first, on the authority of Trust Bank and Italtrafo SpA, was where the 
prohibition of transfer was encapsulated in the agreement which created 
the right.  The second, with Paiges and Du Plessis as authority, was 
where the party who benefited from the inclusion of the pactum de non 
cedendo had a material and reasonable interest (‘wesenlike en redelike 
belang’) therein.479  
 
Against this background MTK Saagmeule asserted that the pactum de non 
cedendo in the present case was indeed encapsulated in the written 
agreement, that the Department of Forestry quite clearly had an interest in 
the prohibition and the pactum de non cedendo was consequently valid.480   
 
Rumpff CJ, handing down the unanimous decision, held that the pactum 
de non cedendo argument put forward by MTK Saagmeule was 
unacceptable on two grounds.481  The first ground was that the present 
case was not an instance of the cessionary suing the debtor – as was the 
situation in all the cases relied upon by MTK Saagmeule in its 
argument.482   
 
The judge explained that in the present case the cessionary was suing the 
cedent and in this regard the cedent cannot respond to a pactum de non 
cedendo argument as the pactum de non cedendo was not included in the 
contract for his benefit and he thus has no interest therein.  Also, the 
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 pactum de non cedendo encapsulated in the agreement creating the right 
was between the cedent and the debtor and not the cessionary.483  
 
The second ground for Rumpff CJ finding that the argument was 
unacceptable was that even if MTK Saagmeule sued the Department of 
Forestry, the latter would be able to rely on the fact that the cession was 
unenforceable due to an absence of written consent.484 
 
The judge explained that it would make no difference if MTK Saagmeule 
sued the Department of Forestry because the cession to MTK Saagmeule 
would still have been invalid; not on the basis of a pactum de non 
cedendo, but on the basis of non-compliance with a contractual formality.  
The pactum de non cedendo accordingly had no scope to feature in the 
present case and the argument as submitted by MTK Saagmeule was of 
no relevance.485   
 
It must be mentioned that the Appeal Court unfortunately had no reason to 
provide clarity as to the standard of the interest requirement or to decide 
whether or not Trust Bank departed from Paiges, since it had ruled out the 
application of the pactum de non cedendo.  Any comments made by the 
court in this regard can be seen as obiter dictum at best.   
 
Interestingly enough, the Appeal Court added another ground for invalidity.  
According to the reasoning of the court, a contractant wishing to include a 
pactum de non cedendo in an agreement can avoid the complex legal 
rules that accompany it, for the purpose of interpreting its validity and 
effect, by merely stipulating in the contract that a cession shall be subject 
to written consent.  In this manner, any cession in contravention thereof 
will be found to be invalid simply on the basis of non-compliance with a 
contractual formality.  
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This alternative, however, may not be a reliable solution as it depends 
upon how a particular judge will view the matter.  Boshoff AJP in Vawda v 
Vawda took a completely different approach.   
 
In the Vawda case, clause 11 in the contract between Mr Vawda and the 
Community Development Board stated that Mr Vawda was prohibited from 
ceding his rights without first obtaining the written consent of the Board.  
This case is very similar to MTK Saagmeule as in both instances written 
consent was required before a cession could be effected. 
 
The very stark difference between the cases is that Boshoff AJP in Vawda 
v Vawda made absolutely no mention of non-compliance with a 
contractual formality, even though this alternative would have very simply 
resolved the issue.  Instead, Boshoff AJA reviewed the relevant cases and 
decided, with the aid of Paiges, that because the pactum de non cedendo 
was ‘part and parcel of the agreement creating the right’, the right was 
limited by the stipulation.486  
 
Surely this new found ground for invalidity would be made use of by 
contractants and argued by litigants in the future? 
 
In the case of Govender v Tongaat Town Clerk and others,487 the third 
respondent concluded a contract with the Town Board of the Township of 
Tongaat.  In terms of the contract the third respondent purchased 
immovable property for a sum payable by monthly instalments.   
 
The third respondent’s rights in the immovable property were attached at 
the instance of the applicant and were sold in execution.  At the sale in 
execution the applicant purchased the third respondent’s rights in the 
property and was eager to pay the balance owing under the contract.   
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The Town Clerk, however, argued that the applicant’s purchase was not 
valid and that he was not obliged to transfer the property to the applicant.  
The Town Clerk relied on clause 12 of the contract between him and the 
third respondent which, according to the Town Clerk, protected the third 
respondent against his rights being sold at a sale in execution and 
purchased by a third party.  Clause 12 read as follows: 
 
During the term of this agreement the purchaser shall be bound 
and obliged personally to occupy the property continuously and 
as his place of residence, together with the persons approved in 
writing by the seller and nominated in the application submitted by 
the purchaser to the seller in connection with the acquisition of 
property, the truth and correctness of which application the 
purchaser hereby warrants as correct.  The purchaser shall be 
deemed to be in breach of this agreement if any information 
contained in such application transpires to be incorrect.  The 
purchaser shall not, without the written consent of the seller first 
having been had and obtained let, part with possession of or any 
portion of the property or make over his rights under this 
agreement or purport to do any of the aforegoing.  If the 
purchaser does any of the foregoing he shall be deemed to be in 
breach of this agreement.488   
 
The Town Clerk and the third respondent contended that clause 12 
amounted to a pactum de non cedendo and relying on Vawda v Vawda, 
argued that the pactum de non cedendo could be enforced against the 
applicant as its effect was expressly, or alternatively impliedly, to preclude 
a sale in execution.489 
 
The applicant consequently applied to the court for a declaratory order 
declaring that the purchase was valid and that transfer should be effected. 
 
The case came before Friedman J, who disagreed as to the express 
interpretation of clause 12.  The judge was of the opinion that clause 12 
                                                    
488 Supra 185F-H. 
489 Supra 185H-J. 
 
 
 
 
 clearly and unambiguously prevented the third respondent himself from 
ceding his rights under the contract.490   
 
Friedman J held that the third respondent did not play an active role in the 
sale of the rights, nor was the messenger of the court who sold the rights 
to the applicant acting as the third respondent’s agent.  The messenger of 
the court was, in fact, disposing of the third respondent’s rights in 
accordance with the statutory duty imposed upon him.491 
 
As to the implied interpretation of clause 12, the judge held that although 
he could understand how such an implied interpretation might be 
reasonable, such an implied interpretation could not be recognised in the 
interest of business efficacy.492   
 
Relying on Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates, the judge stated that: 
 
In other words, it seems to me that the prohibition contained in 
clause 12 contemplates only something in the nature of a 
voluntary relinquishment by the third respondent of his rights and 
not a forced loss of those rights such as occurred at the sale in 
execution.493  
 
Friedman J concluded that since there was no merit in the Town Clerk and 
the third respondent’s argument, the purchase was valid and the Town 
Clerk was ordered to effect transfer.  
  
It is interesting to observe that the new ground for invalidity came before 
this court some six years after MTK Saagmeule. The Town Clerk and the 
third respondent could have argued that because the required prior written 
consent was not obtained the cession was invalid due to non-compliance 
with a contractual formality.  The latter, however, did not rely on this 
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 argument.  Perhaps the facts in this case did not justify such a reliance as 
clause 12 provided that the contract would be breached if consent was not 
first obtained.  That having been said, no other case to my knowledge 
uses or makes reference to this new ground of invalidity. 
 
The case does raise another important question:  Is a trustee on 
insolvency or deputy-sheriff of the court bound to a pactum de non 
cedendo?  Judging from the approach of Friedman J in Govender v 
Tongaat Town Clerk, the terms of the contract should be considered to 
determine this.  Other cases have also discussed this issue.  
 
In Lithins v Laeveldse Koöperasie Bpk and another,494 Lithins sued the 
Laeveldse Koöperasie for the recovery of damages which arose from a 
breach of the contract between it, as seller of timber, and ARC Mining 
Timber (Pty) Ltd, as purchaser. 
 
ARC Mining Timber was duly wound up and the liquidator ceded to Lithins 
the claim for damages that ARC Mining Timber had against Laeveldse 
Koöperasie.  Laeveldse Koöperasie, however, denied the validity of the 
cession on the basis that the contract between it and ARC Mining Timber 
contained a pactum de non cedendo in clause 10 that was subject to prior 
written consent, which was not obtained. 
 
After considering the case law on the issue, Olivier J who presided over 
the matter, stated the following: 
 
I think it can safely be deduced from these cases that there is a 
general principle in our law to the effect that the pactum de non 
cedendo does not bind the trustee or liquidator in insolvency, 
unless it appears in a lease, in which case s37(5) of the 
Insolvency Act applies, or unless it appears from the pactum that 
it would also be applicable in the case of insolvency.  In the latter 
case, the question will then arise whether such a wide clause is 
valid.495  
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Olivier J held that in the present case there was nothing in clause 10 
which would have the effect of extending the pactum de non cedendo to 
the liquidator in insolvency.496   
 
He further added that the contract prohibited cession by one of the parties 
to the contract and since the liquidator was not one of the parties to the 
contract he could not be bound thereby.497  Lithins thus succeeded in 
being allowed to bring the action for damages against Laeveldse 
Koöperasie. 
 
This case illustrates that where the pactum de non cedendo appears in a 
lease, the trustee on insolvency would be bound as if he were the lessee 
due to s37(5) of the Insolvency Act.498  If the contract is one of a general 
nature and not a lease, then the trustee would only be bound if the pactum 
de non cedendo specifically stated that it should apply in the case of an 
involuntary cession.   
 
In Britz NO v Sniegocki and others,499 the court dealt with pacta de non 
cedendo appearing in the transfer of shares.  Sniegocki and Van Lingen 
were partners in a business and on 7 November 1986 they agreed that 
Sniegocki would sell her 40% share in the business to Van Lingen.  They 
also agreed that she would lend Van Lingen R8 000. 
 
Hawthorne owned shares in Point Smith Shareblock Ltd and, acting as 
surety and co-principal debtor, pledged these shares to Sniegocki as 
security for Van Lingen’s monetary obligations arising out of the sale of the 
business and the loan.  Hawthorne subsequently delivered the share 
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 certificate to Sniegocki, with the company being unaware of the security 
cession. 
 
On 1 April 1987 and unbeknown to Sniegocki, Hawthorne entered into an 
agreement with the second claimant whereby he sold him the same 
shares that he had pledged to Sniegocki.  Hawthorne subsequently 
handed to the second claimant, inter alia, a declaration to the effect that 
the share certificate had been lost, mislaid or destroyed; a completed and 
signed share transfer form; and written consent to the transfer granted by 
the directors of Point Smith Shareblock Ltd. 
 
Some time later Sniegocki issued a writ resulting in Britz, the deputy-
sheriff, attaching the shares in execution of debt.  The second claimant, 
however, disputed Sniegocki’s claim to the shares and sought an order 
that the attachment be set aside and a declaration that he be entitled to 
the shares.  
 
The second claimant argued, inter alia, that according to Point Smith 
Shareblock Ltd’s articles of association, the company’s consent was 
required before shares could be ceded, and because Hawthorne had not 
obtained the company’s consent, the pledge was not effective.500 
 
Booysen J delivered the written decision and noted that article 10(b) of the 
company’s articles of association read as follows: 
 
Save as otherwise provided in these articles, no share may be 
transferred to any transferee without prior consent and approval 
of the directors of the company, which consent shall not, however, 
be unreasonably withheld.501 
 
Sniegocki’s response to this, as Booysen J recounted, was that article 
10(b) does not render rights incapable of cession without the consent of 
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 the company, as the articles of association does not operate as between 
the cedent and cessionary.502  Rather, article 10(b) operates as between 
the company and the purported cessionary seeking to obtain 
registration.503 
 
In essence the argument was that article 10(b) can have no effect on a 
pledge or cession in securitatem debiti itself; the article only finds effect 
when the cessionary or pledgee attempts to register the shares in the 
register of members.504 
 
On the strength of the ratio in Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates and 
Trust Bank v Standard Bank, the judge agreed that, as a general rule, all 
contractual rights – including shares – may be freely ceded.  Using the 
aforementioned two cases and Friedlander v De Aar Municipality as 
authority, he added that freely cedable rights may not be freely cedable if 
subject to a delectus personae or a valid pactum de non cedendo.505 
 
He explained that a pactum de non cedendo can also function to restrict 
transfer; it does not only function to render a right absolutely 
intransferable.506  To illustrate this, he used the example of a situation 
where a right may not be ceded without the consent of the debtor.507  In 
this example there is a possibility of transfer, viz, if the debtor consents to 
it. On the other hand, a prohibition that is not subject to consent or any 
other requirement first being fulfilled holds no possibility of a cession and 
the right would thus be absolutely intransferable. 
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 Booysen J held that the freely cedable nature of Hawthorn’s shares had to 
be subject to the restriction in the company’s articles of association.508  
The judge rejected Sniegocki’s argument and held that article 10(b) does 
in fact prevent a pledge or cession in securitatem debiti of the shares.509 
 
Booysen J concluded that: 
 
It seems to me that the rights constituting the shares were created 
with conditional restrictions against alienation. These restrictions 
are contained in the document recording it and the right itself is 
limited by the conditional stipulation against alienation.510 
 
According to the judge, owing to article 10(b) of the company’s articles of 
association, Hawthorn could not pledge or cede the shares without prior 
consent of the directors and because such consent was not obtained, the 
transfer was ‘incomplete’ or ‘ineffective’.511  The judge consequently ruled 
in favour of the second claimant. 
 
In the case that followed the court was once again faced with the effect of 
a pactum de non cedendo in a case of insolvency.  The question, 
however, was not whether the trustee of an insolvent estate was bound by 
a pactum de non cedendo, but whether the deputy-sheriff of the court was 
bound. 
 
In Van der Berg v Transkei Development Corporation,512 the deputy-
sheriff sold shares in a private company, Three Crowns Wholesale 
Supermarket (Pty) Ltd, in a sale in execution to Transkei Development 
Corporation.   
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 One of the existing shareholders of Three Crowns Wholesale Supermarket 
(Pty) Ltd, Van der Berg, brought an application to determine whether the 
deputy-sheriff’s sale was subject to the terms of the articles of association 
of the company. 
 
White J handed down the brief judgment, the outcome of which was the 
same as in Britz v Sniegocki, although that case was never mentioned. 
 
White J stated that a private company is, in terms of s20 of the Companies 
Act,513 compelled to restrict the transfer of its shares.514  Article 11 of the 
articles of association of Three Crowns Wholesale Supermarket (Pty) Ltd 
stated that the directors had the power to refuse to register a transfer of 
shares515 and article 22 obliged a member wishing to sell his shares to 
offer it first to the existing members, thus giving existing members a right 
of pre-emption.516 
 
White J considered possible constructions of the sale of the shares,517 but 
concluded that irrespective of which construction was favoured, in each 
case the requirement of the articles of association still found application.  
The judge therefore held that the requirements as set out in the articles of 
association had to be met before the shares could be registered in the 
name of Transkei Development Corporation.518 
 
The deputy-sheriff of the court was therefore bound by the provisions of 
the articles of association which amounted to a pactum de non cedendo, 
even though, as held in Lithins, the pactum de non cedendo did not 
specifically state that it should apply in the case of an involuntary transfer.  
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 Why should different rules apply to the trustee on insolvency?  This 
question had an opportunity to be addressed in the following case. 
 
In the case of Goodwin Stable Trust v Duohex (Pty) Ltd and 
another,519 Goodwin Stable Trust had entered into a building contract with 
Woodmill Homes Trust, which was sequestrated just before the building 
was completed.  Amongst the assets of Woodmill Homes Trust were 
monetary claims against Goodwin Stable Trust in respect of work done on 
the building construction. 
 
The trustee of the insolvent estate ceded Woodmill Homes Trust’s claims 
against Goodwin Stable Trust to Duohex (Pty) Ltd.  Consequently, 
Goodwin Stable Trust brought an application that the court declare the 
cession unenforceable against it, inter alia, on the ground that clause 19 of 
the building contract contained a pactum de non cedendo which tacitly 
included the trustee on insolvency. 
 
Judgment was given by Selikowitz J, who relied on Lithins v Laeveldse 
Koöperasie for holding that a trustee in insolvency is not bound by a 
pactum de non cedendo unless perhaps it is clear that the parties to the 
agreement intended it to bind the trustee.520   
 
The judge also noticed that Olivier J in Lithins v Laeveldse Koöperasie 
seemed to be doubtful of the possibility of the parties extending the 
application of the pactum de non cedendo to the trustee, who has a 
statutory duty to administer the insolvent estate by making the most 
financially sound decisions in favour of the insolvent estate and in the best 
interest of the creditors.521  Olivier J, as the judge observed, left the 
question open.522  
                                                    
519 1996 All SA 558 (C).  See also Chapter 5.  
520 Supra 563I. 
521 Supra 563I-J. 
522 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
  
Selikowitz J was of the opinion that there was nothing in the interpretation 
of clause 19 to lead him to conclude that its application extended to the 
trustee on insolvency.  The judge therefore held that the cession was valid 
and enforceable against Goodwin Stable Trust.  Unfortunately, nothing 
was said in this case to correct the inconsistency.   
 
The effect of a pactum de non cedendo on the cession of shares came 
under scrutiny once more in the case of Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas 
(Edms) Bpk en ’n ander v Booyens.523 Markplaas (Edms) Bpk was 
incorporated in 1983 with Smuts and Roux as the promotors, equal 
holders of the issued shares, as well as the sole directors.   
 
In 1993 Roux entered into an agreement with Booyens whereby Booyens 
would buy Roux’s shareholding in Markplaas.  This agreement was 
entered into without Smuts’s knowledge and was in conflict with a right of 
pre-emption in the articles of association of the company.   
 
In January 1994 Roux signed an agreement in terms of which he ceded 
his shares as security for a loan.  Roux was provisionally liquidated in 
September 1994 and in October 1994 the sequestration order was made 
final.  Roux subsequently collected the share certificate from Markplaas’s 
auditors and delivered it to Booyens. 
 
In the court a quo an application for the setting aside of the sale 
agreement was brought, inter alia, by the trustee of Roux’s insolvent 
estate and Smuts.  The trustee later ceased to be a party, so his objection 
was no longer in issue.  
 
Smuts’s objection to the sale agreement, which was still in issue, was 
founded on the ground that Roux had failed to adhere to Markplaas’s 
articles of association regarding the sale of shares.  The court a quo held 
                                                    
523 2001 (4) SA 15 (SCA).  See Chapter 5 for a further discussion. 
 
 
 
 
 that the mere agreement of sale made Booyens entitled to the shares and 
prima facie entitled, therefore, to have his name entered into the register 
of members. 
 
Smuts consequently appealed, arguing once again that the company’s 
articles of association created an agreement not to transfer the rights (a 
pactum de non cedendo) and that failure to comply with the procedure laid 
down in the articles of association precluded Booyens from becoming 
entitled to the shares. 
 
Cameron JA delivered the unanimous judgment. 
 
The judge explained that s20 of the Companies Act524 obliges a private 
company in its articles of association to place restrictions on the right to 
transfer its shares,525 and that this restricted transferability is an essential 
characteristic of a private company. 526 
 
Cameron JA made it clear that the restriction on transfer in the Companies 
Act meant that ‘transfer’ in the ‘full’ and ‘technical’ sense of the word is 
restricted.527  Transfer, the judge said, comprises of a series of steps, viz, 
an agreement to transfer, the execution of a deed of transfer, and the 
registration of the transfer.528  If the restrictions imposed by the Act and 
the articles of association of the company (which encompass this threefold 
meaning of the term ‘transfer’) are not complied with, then according to the 
judge, the shares are not transferable at all.529  
 
                                                    
524 61 of 1973. 
525 Supra 21A-D. 
526 Supra 21D. 
527 Supra 21G. 
528 Supra 21H relying on the words of Rumpff JA in Inland Property Development 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Cilliers 1973 (3) SA 245 (A) 251C. 
529 Supra 22D (‘glad nie oordraagbaar nie’). 
 
 
 
 
 The judge stated that articles 21 - 24 of the model articles of association 
contained in Table B of Schedule 1 of the Act contain restrictions on the 
transfer of shares.530 He stated if a private company adopts the model 
articles of association a contract is created between the shareholders and 
according to s20, their right to transfer the company's shares is limited by 
requiring that the stated procedure in articles 21 – 24 to be first complied 
with before the shares may validly be transferred to a party who is not a 
shareholder. 531   
 
Cameron JA cautioned that if the procedure is not complied with, no rights 
in respect of the shares could be transferred to a purchaser.532  The 
reason for this was because in such a case the right would ‘from its 
inception, lack the attribute of transmissibility’.533 In finding favour with the 
argument of Smuts the judge held that Table B of Schedule 1 therefore 
contains an absolute prohibition in the form of a pactum de non 
cedendo.534 
 
The Appeal Court thus authoritatively confirmed what was stated in earlier 
cases dealing with share transfer restrictions.   
 
Recently the pactum de non cedendo once again arose in the context of 
insolvency. 
 
In Any Name 451 (Pty) Ltd v Capespan (Pty) Ltd,535 Any Name 451 
brought an application that it be substituted for Chance Brothers (Pty) Ltd 
and Club Champion Investments (Pty) Ltd as claimant in the latter 
company’s arbitration proceedings against Capespan. 
                                                    
530 Supra 23B-G. 
531 Supra 24E. 
532 Supra 24F. 
533 Supra 24G with the judge quoting from LAWSA. 
534 Supra 24H-25A. 
535 2007 JOL 19402 (C).  See Chapter 5 for a further discussion. 
 
 
 
 
  
Chance Brothers and Champion Investments entered into a marketing 
contract with Capespan and subsequently a dispute arose between the 
parties with the former alleging that Capespan had breached the contract.  
 
Before the matter could be heard the two companies were liquidated.  The 
liquidators were not interested in pursuing the pending proceedings, 
apparently since there were insufficient funds to do so.  Any Name 451 
was consequently incorporated for the purpose of acquiring and 
prosecuting the claim.  The liquidators subsequently ceded to Any Name 
451 all rights, title and interest in their claims against Capespan. 
 
Capespan objected to the substitution on various grounds.  The ground 
relevant to this discussion was to be found in clause 16 of the marketing 
contract between Capespan and the two companies.  Clause 16 prohibited 
cession and read as follows: 
 
Save as herein expressly otherwise provided, neither this 
agreement nor any part, share or interest therein nor any rights or 
obligations hereunder may be ceded, assigned or otherwise 
transferred without prior written consent of the other party, 
provided that Capespan shall have the right to cede, assign or 
transfer this agreement, either in whole or in part, to an 
associated or subsidiary company of Capespan without the 
consent of the supplier. 536 
 
Zondi AJ adjudicated the matter and, relying on Paiges v Van Ryn Gold 
Mine Estates, held that the prohibition only contemplated a voluntary 
cession and did not find application where the cession was involuntary.537  
Thus, the pactum de non cedendo did not prevent the liquidators from 
ceding the right to Any Name 451.538 
 
                                                    
536 Supra 26. 
537 Ibid. 
538 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 Relying on Lithins v Laeveldse Koöperasie Bpk and another, Zondi AJ 
said: 
 
A pactum de non cedendo does not bind the liquidator who 
alienates and cedes the contractual right pursuant to his duties as 
liquidator in insolvency unless it appears in a lease, in which case 
section 37(5) of the Insolvency Act applies, or unless it appears 
from the pactum that it would also be applicable in the case of 
insolvency.539 
 
After considering clause 16, the judge concluded that, since nothing in the 
clause indicated that the pactum de non cedendo was to bind any person 
other than the companies, it could not be construed as binding the 
liquidators on insolvency.540  The liquidators were thus free to cede the 
right to Any Name 451. 
 
This decision appears to be in line with what has been held in earlier 
cases.  The noteworthy development in this regard occurred when 
Capespan appealed against the decision of the court a quo.   
 
In the unanimous judgment in Capespan (Pty) Ltd v Any Name 451 (Pty) 
Ltd, 541 Thring J took an entirely different view, thereby reversing the 
outcome.  
 
Thring J agreed with Zondi AJ that a pactum de non cedendo would not 
always prevent an involuntary cession and that there were instances 
where an involuntary cession would be ineffective.542  
 
Thring J also agreed that two such instances, as explained by Zondi AJ, 
are when a lease contains a stipulation which prohibits the transfer of any 
right under the lease as set out in s37(5) of the Insolvency Act; and where 
                                                    
539 Ibid. 
540 Ibid. 
541 2008 (4) SA 510 (C).  See Chapter 5 for a further discussion. 
542 Supra 513A. 
 
 
 
 
 it is clear from the agreement prohibiting the cession that such a 
prohibition was to prevail in a case of insolvency.543 
 
The judge was of the opinion that Zondi AJ had mistakenly overlooked a 
third possible instance where the pactum de non cedendo may triumph 
against insolvency.544 
 
This oversight, it would seem, stemmed from Zondi AJ believing Paiges to 
be authority for the proposition that a pactum de non cedendo cannot 
prevent an involuntary cession.545   
 
According to Thring J, De Villiers JA in Paiges was simply stating that a 
pactum de non cedendo could not prevent a right from vesting in the 
trustee upon insolvency as this occurs through the operation of law.  
According to the judge, De Villiers JA was not laying down authority that 
the pactum de non cedendo prevents an involuntary cession.   
 
In building a foundation leading to the third instance, Thring J began by 
discussing the possible departure from the Paiges judgment by the court 
in Trust Bank v Standard Bank,546 where that court held that where the 
prohibition against cession was created with the right an interest need not 
be proven as the right is limited by such a stipulation.547 
 
The judge subsequently quoted Scott, one of the leading academics on 
the law of cession, who supports the Trust Bank departure.  Scott 
suggests that where a right is created as non-transferable ab initio, even 
                                                    
543 Supra 513B-C. 
544 Supra 513C. 
545 Supra 513H – 514A.  Paiges supra 616: ‘But the prohibition only contemplates a 
voluntary cession and does not prevent the right to the wages vesting in the trustee in 
insolvency’. 
546 Trust Bank supra 189D-G. 
547 Supra 514C-F.   
 
 
 
 
 an involuntary cession is ineffective.548  Thring J was in complete 
agreement with Scott’s view for the reasons that it was consistent with the 
judgments of previous cases and the views of other academics, and that it 
gives effect to the principle of freedom of contract.549   
 
Further, freedom of contract was the principle underlying the judge’s 
statement that a trustee or liquidator can acquire no greater rights against 
the debtor than the creditor had before insolvency.550  It was also the 
principle underlying the judge’s view that Lithins551 and other cases which 
state the law too broadly should be overruled.552  
 
Thring J was thus of the opinion that Zondi AJ failed to recognise the third 
instance which exists if the pactum de non cedendo was inserted into the 
agreement creating the right from the outset.553 
 
In conclusion, Thring J found that the pactum de non cedendo in this case 
was included in the agreement creating the prohibition ab initio.  
Accordingly, the liquidators were bound by the pactum de non cedendo 
and the judge consequently held that the cession by the liquidators was 
invalid and ineffective.554 
 
The court in Capespan thus expanded the application of the pactum de 
non cedendo to the trustee in insolvency because now, if the personal 
right does not arise from a lease and if the pactum de non cedendo does 
                                                    
548 Supra 514G – 515B. 
549 Supra 515B-J. 
550 Supra 518D-E. 
551 Lithins v Laeveldse Koöperasie Bpk and another 1989 (3) SA 891 (T).  A case 
expressly mentioned by Thring J was Goodwin Stable Trust v Duohex (Pty) Ltd and 
another 1998 (4) SA 606 (C). 
552 Supra 518F-H. 
553 Supra 518C-E.  See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the two possible 
constructions of the pactum de non cedendo – that is – either when appearing in the 
agreement creating the right ab initio, or when super-imposed on an already existing 
agreement at a later stage. 
554 Supra 521E-G and 521I-J. 
 
 
 
 
 not expressly include involuntary cessions, the trustee will still be bound if 
the pactum de non cedendo appeared in the agreement creating the 
personal right ab initio. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
As can be observed from the above case discussions, there are many 
uncertainties in the principles governing pacta de non cedendo.  
 
As has already been pointed out, the judgment in the leading case, Paiges 
v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates, is not convincing, yet no court has 
attempted to correct it.  No court since Paiges has even expressly 
suggested the possibility that the Appellate Division may have erred.  This 
state of affairs is clearly unsatisfactory and academics have accordingly 
developed their own views of the rules governing pacta de non cedendo.  
This can be seen in the next Chapter which considers the views of the 
academics in detail.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER FOUR 
 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN ACADEMICS’ VIEWS ON THE PACTUM DE 
NON CEDENDO 
 
In Chapter 3 the courts’ approach to pacta de non cedendo was discussed 
in detail.  This Chapter considers academic opinion.  In what follows, it 
shall be shown that the academics’ views on pacta de non cedendo are 
not necessarily in line with the courts’ view.  
 
Ever since Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates,555 our courts have, for 
the most part, followed the position espoused by De Villiers JA:  That a 
pactum de non cedendo is only valid and binding if the debtor can show 
that he has an interest in it.  The effect of a valid pactum de non cedendo 
is that the personal right is rendered non-transferable.  If the personal right 
is ceded in contravention of the pactum de non cedendo, such a cession 
is thus ineffective to transfer ownership of the right to the cessionary.556   
 
Strangely enough, the ratio has rarely been criticised by other judges.  
The criticisms by academics, however, are in abundance.  The main 
criticisms can be distinguished as follows: 
 
4.1 The interest requirement and the two possible forms of pacta de 
non cedendo 
 
The court in Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates made no mention of the 
possibility that the pactum de non cedendo could manifest itself in different 
constructions.  Paiges only recognised a pactum de non cedendo that was 
                                                    
555 1920 AD 600. 
556 Presumably with an action for damages arising against the cedent for breach of 
contract. 
 
 
 
 
 entered into between the debtor and creditor at the time of creating the 
right.557 
 
Trust Bank v Standard Bank 558 was the first case to recognise another 
possible construction,559 although many courts refuse to follow this 
purported departure.560     
 
According to Nienaber,561 the first construction arises when the pactum de 
non cedendo is concluded between the debtor and the creditor at the time 
that the right is created.562   
 
                                  creates a right which  
                                         is not transferable         
Creditor (cedent)                                                                      Debtor 
 
     
    
         cedes contrary to the 
         pactum de non cedendo 
                                                                           third party attempt to enforce the 
                                                                           right against the debtor 
                                                                                                                                                
  
 
   
Third party (cessionary)                                                                   
 
 
                                                    
557 Supra 617:  ‘The stipulation against cession is part and parcel of the agreement 
creating the right, and the right is limited by the stipulation’.  
558 Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa 1968 (3) SA 166 (A) 189F. 
559 King JA in Italtrafo SpA v Electricity Supply Commission 1978 (2) SA 705 (W) 
expressly agreed with that ratio.  See also L Tager ‘General principles of contract’ 1978 
Annual Survey 129. 
560 See Vawda v Vawda 1980 (2) SA 341 (T) and subsequent cases.  Recently, a full 
bench in the case of Capespan (Pty) Ltd v Any Name 451 (Pty) Ltd 2008 (4) SA 510 (C) 
expressly accepted the two possible constructions.  Whether this express recognition will 
be accepted by the Supreme Court of Appeal remains to be seen. 
561 PM Nienaber ‘Cession’ in LAWSA 2ed vol 2 (2003) para 37. 
562 S Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles 2ed (2003) 443 footnote 165.  This 
type of pactum de non cedendo is far more common than the alternative, probably 
because the alternative form has a limited scope of application.  It is this construction 
which the court in Paiges recognised.  
 
 
 
 
  
The second construction arises when the pactum de non cedendo is 
concluded between the cedent and the cessionary at the time that the 
agreement preceding or accompanying the cession was concluded.563  In 
this construction the cedent and cessionary agree that the cessionary will 
not cede the right further.  The original debtor, therefore, is not in the 
pactum de non cedendo equation.   
 
 
                                                cedes right contrary to the  
                                                pactum de non cedendo 
Third party                  Third party cessionary      
(cessionary) № 2       № 1 (cedent)           
                                  
 
   
          attempts to enforce the 
          right against original debtor        
                                                             
these parties 
agree to render 
the right not 
transferable 
   
   
                                                          
  Original             creates a right which                    Creditor (cedent)           
  debtor              is transferable 
 
 
 
In the first construction the restraint is ‘a characteristic of the right itself 
and from its inception the right lacks transferability’.564  In the second 
construction the restriction ‘is superimposed on a right that already 
existed’.565 
 
In recognising a second possible construction, the court in Trust Bank v 
Standard Bank necessarily departs from Paiges because with the 
                                                    
563 Nienaber op cit para 37. 
564 Ibid. 
565 Ibid 
 
 
 
 
 recognition of the two possible constructions comes a differentiation 
regarding the validity of the pactum de non cedendo.   
 
According to the ratio in Trust Bank, the interest requirement does not 
apply to the first construction, viz, the debtor does not have to show that 
he has an interest for the pactum de non cedendo to be valid; it is 
automatically valid: 
 
 …[t]hese principles do not, however, apply where the right is 
created with a restriction against alienation, and the restriction is 
contained in the very agreement recording the right, for in such a 
case the right itself is limited by the stipulation against alienation 
and can be relied upon by the debtor for whose benefit the 
stipulation was made.566 
 
Many of our academics have since favoured the existence of two possible 
constructions and the elimination of the interest requirement for the validity 
of the first construction.567 
 
Van der Merwe et al568 point out that if the majority of academics who are 
in support of the differentiation of the two constructions and the supposed 
departure by Botha JA in Trust Bank are to be followed by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal, then ‘it would constitute a significant departure from the 
Paiges case’ since ‘in the majority of cases the pactum de non cedendo 
will be agreed upon by the parties ab initio’.569   
 
In other words, Van der Merwe et al illustrate the fact that if it becomes 
settled law that the interest requirement can be done away with when the 
pactum de non cedendo is created from the inception of the contract, the 
interest requirement will disappear almost completely as most pacta de 
                                                    
566 Trust Bank v Standard Bank supra 189F. 
567 S Scott The Law of Cession 2ed (1991) 205 and 214 (hereinafter referred to as 
‘Cession’).  See also RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5ed (2006) 464. 
568 Van der Merwe et al op cit 443 footnote 165. 
569 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 non cedendo are inserted into a contract from its inception, as opposed to 
being super-imposed on the contract at a later stage. 
 
In my opinion the ratio in Trust Bank indeed amounts to a departure from 
the legal principles laid down in the Paiges case.  If the courts can be 
persuaded to accept this, no possible harm would come to the law of 
cession.  
 
Since a pactum de non cedendo underlies an agreement, if contractants 
agree to the prohibition, why should the debtor have to show, over and 
above that consensus was reached, that he has an interest in the pactum 
de non cedendo? 
 
4.2 The interest requirement and freedom of contract 
 
The interest requirement has been described as limiting contractants’ 
rights to freedom of contract:  If a contractant does not have an interest in 
the pactum de non cedendo the cession may be held to be invalid, even 
though the contractants wish it to be valid. 570  Thus, the contractants’ 
intentions are not given effect to with the result that the court imposes on 
the parties a contract they never wanted. 
 
Lubbe and Murray571 question why such an interest requirement exists for 
the validity of an ordinary contract.  Roussouw572 also asks why this 
particular prohibition should be treated differently from any other 
prohibition. 
 
                                                    
570 Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates supra 614 and 615, Northern Assurance Co Ltd 
v Methuen 1937 SR 103 111, S Scott ‘Pacta de non cedendo’ 1981 Tydskrif vir 
Hendendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 159 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Pacta’), RS 
Welsh ‘General principles of contract’ 1950 Annual Survey 81. 
571 GF Lubbe and CM Murray Farlam & Hathaway: Contract Cases, Material and 
Commentary 3ed (1988) 655. 
572 SR Roussouw ‘Pacta de non cedendo’ 1991 Responsa Meridiana 54-55. 
 
 
 
 
 Roussouw compares pacta de non cedendo to a limitation on the 
alienation of rights in the context of the law of things.  He states that an 
owner’s right to alienate may not only be limited by recognised real rights, 
but also by personal rights.573 As examples, Roussouw lists an option, a 
right of pre-emption, a restraint on alienation or a fideicommissum.574  
 
These restrictive personal rights are completely valid and some, the 
argument goes, are so strongly binding that they are perceived (from an 
historical and jurisprudential point of view) as an encumbrance on 
immovable property and can be registered as real rights.575 
 
The conclusion that Roussouw reaches is that if these agreements are 
regarded as valid and can lead to legitimate personal rights, then there 
should be no reason why agreements which prohibit the transfer of a 
personal right should not be valid without the addition requirement of an 
interest.576 
 
Roussouw makes a good point.  If contractants in other instances are free 
to include as a term of their contract a particular prohibition, why must a 
burden be placed on the debtor to show that he has an interest when both 
parties wish to include a pactum de non cedendo as a term of their 
contract?   
 
On the assumption that the contract is valid in every other respect, surely 
our courts should recognise the pactum de non cedendo as valid, 
regardless of the absence or presence of an interest?  Is that not the 
cornerstone of the principle of freedom of contract (‘pacta sunt servanda’) 
to which our law subscribes?   
 
                                                    
573 Roussouw op cit 54. 
574 Ibid. 
575 Roussouw op cit 54-55. 
576 Roussouw op cit 55. 
 
 
 
 
 Not all academics are of the opinion that the interest requirement limits a 
contractant’s freedom of contract.  Welsh577 questions the rationale of the 
interest requirement in relation to the case of Du Plessis v Scott.578   
 
In that case the court held that it was unnecessary for the defendant to 
prove that the pactum de non cedendo was genuinely in his interest and 
not merely an idle stipulation, since this was obvious from the contract 
between the parties.  
 
In view of the above, Welsh writes that:  
 
The decision may lead one to reflect whether this supposed 
‘limitation upon the freedom of contract’ really has any practical 
content or significance in our law.579   
 
De Wet and Van Wyk are of the opinion that no real meaning has been 
attached to the interest requirement as laid down in Paiges and that it is 
effectively an unconvincing argument.580  
 
Admittedly, De Villiers JA in Paiges spoke only of the contractant having 
‘an interest’; no court has subsequently given any further explanation as to 
what ‘an interest’ means – except for one or two judges who, without 
giving any reasons, took it upon themselves to term ‘an interest’ a 
‘material and reasonable’ interest,581 also without giving any further useful 
explanation of the term.   
 
                                                    
577 Welsh op cit 82 
578 1950 (2) SA 614 (W) 618. 
579 Welsh op cit 82. 
580 JC De Wet and AH Van Wyk Kontraktereg 4ed (1993) 254 footnote 16. 
581 Italtrafo SpA v Electricity Supply Commission 1978 (2) SA 705 (W) and Vwada v 
Vawda 1980 (2) SA 341 (T).  See Chapter 3 where it is questioned whether a ‘material 
and reasonable’ interest is a new interpretation which raises the debtor’s standard of 
proof.  It appears that only the case of Vawda has since used this term.  Further, in light 
of my proposed solution (to be found in Chapter 6) any issues presently arising from the 
interest requirement matter not, since I propose that the interest requirement be done 
away with. 
 
 
 
 
 De Wet and Van Wyk argue further that, because the interest requirement 
is not defined, but broad and vague, all contractants would consequently 
have some interest in the pactum de non cedendo as it would surely 
always be of importance to the debtor to know the identity of the 
creditor.582  The interest requirement therefore does not go far to limit a 
contractant’s freedom of contract.  
 
Scott seems to agree on this point as she states that the discussion of De 
Villiers JA of the instances when an interest will exist may lead to an 
interpretation that an interest will almost always be present.583  She is also 
of the opinion that it is in the interest of any debtor that he know the 
identity of the person to whom he has to pay his debt.584 
 
It can thus be accepted that in the vast majority of cases, most debtors 
would have some interest in the pactum de non cedendo being valid.  The 
pertinent question is:  Under what circumstance does some interest 
become ‘an interest’ for the pactum de non cedendo to be upheld by our 
courts? 
 
Sande and Voet spoke of ‘an interest’, ‘some interest’, ‘any interest’ and 
Sande cautioned that the interest should not be ‘too strictly judged’.585  
This supports the view that the interest requirement does not pose much 
of an obstacle to the debtor when attempting to enforce the pactum de 
non cedendo.  The requirement can therefore easily be shown to exist, 
and the pactum de non cedendo will accordingly be upheld as the 
contractants originally intended it to be – freedom of contract prevailing. 
 
                                                    
582 De Wet and Van Wyk op cit 254 footnote 16. 
583 S Scott ‘Italtrafo SpA v Electricity Supply Commission 1978 (2) SA 705 (W)’ 1978 
Tydskrif vir Hendendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg 334 (hereinafter referred to as 
‘Italtrafo SpA’); Scott Cession 206. 
584 Ibid. 
585 See Chapter 1. 
 
 
 
 
 Since a contractant would be inconvenienced by having to adduce some 
kind of evidence to show that the prohibition is in his interest should the 
matter end up in court, it is understandable why some would consider the 
interest requirement to be limiting freedom of contract.  True freedom of 
contract would only require the contractant to show that the parties were 
ad idem. 
 
In reality, however, the interest requirement is so vague and ill-defined 
that it would be relatively easy to show that an interest exists.  
Consequently freedom of contract remains more or less intact.  Seen from 
this point of view the interest requirement seems rather redundant.586   
 
4.3 The interest requirement and the alternative arguments 
 
It is clear that pacta de non cedendo set two conflicting freedoms up 
against each other, viz, freedom of contract and freedom of trade.587  Scott 
states that the problems encountered when determining the validity of 
pacta de non cedendo relate to the approach one adopts towards cession 
as a legal notion.588   
 
She argues that there are two possible approaches:  A law of things 
approach, also known as a law of property approach (‘sakeregtelike 
benadering’) or a law of obligations approach (‘verbintenisregtelike 
benadering’).589   In terms of the law of property approach, cession brings 
about the transfer of an incorporeal asset, where ownership is transferred.  
                                                    
586 It is submitted, however, that if one subscribes to a law of property approach the 
interest requirement does gain some relevance, as according to the general principle laid 
down by Sande and Voet, res in commercio should not be withdrawn from commercial 
dealings without a good reason.  See below for a further discussion as well as Scott 
Cession 209. 
587 It must be noted from the outset that the term ‘freedom of trade’ in this context means 
the right to transfer one’s property or rights freely; or to conduct business through the free 
transfer of such property or rights.  It does not mean the freedom to choose one’s 
profession or occupation. 
588 Scott ‘Pacta’ 149. 
589 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 In terms of the law of obligations approach, cession brings about a 
replacement of the creditor, where the personal right is transferred.590   
 
Scott explains that if one follows a law of property approach, the validity of 
the pactum de non cedendo is determined according to the basic principle 
of ownership that an owner may freely dispose of his property.591  Further, 
it is public policy that things should not be withdrawn from commercial 
dealings.592 
 
If one follows a law of obligations approach, the validity of the pactum de 
non cedendo is determined according to the basic premise that parties to 
a contract are, in principle, free to determine the content of a personal 
right through agreement and that contracts usually do not apply to third 
parties.593  Scott stresses that either one or the other approach should be 
adopted consistently, and not a mixture of the two.594 
 
4.3.1 Joubert’s argument 
 
As a solution to the controversial interest requirement, Joubert offers an 
interesting alternative.  He submits that the issue of the validity of a 
pactum de non cedendo does not involve a choice between the two 
conflicting freedoms, viz, freedom of trade (Scott’s law of property 
approach) and freedom of contract (Scott’s law of obligations 
approach).595  The issue is rather how these two conflicting freedoms may 
                                                    
590 Ibid. 
591 Ibid. 
592 Scott ‘Pacta’ 150.  
593 Ibid.  
594 Scott ‘Pacta’ 162. 
595 N Joubert Die Regsbetrekking by Kredietfaktorering (1985) LLD Thesis Randse 
Afrikaanse Universiteit 464 footnote 144 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Kredietfaktorering’); N 
Joubert 1986 ‘Boekskuldfinansiering en pacta de non cedendo’ Modern Business 110 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Boekskuldfinansiering’). 
 
 
 
 
 be reconciled with one another.596  Joubert’s solution can be seen in the 
following extract:   
 
‘Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat dit nie nodig is om met 
besondere reels te werk waarmee die geldigheid van pacta de non 
cedendo beoordeel moet word nie.  Al wat nodig is, is om aan die 
hand van die normale geldigheidsvereistes vir ’n kontrak vas te stel 
of ’n pactum de non cedendo geldig is.  Veral die 
geoorloofheidsvereiste kom in hierdie verband ter sprake.  In die 
Suid-Afrikaanse reg is ’n kontrak onder andere ongeoorloofd indien 
dit in stryd met die openbare belang is’.597   
 
Joubert is of the opinion that it is not against the interest requirement that 
the pactum de non cedendo should be judged and it is therefore 
unnecessary to select and be consistent with a particular approach.  The 
pactum de non cedendo should be judged against the general validity 
requirements of a contract.598  One of these requirements is that a contract 
must not be unlawful, or more specifically, it must not be against public 
policy.599 
 
To illustrate his submission, Joubert relies on Magna Alloys and Research 
SA (Pty) Ltd v Ellis.600 In this case the court was not faced with a pactum 
de non cedendo, but with a restraint of trade clause.  The court held that 
restraint of trade clauses are prima facie valid unless it can be shown that 
the restraint of trade clause would be contrary to public policy, and a 
restraint which is unreasonable would be contrary to public policy.601  Only 
in such a case would the clause be invalid and unenforceable.602  For 
Joubert, a factor which may indicate unreasonableness is when the 
                                                    
596 Ibid. 
597 Joubert Kredietfaktorering 463. 
598 Joubert Kredietfaktorering 463; Joubert ‘Boekskuldfinansiering’ 111. 
599 Ibid. 
600 1984 (4) SA 874 (A). 
601 Supra 886I-887; 891A-B. 
602 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 person in whose favour the restriction applies, has no interest in the 
restraint of trade clause.603   
 
He thus compares the pactum de non cedendo to the restraint of trade 
clause which is governed by public policy.  As the comparison goes, if the 
person in whose favour the pactum de non cedendo applies has an 
interest in it, then according to the decision in Magna Alloys and Research 
v Ellis, the pactum de non cedendo will not be invalid as it will not be 
against public policy, since the presence of an interest renders the 
restraint reasonable.604   
 
Joubert cites Paiges in support of the view that our courts judge the 
validity of pacta de non cedendo against the same criterion as that of an 
agreement in restraint of trade, viz, the requirement of lawfulness or public 
policy.  He uses the judgments of Gregorowski J and Wessels J in the 
court a quo as an illustration, since both judges, although reaching 
different conclusions, assessed the pactum de non cedendo in light of 
public policy.605 
 
Joubert points out that Gregorowski J was of the opinion that the pactum 
de non cedendo was not against public policy since the employer had an 
interest in the restriction, which may also serve to be beneficial to the 
employee.606 
 
He also observes that Wessels J, on the other hand, was of the opinion 
that the pactum de non cedendo was against public policy since the 
employee was deprived of financing possibilities with the only option being 
                                                    
603 Joubert Kredietfaktorering 464; Joubert ‘Boekskuldfinansiering’ 111. 
604 Joubert Kredietfaktorering 465; Joubert ‘Boekskuldfinansiering’ 111.  Joubert adds that 
this should also be the case where the pactum de non cedendo appears in the 
agreement creating the right. 
605 Joubert Kredietfaktorering 466; Joubert ‘Boekskuldfinansiering’ 111. 
606 Paiges supra 603.  Joubert Kredietfaktorering 466; Joubert ‘Boekskuldfinansiering’ 
111. 
 
 
 
 
 to obtain credit from his employer, which may not have been given at a fair 
and equitable rate.607 
 
Joubert also notes that the Appeal Court in Paiges considered how public 
policy would affect a pactum de non cedendo.  The position, as declared 
by De Villiers JA, is that a pactum de non cedendo that has been freely 
entered into is valid and not against public policy until such time as the 
legislature states otherwise.608 
 
In my opinion, although the courts sometimes discuss public policy with 
regard to pacta de non cedendo, they do this because it is argued by the 
party seeking to escape the pactum de non cedendo that the prohibition is 
against public policy.   
 
Lubbe and Murray, in a sceptical discussion, question whether a restraint 
of trade clause is sufficiently akin to a pactum de non cedendo to allow for 
such an analogy.609  I believe that the two constructions are sufficiently 
similar to justify a comparison and as Joubert has pointed out, a restraint 
of trade clause and a pactum de non cedendo are both restraints 
voluntarily agreed to by parties in the commercial arena.   
 
The validity of a pactum de non cedendo has primarily been assessed by 
the presence of an interest to the debtor and, as an aside, the presence of 
an advantage to the creditor may be persuasive.  As mentioned above, the 
court in Magna Alloys held that unreasonableness is a factor indicating 
that the restraint may be against public policy. What I find problematic is 
that Joubert seems to associate the pactum de non cedendo with this 
factor, as ‘reasonableness’ or ‘unreasonableness’ has never been a factor 
against which the pactum de non cedendo has been judged.   
                                                    
607 Paiges supra 609.  Joubert Kredietfaktorering 466; Joubert ‘Boekskuldfinansiering’ 
111. 
608 Supra 616. 
609 Lubbe and Murray op cit 655.  See also Scott Cession 212. 
 
 
 
 
  
I tend to agree with the succinctly stated critique that the problem with 
Joubert’s submission is that he attempts to bring the pactum de non 
cedendo under the umbrella of the Magna Alloys decision.610   
 
Perhaps Joubert should not have made his suggestion of judging a 
pactum de non cedendo against public policy so specific and so heavily 
dependent on Magna Alloys, the restraint of trade clause and 
reasonableness.  
 
Roussouw’s main concern with Joubert’s argument is that the shift from 
the pactum de non cedendo to the restraint of trade clause cannot be 
made spontaneously.611   One of the reasons for this is that a restraint of 
trade clause is valid unless the contrary is proven.  The pactum de non 
cedendo, on the other hand, is invalid unless the debtor has an interest in 
the restriction.612  
 
Another reason that Roussouw advances is that the two constructions 
contemplate different interests.  A restraint of trade clause is concerned 
with freedom of contract in direct conflict with the right to freedom of trade.  
A pactum de non cedendo is concerned with freedom of contract in direct 
conflict with the right to freely dispose of an asset.613  
 
Roussouw, however, fails to recognise that the two interests or 
constructions are more similar than different.  He already accepts that the 
notion of freedom of contract plays a role in both constructions.  He, 
however, overlooks the fact that in the commercial and mercantile arena, 
disposing of assets for financial gain is trading.   Thus, not being able to 
freely dispose of an asset for financial gain is a restraint on freedom of 
                                                    
610 Roussouw op cit 61. 
611 Roussouw op cit 60:  ‘[D]aar [kan] na my mening nie sonder meer so ’n sprong vanaf 
die pactum de non cedendo na die “restraint of trade” gemaak word nie’. 
612 Ibid. 
613 Roussouw op cit 60-61. 
 
 
 
 
 trade.  By the same token, one of the ways that a person’s freedom of 
trade may be restricted is by restraining a person’s ability to dispose of 
assets for financial gain. 
 
Perhaps if Joubert had suggested that the pactum de non cedendo should 
be judged against public policy in general, and used a restraint of trade 
clause, as illustrated in Magna Alloys as a mere example, his view might 
have been better received by other academics.   
 
4.3.2 Roussouw’s argument 
 
It seems that Roussouw has drawn some inspiration from Joubert’s 
argument and has come up with a suggestion of his own.  Roussouw 
submits that to achieve the result that Joubert endeavours to achieve, one 
need not rely solely on Magna Alloys and Research v Ellis, and that one 
can do away with the interest requirement completely. 614   
 
The pactum de non cedendo need only be judged against public policy in 
general with the central question being which freedom should be favoured 
– freedom of contract or freedom of trade?  Roussouw is of the opinion 
that an approach of this nature is preferable in changing times, since 
public policy is a flexible concept that can change from time to time and 
from case to case.615  He also adds that judging the validity of pacta de 
non cedendo against a single element may bring about more certainty.616 
 
There are, however, two points of interest that should be mentioned.  
These points concern public policy, so the meaning and content of public 
policy must first be considered before the two points can be discussed:617 
  
                                                    
614 Roussouw op cit 61. 
615 Roussouw op cit 63; see also Magna Alloys and Research v Ellis supra 891H. 
616 Roussouw op cit 64. 
617 See generally S Van der Merwe and GF Lubbe ‘Bona fides and public policy in 
contract’ 1991 Stellenbosch Law Review (vol 2) 91. 
 
 
 
 
 4.3.2.1 Public policy 
 
In the case of Printing and Numerical Registration Co. v Sampson,618 
Jessel MR stated the following: 
 
If there is one thing which, more than another, public policy 
requires, it is that men of full age and competent understanding 
shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, 
when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred and 
shall be enforced by our courts of justice.619 
 
This dictum has since been cited, in some form or another, in many cases 
thereafter.620  More recently in Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes, 621 Smalberger 
JA held that: 
 
No court should therefore shrink from the duty of declaring a 
contract contrary to public policy when the occasion so demands. 
The power to declare contracts contrary to public policy should, 
however, be exercised sparingly and only in the clearest of cases, 
lest uncertainty as to the validity of contracts result from an arbitrary 
and indiscriminate use of the power. One must be careful not to 
conclude that a contract is contrary to public policy merely because 
its terms (or some of them) offend one’s individual sense of 
propriety and fairness….  In grappling with this often difficult 
problem it must be borne in mind that public policy generally 
favours the utmost freedom of contract. 622 
 
                                                    
618 1875 LR 19 Eq 462 465.   
619 Similarly, Innes CJ in Law Union and Rock Insurance Co Ltd v Carmichael’s Executor 
1917 AD 593 598 stated: ‘[P]ublic policy demands in general full freedom of contract; the 
right of men freely to bind themselves in respect of all legitimate subject matters’. 
620 Wells v South African Alumenite Company 1927 AD 69; Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 
1989 (1) SA (AD) 1; De Klerk v Old Mutual Insurance Co Ltd 1990 (1) All SA 371 (E); 
Joosub Investments (Pty) Ltd v Maritime and General Insurance Co Ltd 1990 (3) SA 373 
(C). 
621 1989 (1) SA 1 AD 2A-B.   
622 This quotation has been applied or referred to in many cases, for example, Botha (now 
Griessel) and another v Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd 1989 (2) All SA 401 (A); De Klerk v Old 
Mutual Insurance Co Ltd 1990 (1) All SA 371 (E); Joosub Investments (Pty) Ltd v 
Maritime and General Insurance Co Ltd 1990 (3) SA 373 (C). 
 
 
 
 
 Hopkins623 has recognised that in the law of contract public policy has 
acquired its own meaning.  He comments that the words from Printing and 
Numerical Registration Co. v Sampson ‘captured the essence of public 
policy in contract law’ and submits that ‘the sanctity of contract rule … [has 
become] the epitome of public policy in contract law’.624 
 
From the case law it is very clear that if the validity of pacta de non 
cedendo were to be judged against public policy, they would more often 
than not be found to be valid, since public policy (as seen by the courts) 
seems to put the principle of ‘pacta sunt servanda’ on a very high 
pedestal. 
 
The first point of interest that should be mentioned is that, although the 
concept of public policy is flexible enough to accommodate changing 
times and values, most of the above cited cases have stated at some 
point in the judgment that public policy is ‘vague’625, ‘imprecise’626 and 
‘elusive’627 to quote just a few descriptions.  Determining the validity of 
pacta de non cedendo against public policy might become obscured in a 
court’s attempt to establish what public policy requires in that particular 
case. 
 
The second point of interest concerns the caution expressed by Nicholas 
AJA in Longman Distillers v Drop Inn Group of Liquor Supermarkets,628 
where he stated that when a court is faced with the question of public 
                                                    
623 K Hopkins ‘The influence of the Bill of Rights on the enforcement of contracts’ 2003  
De Jure (vol 32) 134. 
624 Ibid. 
625 Law Union and Rock Insurance Co Ltd v Carmichael’s Executor 1917 AD 593 598. 
626 Longman Distillers Ltd v Drop Inn Group of Liquor Supermarkets (Pty) Ltd 1990 (2) SA 
906 (A) 913F. 
627 Ibid. 
628 Supra 913H-I. 
 
 
 
 
 policy it should keep in mind the well known words in Richardson v 
Mellish,629 where Burrough J held that: 
 
I, for one, protest…against arguing too strongly upon public policy; - 
it is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never 
know where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law. It 
is never argued at all but when other points fail.630 
 
More recently, a South African judge has similarly remarked: 
 
Our Courts have recognised that public policy can be ‘an unruly 
horse’ unless the judicial reins are tightly held.631  
 
There is definitely some truth in this.  Public policy is often included as an 
alternative argument only, in the fear that the main argument does not 
succeed – the last resort or the fall-back argument.  Due to the fact that 
the concept of public policy is broad and insufficiently defined, it very 
easily functions as a ‘catch all’ net. 
 
Further, as Burrough J mentions, if courts too readily embark on a 
consideration of public policy in a particular issue, the results may not be 
desirable (‘you never know where it will carry you’) as public policy is itself 
not law.  Public policy is the community’s sense of justice which may not 
be ‘sound law’.  
 
4.3.3 Conclusion 
 
Roussouw’s submission is to judge pacta de non cedendo against public 
policy with the central question being whether freedom of contract or 
freedom of trade should be favoured.  The enquiry is futile since our courts 
clearly favour freedom of contract above freedom of trade, and have 
always insisted that public policy favours freedom of contract. 
                                                    
629 [1824] 130 ER 294 303. 
630 Longman Distillers supra 913I-914J. 
631 Per Seligson AJ in Joosub Investments supra 385D-E. 
 
 
 
 
  
Thus, if freedom of contract must prevail because public policy so dictates, 
then in terms of Roussouw’s alternative submission, pacta de non 
cedendo that are freely entered into, would generally be valid and 
enforceable. 
 
It must, however, be remembered that public policy is an ‘unruly horse’ 
and judging the pactum de non cedendo against it is risky and can lead to 
undesirable results.   
 
Albeit interesting, Joubert’s argument also cannot be seen as a solution,632  
and neither of the two submissions thus bring the pactum de non cedendo 
any closer to a solution.  
 
Returning to Scott’s submission, it seems as though the solution to the 
validity of pacta de non cedendo does indeed involve a choice between 
the two approaches and our courts have made their choice.  Our courts 
have impliedly adopted the freedom of contract approach (Scott’s law of 
obligations approach) and accordingly it seems as though a restraint of 
trade approach (or law of property approach) will rarely triumph.   
 
4.4 The interest requirement and the interpretation of Sande and Voet 
 
When our courts633 are faced with pacta de non cedendo they rely on 
Sande De Prohibita Rerum Alienatione and Voet Commentarius ad 
Pandectas as authority.  Scott has advanced two noteworthy criticisms in 
this regard.634  These two criticisms are discussed as follows: 
 
                                                    
632 That is, the reasonableness or unreasonableness factor against which he judges the 
pactum de non cedendo and the fact that the submission is too heavily reliant on the 
Magna Alloys case as well as the concept of restraint of trade, both of which should 
rather have been used as a general analogy. 
633 Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates and all the subsequent cases. 
634 See generally Scott ‘Italtrafo SpA’; Scott ‘Pacta’ and Scott Cession. 
 
 
 
 
 4.4.1 Applying two conflicting legal systems    
 
Scott raises the objection that our courts apply two conflicting legal 
systems in determining the validity and effect of pacta de non cedendo.  
To determine the validity of pacta de non cedendo, the views of Roman-
Dutch jurists, Sande and Voet are followed, yet the view of German jurists, 
Windscheid635 and Dernburg,636 are followed to determine the effect.637 
 
According to Paiges and subsequent cases, which base their reliance on 
Sande and Voet, a pactum de non cedendo will be valid if the debtor has 
an interest in the prohibition.  Sande and Voet require the debtor to have 
an interest in the prohibition since they follow a law of property approach 
where a restriction of the free disposal of things in commercial dealings 
has to be justified.638   
 
As to the effect, Sande and Voet state that a cession in contravention of 
the pactum de non cedendo still transfers ownership of the personal right 
to the cessionary, but the debtor has an action for damages against the 
cedent.639   
 
This effect has been rejected by our courts in favour of the German law 
approach.   
Paragraph 399 of the German Civil Code640 provides that a pactum de non 
cedendo is valid without the requirement that it has to be in the interest of 
the debtor.641  This is so because the German legal system follows a law 
                                                    
635 B Windscheid Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts 8ed (1900) 358 footnote 5. 
636 H Dernburg Pandekten 3ed vol 2 (1892) 138. 
637 Scott ‘Italtrafo SpA’ 335; Scott ‘Pacta’ 159; Scott Cession 210. 
638 Scott ‘Pacta’ 155 footnote 69 and 156. 
639 See Chapter 1. 
640 Known as the Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (hereinafter referred to as the ‘BGB’). 
641 Scott ‘Italtrafo SpA’ 335.  Paragraph 399 of the BGB states that: ‘A claim is not 
assignable if the performance cannot be effected in favour of any person other than the 
original creditor without alteration of its substance, or if the assignment is excluded by 
 
 
 
 
 of obligations approach, where parties are free to determine the content of 
their contracts through agreement.642   
 
In Germany, therefore, pacta de non cedendo are valid ex mero moto as a 
pactum de non cedendo can only occur when the right is created by 
agreement between the creditor and the debtor.  The right is thus created 
as a non-transferable right from the outset.  Should the right be transferred 
contrary to the prohibition, the effect is that the cessionary receives 
nothing, with ownership still vesting in the cedent.643  
 
Scott’s main objection to applying two different legal systems in South 
Africa is that the Roman-Dutch legal system follows a law of property 
approach and the German legal system follows a law of obligations 
approach which may be jurisprudentially unsound.644  She argues that 
whichever approach is to be preferred, it should be dogmatically pure with 
the validity and effect both being dealt with either under the law of property 
or under the law of obligations.645  
 
Scott’s solution is that a clear distinction should be drawn between a 
pactum de non cedendo that was entered into between the debtor and 
creditor at the time of creating the right and a pactum de non cedendo that 
was super-imposed onto an already existing agreement.646  As the 
suggestion goes, different legal principles should be applied depending on 
which type of pactum de non cedendo one is dealing with.  If the 
                                                                                                                                              
agreement with the debtor’.  [My emphasis]  See IS Forrester, SL Goren and H Ilgen The 
German Civil Code (1975) 64 for the English translation. 
642 Scott ‘Pacta’ 160 and 161. 
643 Scott ‘Italtrafo SpA’ 335; Scott ‘Pacta’ 154-155 who relies on K Larenz Lehrbuch des 
Schuldrechts 11ed (1976) and W Fikentscher Schuldrecht 6ed (1976). 
644 Scott ‘Italtrafo SpA' 335; Scott ‘Pacta’ 160 and 161; Scott Cession 210-211 where she 
adds that: ‘By the time of Windscheid and Dernburg the German law of cession had 
undergone a distinctive development, which the Roman-Dutch law of cession never 
reached’. 
645 Scott ‘Pacta’ 161. 
646 Scott Cession 213. 
 
 
 
 
 prohibition is super-imposed on existing rights then the views of Sande 
and Voet should be purely applied to both the validity and the effect.647  
 
This means that the prohibition is only valid if it can be shown that the 
other party has an interest in it, as the law of property requires that 
property should not be withdrawn from commercial dealings without a 
good reason.  In terms of the effect, it is only binding on the parties 
themselves and has no bearing on third parties.  Thus, a cession in 
contravention of the pactum de non cedendo gives rise to damages in 
favour of the party who has an interest in the prohibition (the debtor).  
Ownership of the right, however, passes to the cessionary.648 
 
If the pactum de non cedendo was entered into at the time that the 
personal right was created, the German law view should be purely applied 
to both the validity and the effect.649  This means that the prohibition is 
automatically valid as the law of obligations favours freedom of contract.  
In regard to the effect, the right is non-transferable by its very nature, so a 
cession in contravention of the pactum de non cedendo is void.650 
 
It is submitted that legal principles governing pacta de non cedendo 
should be as pure as possible,651 and applying partially Roman-Dutch law 
for its validity and partially German law for its effect is undesirable.   
 
In my opinion, one set of rules stemming from one legal system should 
govern all pacta de non cedendo and it should not make a difference 
                                                    
647 Ibid. 
648 Scott Cession 213-214. 
649 Scott Cession 214, see also footnote 288. 
650 Ibid. 
651 Although the legal system in South Africa is generally mixed in nature, and although 
this is generally not problematic, the pactum de non cedendo is one of those instances 
where mixed legal principles make the situation unnecessarily more complex. 
 
 
 
 
 whether the pactum de non cedendo was created from the inception of the 
right or whether it was super-imposed on an already existing right.652  
 
4.4.2 Misinterpretation of Sande and Voet 
 
Scott is of the opinion that the court in Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine 
Estates, and the subsequent cases also relying on Sande and Voet, have 
applied the writings of these old authorities incorrectly.653  She believes 
that in their writings Sande and Voet were, first, referring to existing 
property and, secondly, that they were referring to corporeal property. 
 
From the manner in which Sande and Voet use the word ‘property’, Scott 
states that Sande and Voet had already existing or pre-existing property in 
mind.654  The implication is that the personal right would first have to come 
into existence through a cession agreement, before a restraint could be 
imposed upon it.  
 
Thus, if Sande and Voet were indeed referring to already existing property, 
only once the cession has been concluded and the personal right is 
brought into existence, can a pactum de non cedendo be imposed on that 
agreement.655 
 
The problem with this is that the prohibition would fall into the second form 
of pacta de non cedendo, a category not recognised by Voet. 656  It would 
                                                    
652 See Chapter 5.   
653 Scott ‘Italtrafo SpA’ 335; Scott Cession 208. 
654 Scott ‘Pacta’ 156 and footnote 81 and 158 as well as footnote 95; Scott Cession 208-
209 and footnote 257.  Scott bases this assertion on the fact that the old authorities refer 
to phrases like the ‘owner’s property’ or an owner disposing of ‘his own property’.    
655 Scott ‘Pacta’ 157. 
656 In this category the cedent, upon cession, adds the prohibition that the cessionary may 
not cede the right further.  See above as well as Chapter 1. 
 
 
 
 
 also cause the first form,657 which both Sande and Voet recognise, and 
which is the most common form of pactum de non cedendo, to fall into 
desuetude.658 
 
It is unnecessary for me to express an opinion as to whether or not Voet 
and Sande were referring to already existing property, as my view of the 
discussion of Scott’s second criticism disposes of the matter. 
 
As mentioned above, Scott asserts that Sande’s and Voet’s treatises 
covered only corporeal property and not incorporeal property.659  She 
bases this assertion on the fact that Sande expressly refers to corporeal 
things in the introductory chapter of De Prohibita.660  Scott further states 
that although it is not clear, Voet’s discussion probably also applies to 
corporeals only, as he continuously uses the word ‘res’ (‘thing’) and that 
when he gives examples he uses the word ‘traditio’ (‘delivery’ of a 
corporeal movable).661   
 
A contradiction, however, appears in Scott’s opinion, as in a later work she 
states that ‘Voet probably included incorporeal things under the term 
“res”’.662  Perhaps she changed her mind, or was influenced by the fact 
that it was widely accepted that at the time of Voet’s treatise an 
                                                    
657 It will be remembered that the first form is where the pactum de non cedendo comes 
into existence in the agreement which creates the personal right that is concluded by the 
debtor and the creditor.  See above as well as Chapter 1. 
658 This is so because the personal right is not already in existence when the pactum de 
non cedendo is imposed. 
659 Scott ‘Pacta’ 156-157, 158; Scott Cession 209.  Scott noticed something that many 
judges and academics were either oblivious to, or just accepted without question.  The 
result is that our courts have probably been applying the law on the restraint of transfer of 
corporeals to instances where the transfer of an incorporeal is has been restrained. 
660 Scott ‘Pacta’ 156.  See also footnote 79 where she quotes the said passage in the 
introduction to De Prohibita:  ‘Dominium vulgo definiri solet, esse jus de re corporali 
statuendi, ut si quis velit, nisi jure prohibeatur’. [My emphasis]  
661 Scott ‘Pacta’ 158 and footnote 96. 
662 Scott Cession 209. 
 
 
 
 
 incorporeal right was considered to be a thing just as much as a corporeal 
right was.663  
 
Be that as it may, Scott nevertheless holds the view that in their treatises 
Sande and Voet were referring to pacta de non aliendo, rather than pacta 
de non cedendo.664 
 
Despite the apparent contradiction, the criticism that our courts have 
misinterpreted Sande and Voet can be fully supported.   
 
Dealing first with Voet, he indeed refers to ‘traditio’ (of land) in one of his 
examples.  This does lead one to believe that he was referring to 
corporeals; if he were referring to incorporeals he would have used the 
word ‘cession’ as ownership of incorporeals is delivered or transferred in 
this manner.    
  
Furthermore, the heading of Commentarius 2 14 20, that introduces Voet’s 
discussion which follows, is translated as:   
 
Agreements depriving owners of management of own property 
without effect, unless other party has interest.665  (Gane’s 
translation) 
 
His discussion that follows begins with the following sentence: 
 
Agreements also by which an owner deprives himself of discretion 
and control as to his own property….666  (Gane’s translation) 
 
                                                    
663 Admittedly, this is a valid point in favour of the argument that Voet’s writings (at least) 
do cover incorporeals, but as can be seen from the discussion which follows, the more 
likely situation is that Voet’s writings do not include incorporeals. 
664 Scott Cession 209.  That is, an agreement not to alienate (a corporeal) as opposed to 
an agreement not to cede (an incorporeal). 
665 P Gane The Selective Voet being the Commentary on the Pandects by Johannes Voet 
and the Supplement to that work by Johannes van der Linden (1955) 434. 
666 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 According to the general principles of cession, when a right is ceded, for 
example, a right to claim monetary performance, complete ownership of 
the right is transferred to the cessionary.667  The cessionary alone owns 
the right to claim the debt from the debtor.  Even if a partial debt is ceded, 
that part of the debt which is ceded is owned by the cessionary alone.668 
 
The above-quoted passages from Commentarius imply that the owners of 
property are not deprived of their right of ownership in that property, but 
deprived merely of their right to, in some way, manage, control or exercise 
discretion over their property.  No mention is made of a transfer of the right 
of ownership of the property.  Cession transfers ownership, thus Voet 
could not have been referring to cession, but rather alienation of one or 
some of the rights of ownership in corporeal property. 
 
Voet goes on to state that if such an agreement to limit an owner’s right of 
ownership is entered into, one of the parties must have an interest in this 
agreement if an action is to arise from a breach thereof.  The examples he 
uses to illustrate this point are examples where an owner’s right is limited 
and not where an owner is divested of ownership. 
 
The examples used are that, without an interest, no person can enter into 
an agreement whereby an owner shall not have the power to consecrate 
his own place, or that he shall not have the power to bury a corpse in his 
own ground, or that he shall not have the power to part with his land 
without the consent of his neighbour. 
 
It is also interesting to note that Voet in Commentarius 2 14 20 refers to 
Sande’s De Prohibita part 4,669 the part that supposedly covers pacta de 
                                                    
667 Barring, of course, a cession in securitatem debiti where the pledge construction is 
preferred.  See Chapter 5. 
668 Nienaber op cit para 45-46. 
669 It is likely that because Voet refers to Sande’s De Prohibita, a treatise that our courts 
mistakenly thought covers restraints on cession, our courts assumed that Voet was also 
referring to restraints on cession. 
 
 
 
 
 non cedendo.  Therefore, if it can be shown that Sande was writing of 
pacta de non aliendo, it will strengthen the argument that Voet, too, was 
writing on pacta de non aliendo, since he associates his work with that of 
Sande.   
 
Sande was well known as an authority on the law of cession and his 
treatise, De Cessione Actionum, covers the general principles of cession.  
Since a treatise covering the general principles would normally be 
published first and another treatise dealing with prohibitions published 
thereafter, it can, therefore, be understood how our courts could 
mistakenly assume that De Prohibita deals with the restraints upon 
cession.670 
 
If one considers Sande’s writings in De Prohibita, it indeed appears that he 
expressly refers to corporeal property.671  This argument becomes even 
more convincing upon a reading of all the examples as a whole:  
 
Sande’s examples (as Voet’s) deal also with partial restrictions on 
ownership upon alienation, like a right of pre-emption or some type of 
servitude.  To illustrate this, one of the examples Sande uses is where a 
person alienates (through donation) his slave to another person on the 
condition that the slave shall not come into the possession of certain 
people, for instance the brother of the donee.  Such an agreement on the 
restraint of alienation is valid.672   
 
Of the examples that deal with a complete restriction on alienation, it is 
clear from the wording that what is being restricted is the sale of the 
                                                    
670 It is a possibility that the dates of publication do not necessarily reflect the dates when 
the treatises were written, that is, Sande may have written De Prohibita first, but 
published it after De Cessione.  In my opinion, there is nothing to suggest that this was 
the case. 
671 De Prohibita Introduction:  ‘Dominium vulgo definiri solet, esse jus de re corporali 
statuendi, ut si quis velit, nisi jure prohibeatur’. [My emphasis] 
672 De Prohibita 4 1 7.  PC Anders Commentary on Cession of Actions by Johannes à 
Sande (1906) 296.  
 
 
 
 
 corporeal object itself (usually land) and not cession of the rights in 
respect of the thing.  To illustrate this, one of the examples Sande uses is 
where a mortgagor places a restraint on the owner of the mortgaged land 
that the owner shall not alienate his land.673  Thus, the restriction covers 
alienation of the land, not the cession of the rights to the land. 
 
Another observation worthy of note is that both Sande and Voet never 
mention the words ‘cession’ or ‘cedent’ or ‘cessionary’.  They use only 
words like ‘alienate’, ‘purchaser’, ‘seller’ or ‘lessor’.  In fact, Sande actually 
used the term ‘pactum de non alienando’.674 
 
Further, in Sande’s earlier work,675 De Cessione Actionum, he wrote quite 
extensively on the cession of actions.  Therein he included a chapter 
(Chapter 5) on the kinds of actions which are capable of cession and 
those which are not.  If Sande was truly an authority on pacta de non 
cedendo, this chapter would have been his opportunity to deal with this 
issue, yet he said nothing.   
 
The obvious question is why would Sande write an entire treatise dealing 
with just pacta de non cedendo (supposedly De Prohibita) when he 
already had an opportunity to address the issue in De Cessione?   
 
Further, even if in the 10 years between De Cessione and De Prohibita, 
Sande was of the opinion that the pactum de non cedendo was so 
extensive that it warranted its own treatise, he surely would have by way 
of introduction explained how De Prohibita was an extension of De 
Cessione.  And, if this unlikely scenario was the case, surely Sande would 
still have, for the sake of completeness, briefly mentioned pacta de non 
cedendo in De Cessione?  
 
                                                    
673 De Prohibita 4 1 3.  Anders op cit 294-295. 
674 De Prohibita 4 2 2. 
675 About 10 years earlier. 
 
 
 
 
 Lastly, why would Sande have altered his terminology in De Prohibita?  If 
his first treatise is about cession in general and it is titled ‘De Cessione 
Actionum’, and if his second treatise is (supposedly) about the restrictions 
on cession, why did he not title his second treatise something like ‘De 
Prohibita Rerum Cessione’ – restraints upon cession, as opposed to ‘De 
Prohibita Rerum Alienatione’ – restraints upon alienation? 
 
4.4.3 Conclusion 
 
These unexplained vexing questions lead one to believe that Voet in 
Commentarius and Sande in De Prohibita were in fact, as Scott points out, 
referring to corporeal things and not incorporeal things.   
 
One is thus inclined to wonder what exactly the thought process was in the 
minds of the judges in Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estate.  Were they 
aware of the probability that these old authorities were writing about 
corporeal things?   
 
Their application of similar, yet incorrect legal principles was most likely an 
oversight.  On the other hand, it is bothersome that all the judges in 
Paiges made an oversight error, as well as all the other judges who have 
ever had the occasion to consider the issue,676 as well as all the 
academics (barring Scott of course) who have written on the pactum de 
non cedendo. 
 
As a consequence, much of the historical development as considered in 
Chapter 1 cannot be said to be the historical development of the pactum 
de non cedendo.  The historical development can rather be said to be that 
of the pactum de non aliendo.   
                                                    
676 It is submitted that Blackwell J in Du Plessis v Scott 1950 (2) SA 462 (W) may have 
doubted whether the legal rules, as laid down by Sande and Voet, were applicable.  This 
doubt was never express and the judge unfortunately did not pursue the matter.  He 
probably believed that the Appellate Division in Paiges had conducted proper research 
and that the more likely situation was that it was he who was mistaken.  See Chapter 3 
where this view was first suggested. 
 
 
 
 
  
As to the (true) historical development of the pactum de non cedendo, 
there is, to my knowledge, no historical record tracing this development.  
One can therefore only speculate.  In my view, since cession was not 
recognised in Roman law, an agreement preventing cession (when it was 
finally seen as acceptable) was probably considered valid and a cession in 
contravention was probably ineffective, since it harked back to the 
traditional position.677 
 
The lack of a historical development aside, the fact is simply that this 
prohibition exists and the pertinent issue is how our law is going to deal 
with it in the context of modern South African realities. 
 
In chapter 6 some viable solutions are proposed. 
 
 
4.5 Recent developments 
 
Scott has recently published an article where she revisits her earlier ideas 
surrounding the pactum de non cedendo in light of developments in 
international financing law.678   
 
Featuring strongly in her discussion is the significance of the commercial 
value of claims as assets. Realising that it is important for creditors (both 
private individuals and multinational companies) to freely dispose of their 
assets, she suggests that the traditional view of pacta de non cedendo 
should be relaxed to aid financial expediency, but at the same time without 
neglecting the interests of the debtor.679 
 
                                                    
677 Ineffective in the sense that ownership of the personal right did not pass to the 
cessionary.   
678 S Scott ‘Once again: agreements prohibiting cession’ 2008 Stellenbosch Law Review 
(vol 3) 483 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Once again’). 
679 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 Scott considers two international conventions seeking to unify assignment 
rules, since cross-border assignments can be confusing and very risky 
with different jurisdictions applying their own rules.680  
 
The first is the UNIDROIT Factoring Convention of 1988 which covers the 
assignment of receivables in a factoring contract.681  This Convention has 
a limited scope of application as it does not apply to all cross-border 
factoring assignments, but only to those where the receivables arise from 
the sale of goods and where the assignor’s and assignee’s places of 
business are in different states (or countries).682  
 
Scott notes that article 6(1) of this Convention addresses pacta de non 
cedendo by declaring that any assignment in contravention of such a 
restriction is valid and effective despite the pactum de non cedendo.  
Article 6(3) bases this position on the principle that a pactum de non 
cedendo entered into by the creditor (assignor) and debtor operates inter 
partes and a breach thereof may lead only to a claim for damages for 
breach of contract.683 
 
What further limits its scope of application is that only six countries have 
ratified it:  France, Italy, Germany, Hungry, Latvia and Nigeria. 
 
The second international convention is the UNCITRAL Convention on the 
Assignment of Receivables in International Trade of 2001, which covers 
assignments of international receivables where the assignor and debtor or 
the assignor and assignee are located in different states. 
 
This Convention closely follows that of the UNIDROIT Factoring 
Convention in its governing of pacta de non cedendo.  Article 9 provides 
                                                    
680 B Lurger ‘Assignment’ in Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (2006) 92. 
681 See Chapters 5 and 6 for a further discussion. 
682 Scott ‘Once again’ 488; Lurger op cit 92. 
683 Scott ‘Once again’488-489; Lurger op cit 101. 
 
 
 
 
 that an assignment contrary to such a prohibition is valid and effective as 
the pactum de non cedendo operates inter partes only.684 
 
The UNCITRAL Convention also has a limited scope of application since 
article 9 only applies to certain receivables,685 and because a mere three 
countries have signed the convention (USA, Luxembourg and 
Madagascar) with only Liberia that has ratified it.686 
 
Another international instrument mentioned by Scott is the UNIDROIT 
PICC (Principles of International Commercial Contracts) of 2004 and in 
Europe the PECL (Principles of European Contract Law) of 2003.   
 
The purpose of the former instrument is to establish general rules for 
dealing with international commercial contracts and includes a section 
dealing with assignments and pacta de non cedendo.   
 
The validity and effect of an assignment made contrary to a pactum de 
non cedendo is the same as the UNIDROIT Factoring Convention and the 
UNCITRAL Convention.687  UNIDROIT PICC, however, is not a formal 
source of law and applies only if the parties have agreed that their contract 
shall be governed by it.688 
 
The purpose of the latter instrument is to provide a comprehensive set of 
rules for contracts concluded in Europe.  It covers the rules governing 
                                                    
684 Scott ‘Once again’ 489; Lurger op cit 101. 
685 That is, to the assignment of receivables:  (a) Arising from an original contract that is a 
contract for the supply or lease of goods or services other than financial services, a 
construction contract or a contract for the sale or lease of real property;  (b) Arising from 
an original contract for the sale, lease or licence of industrial or other intellectual property 
or of proprietary information;  (c) Representing the payment obligation for a credit card 
transaction; or  (d) Owed to the assignor upon net settlement of payments due pursuant 
to a netting agreement involving more than two parties.  See article 9(3). 
686 Scott ‘Once again’ 489; Lurger op cit 101. 
687 Scott ‘Once again’ 489-499; Lurger 93-94. 
688 Scott ‘Once again’ 489-499; Lurger 93-94; F Mazza ‘Assignment of rights’ in 
Commentary on the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC) 
(2009) 995 et seq. 
 
 
 
 
 claims of any contractual performance and partially other transferable 
claims which are not sounding in money.   
 
It addresses pacta de non cedendo in the same way as the other 
abovementioned instruments.  Like the UNIDROIT PICC, it is not a formal 
source of law and applies only if the parties have agreed that their contract 
shall be governed by it.689  
 
Despite not being formal sources of law, both the UNIDROIT PICC and 
the PECL serve as model rules for future attempts to unify the law of 
assignment at European and international levels.690 
 
Scott’s opinion of the abovementioned instruments is evident from the 
following passage: 
 
In all these instruments there is clearly a balancing of interests. 
Both the 
demands of commercial expediency and the interests of the 
debtor are considered.  The principle of freedom of contract is 
upheld, but the effect of this freedom on third parties is curtailed 
to serve the needs of both the creditor and her debtors. All the 
above instruments favour the validity of agreements prohibiting 
cession, but restrict their effect to the contracting parties. Some of 
these instruments show a measure of sensitivity to the particular 
needs of the debtor.691 
 
 
Bearing in mind the content of all the instruments, Scott’s assertion for a 
solution in South Africa is that the entire law of cession is in ‘dire need of 
reform and should therefore be codified’.692  
 
                                                    
689 Scott ‘Once again’ 490; Lurger 93-94; GF Lubbe ‘Assignment’ in European Contract 
Law: Scots and South African Perspectives vol 2 (2006) 307 et seq. 
690 Scott ‘Once again’ 489 footnote 26 and 490; Lurger 94; Lubbe op cit 307 et seq; 
Mazza op cit 995 et seq. 
691 Scott ‘Once again’ 491.  See also 492-493. 
692 Scott ‘Once again’ 494. 
 
 
 
 
 The proposed codification should approach the matter by declaring all 
pacta de non cedendo valid as this would be in line with the principle of 
freedom of contract.  The effect of a cession made contrary to a pactum 
de non cedendo should give rise to a claim of damages for breach of 
contract, therefore operating inter partes only.693 
 
Further, she adds that:  
 
Where the debtor has an interest in re-instating the personal 
nature of the obligation, she could do so in the agreement 
creating the claim.  In this way both the interests of the creditor in 
the free disposal of her assets and the interests of the debtor 
would be protected.694 
  
Scott’s suggestion thus allows the parties to override the proposed 
legislation in an attempt to make the pactum de non cedendo non-
transferable.  This would have the result of rendering a cession in 
contravention of the pactum de non cedendo ineffective.  Ownership 
would still vest in the creditor and the pactum de non cedendo would 
accordingly apply to third parties.  The purported cessionary would 
presumably have a claim for damages against the creditor for breach of 
contract. 
 
The logic and simplicity of this suggestion must be noted.  I am, however, 
of the opinion that a more drastic change is needed to modernise our law 
and to bring South Africa in line with international commercial trends.695 
 
Scott concludes that without legislation the codification of the law of 
cession and consequently the law governing pacta de non cedendo is not 
possible.696  She is of the opinion that with all the mentioned international 
                                                    
693 Ibid. 
694 Ibid. 
695 My suggestions are to be found in Chapter 6. 
696 It is, however, submitted that the entire law of cession need not be codified in order to 
effect a re-evalution of the pactum de non cedendo.  Further, codification of the law of 
cession would necessitate codification of related areas, like the law of contract and the 
 
 
 
 
 instruments dealing with the topic, South African legislators would have 
much to guide them.697 
 
Judging from the attitude of the South African Law Commission in 1998, 
Scott is sceptical as to whether South African legislators will step up and 
codify the law of cession and pacta de non cedendo.698   
 
The Law Commission deems it wise that our courts take on the task of 
reforming this area of the law.  Scott is convinced that a successful 
reformation cannot occur within the walls of a courtroom.  I tend to agree 
with her on this point, but only to a limited extent.699   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
law of delict.  Moreover, my proposed solution suggests the enactment of legislation only 
where the pactum de non cedendo appears in a contract of a commercial nature, that is, 
where factoring is involved.  I make this suggestion because a transformation of this 
magnitude cannot be made judicially.  If Scott’s proposed solution to the plight of the 
pactum de non cedendo is considered, the necessary adjustments can easily be made in 
a judicial decision.    
697 Ibid. 
698 Scott ‘Once again’ 485 and footnote 9. 
699 That is, only in so far as the reform with regard to factoring (book debt financing) is 
concerned. See Chapters 5 and 6. 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER FIVE 
 
AREAS OF APPLICATION 
 
 
Chapter 4 reviewed the validity and effect of the pactum de non cedendo 
in general.  This Chapter considers how the pactum de non cedendo 
manifests itself in specific contracts or in specific areas of the law and 
considers, in addition, American law.  The reason for examining American 
law is for the purpose of comparison.  Perhaps a viable solution can be 
uncovered. 
  
5.1 Insolvency 
 
              pactum de non cedendo 
                 agreement 
Creditor (insolvent debtor)                  Debtor  
    
 
                                                                                                              
      third party attempts 
                                                to enforce the right 
                               against the debtor  
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Trustee of creditor’s insolvent                                            Third party (cessionary) 
estate takes the right        cedes right               
 
 
5.1.1 South African law 
 
In Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates,700 the Appeal Court held that: 
 
…the prohibition only contemplates a voluntary cession and does 
not prevent the right to the wages vesting in the Trustee in 
insolvency.701 
 
   
This court thus laid down the principle that upon the insolvency of the 
creditor the trustee is not bound by the pactum de non cedendo.  Since 
                                                    
700 1920 AD 600. 
701 Supra 616. 
 
 
 
 
 this right is an asset in the estate of the insolvent creditor, the trustee may 
consequently cede the right in administration of the indebted estate.702 
 
In the case of Estate Fitzpatrick v Estate Frankel and others; Denoon and 
another v Estate Frankel and others,703 the Appellate Division held that a 
clause in a lease which prohibited the lessee from, inter alia, ceding the 
lease without the consent of the lessor applied only to voluntary cessions 
and not cessions which had resulted from a ‘forced sale’.704   
 
The court further stated that a cession in execution was not in breach of 
the clause prohibiting cession because, according to the court’s 
interpretation of the lease in this case, there was no clear intention that the 
clause should apply to a cession that was involuntary.705 
 
The Estate Fitzpatrick case seems to have developed the principle laid 
down in Paiges, as the court opened the door to the possibility of binding 
the trustee to the pactum de non cedendo on insolvency.  This possibility 
may be brought about if the contract specifically states that the pactum de 
non cedendo shall apply to involuntary cessions in the same way as it 
applies to voluntary cessions.   
 
This case, however, dealt with a lease and the tendency of our courts was 
in any event that, depending on the wording of the lease, the trustee may 
or may not be bound.706 
                                                    
702 This principle was followed in other cases, viz, Heimann v Klempman & Jaspan 1922 
WLD 115; Stalson v Brook 1922 WLD 143; Moseley Buildings v Bioscope Cafés Ltd 1923 
WLD 189; Himmelhoch v Liquidators, Fresh Milk & Butter Supply Co Ltd and others 1925 
TPD 958; Govender v Tongaat Town Clerk and Others 1986 (4) SA 187 (D).  See also 
SM Luiz ‘Review of recent cases’ 1987 De Rebus (vol 3) 34. 
703 1943 AD 207.  See Chapter 3 for a summary of the case. 
704 Supra 218-219. 
705 Supra 219. 
706 See Moseley Buildings v Bioscope Cafés Ltd 1923 WLD 194; also Lithins v Laeveldse 
Koöperasie Bpk and Another 1989 (3) SA 891 (T) 894F-H where Olivier J states that the 
cases introducing the rule that a pactum de non cedendo in a lease does not bind the 
trustee were based on English decisions dealing only with leases.  The English ratio 
seems to have, in the course of time, become a substantive rule in South African law. 
 
 
 
 
  
In 1943 the Legislature inserted s37(5)707 into the Insolvency Act708 to 
create a statutory exception to the general principle that the trustee is not 
bound by a pactum de non cedendo.  The section provides that a 
stipulation in a lease which restricts or prohibits the transfer of any right 
under the lease will bind the trustee of the insolvent estate as if he were 
the lessee.  Section s37(5) is thus very limited in its application as it only 
applies to leases.709 
 
Olivier J in Lithins v Laeveldse Koöperasie710 held that the position of the 
pactum de non cedendo in insolvency is as follows: 
 
I think it can safely be deduced from these cases that there is a 
general principle in our law to the effect that the pactum de non 
cedendo does not bind the trustee or liquidator in insolvency, 
unless it appears in a lease, in which case s37(5) of the Insolvency 
Act applies, or unless it appears from the pactum that it would also 
be applicable in the case of insolvency.  In the latter case, the 
question will then arise whether such a wide clause is valid.711 
 
 
                                                    
707 Section 37(5) reads as follows:  ‘A stipulation in a lease that the lease shall terminate 
or be varied upon the sequestration of the estate of either party shall be null and void, but 
a stipulation in a lease which restricts or prohibits the transfer of any right under the lease 
or which provides for the termination or cancellation of the lease by reason of the death of 
the lessee or of his successor in title, shall bind the trustee of the insolvent estate of the 
lessee or of his successor in title, as if he were the lessee or the said successor, or the 
executor in the estate of the lessee or his said successor, as the case may be’. 
708 Act 24 of 1936. 
709 See Durban City Council v Liquidators, Durban Icedromes Ltd and Another 1965 (1) 
SA 600 (A) 613B-C; Slims (Pty) Ltd and Another v Morris NO 1988 (1) SA 715 (A) 734B-
D and 742B-H; Lithins v Laeveldse Koöperasie Bpk and Another 1989 (3) SA 891 (T) 
894B-C. 
710 Lithins Supra 895H.  See Chapter 3 for a case summary. 
711 See RH Zulman ‘Insolvency law’ 1989 Annual Survey (vol 7) 251; S Scott The Law of 
Cession (2ed) 1991 206-207; AJ Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract (6ed) 2002 
500; PM Nienaber ‘Cession’ LAWSA (2ed) vol 2 2003 para 37; RH Christie The Law of 
Contract in South Africa (5ed) 2006 464; S Scott ‘Sessieverbiedende ooreenkomste en 
die posisie van die curator of likwidateur by insolvensie’ 2008 Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg  (vol 4) 776 776-778 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Sessieverbiedende’). 
 
 
 
 
 Olivier J was therefore doubtful as to whether an express term would bind 
the trustee in cases other than that of a lease, but left the question 
open.712 
 
Recently this issue came before the court in Any Name 451 (Pty) Ltd v 
Capespan (Pty) Ltd,713 where Zondi AJ relied on the ratio in both Paiges 
and Lithins.714  The outcome of the case was that on the interpretation of 
the wording of the pactum de non cedendo, it was not binding on any 
person other than the companies (the parties to the agreement) and it 
could thus not be construed as binding the liquidators on insolvency.715 
 
Capespan appealed against this decision.716  Thring J, who delivered the 
judgment, held that Zondi AJ had erred in reaching his conclusion in the 
court a quo.717  According to the judge, Zondi AJ was correct in stating that 
a pactum de non cedendo will not always prevent an involuntary cession 
where a trustee or liquidator cedes the right in question to a third party.718 
 
There would, however, be certain instances where the pactum de non 
cedendo would bind the trustee or liquidator on insolvency.  Thring J notes 
that Zondi AJ mentioned two instances, viz:  Where the pactum de non 
cedendo appears in a lease (being saved by s37(5) of the Insolvency Act) 
or where it appears from the pactum de non cedendo itself that the trustee 
                                                    
712 Goodwin Stable Trust v Duohex (Pty) Ltd and Another 1996 (2) All SA 558 (C) 563I-J.  
If it is uncertain as to whether an express term would bind the trustee, an implied or tacit 
term would definitely not bind the trustee.  Although, on the other hand, the court in 
Estate Fitzpatrick did not seem to have a problem with this kind of term.  Is it really such a 
wide term? 
713 2007 JOL 19402 (C).  See Chapter 3 for a case summary. 
714 Supra 26. 
715 Ibid. 
716 Capespan (Pty) Ltd v Any Name 451 (Pty) Ltd 2008 (4) SA 510 (C).  See Chapter 3 for 
a case summary.  
717 Supra 512J. 
718 Supra 512J-513A. 
 
 
 
 
 should be bound.719  Thring J is, however, of the opinion that a third 
instance exists. 
 
In Chapter 4 the possibility was discussed that the pactum de non 
cedendo can manifest itself in two constructions.720  Against the distinction 
between and acceptance of these two possible constructions, Thring J 
states that a third mechanism for binding the trustee to a pactum de non 
cedendo exists.  According to the judge, when a personal right is created 
as a non-transferable right ab initio, thus falling within the first 
construction, the trustee is bound by the pactum de non cedendo.721 
 
In such a case the trustee and liquidator on insolvency will be bound by 
the pactum de non cedendo as the personal right is ‘inherently incapable’ 
of being transferred.722  Thus, a cession by the trustee in contravention of 
the pactum de non cedendo would be of no force or effect, even though 
the term ‘involuntary cession’ may be used.723 
 
According to the judge, the principles of freedom of contract and that the 
trustee can acquire no greater right against the debtor than the insolvent 
creditor himself had, are persuasive arguments to overrule Lithins and 
other cases.724  
 
Thring J also rejected Paiges as an authority that the pactum de non 
cedendo is unable to prevent an involuntary cession.725  He explained that 
De Villiers JA in Paiges was merely referring to the fact that a pactum de 
non cedendo is powerless to prevent a ‘vesting’ of a right in the trustee 
                                                    
719 Supra 513A-C. 
720 See Chapter 4 140-143.  
721 Supra 518C-E. 
722 Supra 514G-515C; 515C-D; 519A. 
723 Supra 519B. 
724 Supra 518D-E. As well as the authority he quotes therein, which Thring J believes 
lends itself to such an interpretation. 
725 Paiges Supra 616: ‘But the prohibition only contemplates a voluntary cession and 
does not prevent the right to the wages vesting in the Trustee in insolvency’. 
 
 
 
 
 upon insolvency.  According to the judge, De Villiers JA was not stating 
that a pactum de non cedendo was powerless to prevent an involuntary 
cession.726   
 
It is clear from the judgment that De Villiers JA used the word ‘voluntary’ 
cession, and never the word ‘involuntary’ cession, nor did he offer any 
explanation as to what the position would be once the right has vested in 
the trustee.   
 
In my view, the answer lies in the principles of the law of insolvency:  The 
pactum de non cedendo is powerless to prevent such a vesting as it is a 
natural and necessary consequence of insolvency,727 but a pactum de non 
cedendo can (as it was so designed) prevent a cession, even in the hands 
of a trustee. 
 
It is the function of the trustee to administer the insolvent estate in a 
manner that would best benefit the creditors of the insolvent estate.728  
The trustee, however, must take the insolvent estate as he finds it and 
better or greater rights for the creditors cannot be ‘created’ by allowing the 
trustee to be unbound by a pactum de non cedendo.  Also, allowing the 
trustee (a third party) to interfere in a contract to which he was not a party, 
nor could ever be a party, is contractually unsound. 
 
The question, however, arises that if the trustee is to be bound by the 
pactum de non cedendo and is consequently unable to cede the personal 
right, what is he to do with it?  According to the prevailing legal principles, 
the trustee’s only option would be to enforce the right against the debtor.  
If the debt is not yet due and enforceable, or if the debtor is unable to pay 
some or all of the debts for any reason, the insolvent estate may have to 
bear the loss.  
                                                    
726 See Chapter 3. 
727 Insolvency Act s20; R Sharrock et al Hockly’s Insolvency Law 7ed (2002) 57. 
728 Sharrock et al op cit 110. 
 
 
 
 
  
It stands to reason that if the earliest case relied upon as authority for 
allowing the trustee to ignore a pactum de non cedendo is incorrect, all the 
cases thereafter that rely on Paiges cannot be considered as authority on 
the issue either.     
   
Scott has recently reviewed the Capespan case and the position of pacta 
de non cedendo in insolvency in general.729  She questions why s37(5) of 
the Insolvency Act makes a statutory exception in the case of leases, 
whereas other personal rights are treated differently.730  She makes a 
good point, one for which no plausible explanation can be found. 
 
Scott also observes that after Capespan, the position is now somewhat 
uncertain.731  She writes that, on the one hand, there is a judgment of a 
single judge in the Transvaal division (Lithins), which is based on a 
passage from the highest court of appeal in Paiges, although this was an 
obiter dictum and possibly misinterpreted.  The judgement in Lithins has 
also been followed by single judge in the Cape division.732   
 
On the other hand, there is a judgment of a full bench in the Cape division, 
Capespan, which deals with the issue differently and effectively overturns 
the earlier cases.733  It is a concern that the possibility exists that the issue 
may be split on a geographical jurisdictional basis.   
 
                                                    
729 Scott ‘Sessieverbiedende’ in addition to offering criticism of both the Lithins and 
Capespan judgments. 
730 Scott ‘Sessieverbiedende’ 779 without any giving examples of other personal rights 
which are treated differently.  
731 Ibid. 
732 In Goodwin Stable Trust v Duohex (Pty) Ltd and Another 1996 (2) All SA 558 (C). 
733 Scott ‘Sessieverbiedende’ 779. 
 
 
 
 
 The current position is clearly unsatisfactory.  The solution lies in the 
Appeal Court pronouncing on the issue expressly.  Alternatively, this state 
of affairs can be disposed of if my proposed solution is adopted.734 
 
5.1.2 American law   
 
In America the law of bankruptcy is governed by the Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978 and the 1994 Act, which served to update certain portions of 
the 1978 Act.  This legislation can be found in Title 11 of the United States 
Code and is commonly referred to as the ‘Bankruptcy Code’.735 
 
Anti-assignment clauses appearing in the area of the law of bankruptcy 
are dealt with simply and logically.   
 
In terms of the Bankruptcy Code s541(c)(1)(A), any property interest of the 
insolvent debtor (the creditor in the anti-assignment agreement) becomes 
the property interest of the trustee of the bankrupt estate, despite any kind 
of restriction that would hamper such interest being vested in the 
trustee.736   
 
To this rule there is only one instance where a property interest would not 
automatically be transferred to the trustee, and that is in the case of a 
beneficial interest in a trust.737 
 
Once the property interests are vested in the trustee, the general principle 
is the following: 
 
                                                    
734 See Chapter 6 were my suggestions are discussed in detail. 
735 TJ Salerno, JM Udall and B Sirower Bankruptcy Litigation and Practice: A 
Practitioner’s Guide 2ed vol 1 (1995) 6. 
736 DE Ytreberg in American Jurisprudence 2ed vol 9A (1999) 412.  Section 541(c)(1)(A) 
reads as follows:  ‘…an interest of the debtor in property becomes property of the 
estate…notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or applicable 
nonbankruptcy law that restricts or conditions transfer of such interests by the debtor…’.  
See also TH Jackson The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986) 104. 
737 Ytreberg op cit 412. 
 
 
 
 
 [T]o the extent that an interest in property is limited in the hands of 
the debtor, it is equally limited in the hands of the bankruptcy 
estate.738 
 
Thus, the debtor’s assets become the property of the trustee of the 
insolvent estate, but are still fully subject to their ‘nonbankruptcy 
attributes’.739  Thus, if an insolvent debtor was prohibited from assigning a 
personal right due to an anti-assignment clause, then upon the vesting of 
the right in the trustee, he too, will be prohibited from assigning the 
personal right.   
 
The rationale for this is that the trustee does not obtain a greater right 
against third parties than the debtor himself had as at the day of 
commencement of the bankruptcy case.740  Accordingly, the trustee of the 
bankrupt estate is subject to the same claims and defences that a third 
party may have asserted against the insolvent debtor, as if the bankruptcy 
estate had never been created.741   
 
This means that if the trustee assigns the personal right in contravention of 
an anti-assignment clause, he will be subject to a claim for damages for 
breach of contract by the third party (the debtor in the anti-assignment 
agreement). 
 
The trustee, it seems, only has two options when faced with an anti-
assignment clause, with his choice dependant on which option would best 
serve the bankrupt estate:  Either he can enforce the personal right 
against the debtor of the anti-assignment agreement and transfer the 
proceeds to the bankrupt estate to be distributed among the creditors; or 
he can assign the personal right contrary to the anti-assignment clause, 
while expecting a claim for damages to be lodged against the bankrupt 
estate, but while knowing that such a claim would be ranked together with 
                                                    
738 Ibid. 
739 Jackson op cit 104. 
740 Ytreberg op cit 412. 
741 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 the other claims of the concurrent creditors and would not affect the 
general indebtedness of the estate. 742  
 
The American law approach seems to make more legal sense in that it 
does not allow the creditors of the insolvent estate to benefit from 
something that the insolvent debtor would not have been able to benefit 
from had he not become insolvent.  Further, it upholds the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda by honouring the agreement entered into by the 
debtor and creditor (of the pactum de non cedendo agreement).743 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
742 For the sake of completeness it must be added that, in terms of s365(f)(1) of the 
Bankruptcy Code, the trustee has the choice to take up an ‘executory’ contract or to 
assign it, regardless of any prohibition or restriction against assignment.  What is under 
discussion here, is assumption or assignment of the performance of a duty or obligation 
by the insolvent debtor (that is – the executory contract) and not assumption or 
assignment of the insolvent debtor’s right to claim performance.   
743 Had the Appellate Division in Paiges decided not to render the personal right of a valid 
pactum de non cedendo non-transferable, the position would be the same in South 
African law, as the Trustee could elect to honour the agreement or not on the pains of 
damages. 
 
 
 
 
 5.2 Company law 
 
                                          pactum de non  
 Shareholder                     cedendo agreement                   Company 
(creditor)                                                                              (debtor) 
 
     
    
         cedes shares 
 
                                                                      third party attempt to enforce the 
                                                                     right against the company 
                                                                                                                                                                             
  
 
Third party (cessionary)                                                                   
                           
 
 
5.2.1 South African law 
 
A share in a company with a share capital is an incorporeal asset in the 
estate of the shareholder, not only because of its monetary value when a 
company declares dividends, but, inter alia, also because of the voting 
rights that accompany it.744   
 
Shares are generally issued to a shareholder in terms of a company’s 
articles of association,745 and the articles of association is, ultimately, 
governed by the Companies Act.746 
 
A private company may, in terms of s59(2) of the Companies Act, adopt 
the model articles in Schedule 1, Table B of the Act or it may draft an 
original set of articles.747  Regardless of which set of articles the company 
                                                    
744 HS Cilliers and ML Benade et al Corporate Law 3ed (2000) 224-225.  See also s91 of 
the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
745 The articles of association is a document determining the manner in which the 
company will function (hereinafter referred to as the ‘articles’).  Shares may also be 
issued in terms of a shareholder’s agreement.  See Cilliers and Benade op cit 74. 
746 Act 61 of 1973; Cilliers and Benade op cit 225.   
747 Cilliers and Benade op cit 74. 
 
 
 
 
 uses, its articles will still be subject to the restrictions in s20 of the 
Companies Act.748 
 
In order for a company to qualify as a private company it must comply with 
s20 of the Companies Act.  Besides requiring a private company to have a 
share capital, s20 compels the company to include in its articles three 
restrictions.749  One of these restrictions, which appears in s20(a), is that a 
private company must restrict the free transferability of its shares.750 
 
Cilliers and Benade discuss how the restriction on the transfer of shares 
can manifest itself: 
 
Forms which the restriction can assume are that the shares may 
only be transferred subject to the approval of the board or directors, 
or only to existing members of the company, or only if they have 
first been offered to the other members, or only to persons 
approved of by all the members or by a particular person and so 
forth.751 
 
Thus, the issuing of shares is subject to a company’s articles, which is, in 
turn, subject to the restrictions in s20 and upon purchasing shares the 
shareholder agrees to the restrictions. The restrictions which a private 
company is compelled to insert into its articles effectively amount to a 
pactum de non cedendo.752 
 
In addition to the provisions of s20 of the Companies Act, s65(2) of the Act 
also elevates the articles to the status of a contract between the company 
and its members.  Since it is impossible to be a member of a private 
company without also being a shareholder at the same time, the articles 
                                                    
748 The restrictions on the transfer of shares may also be written into the articles of a 
public company, although public companies are not statutorily required to do this. 
749 Cilliers and Benade op cit 40. 
750 Ibid. 
751 Ibid. 
752 See MS Mphalele ‘Cession of the rights of a member in a close corporation’ 1998 
Journal for Juridical Science (vol 21) 244 256.  Although the article discusses pacta de 
non cedendo in close corporations, the general idea is the same as in private companies.   
 
 
 
 
 (which contain the pacta de non cedendo) constitutes an agreement 
between the company and its shareholder.753  
 
Should a private company elect to adopt the model articles, such a 
restriction can be found in article 11 of the model articles.  This article 
states that the directors of a company have the power to refuse to register 
the transfer754 of any shares without giving reasons therefor. 
 
This restriction was illustrated in Richter N.O v Riverside Estates (Pty) 
Ltd755 where, although the company had drafted its own articles, the 
articles contained a provision almost the same as that of article 11.   
 
The court held that if pacta de non cedendo are valid, then the restriction 
on the transfer of shares in the company’s articles, to which the 
shareholder had agreed (by virtue of purchasing the shares subject to the 
articles) was also valid, as such a restriction amounts to a pactum de non 
cedendo.756 
 
Another restriction is to be found in articles 21-24 of the model articles.  
These articles state that if a shareholder desires to sell his shares he must 
give written notice thereof to the directors of the company. The directors 
subsequently have one month in which to first offer the shares for 
purchase to the other shareholders.757  Should the other shareholders not 
purchase the shares within that time, the shareholder may only then offer 
it to a person outside of the company.758  
 
                                                    
753 De Villiers v Jacobsdal Saltworks (Pty) Ltd 1959 (3) SA 873 (O). 
754 The word ‘transfer’ (of shares) in the Companies Act encompasses the cession of the 
shares, the completion of the transfer document in terms of s133 and the placement of 
the shareholder’s name in the register of members.  See Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas 
(Edms) Bpk en ’n ander v Booyens 2001 (4) SA 15 (SCA) 21H. 
755 1946 OPD 209.  See Chapter 3 for a case summary. 
756 Supra 226. 
757 As stated in article 22. 
758 As stated in article 24. 
 
 
 
 
 These two restrictions (that is, in terms of articles 11 and 21-24) appeared 
in the articles of a company under consideration in Van der Berg v 
Transkei Development Corporation,759 where the court confirmed that the 
restrictions indeed amounted to pacta de non cedendo.  The court further 
added that the prohibitions would bind a deputy-sheriff of the court who 
sells the shares in execution of a debt.760 
 
The case of Britz NO v Sniegocki and others 761 illustrated that a provision 
in a company’s articles first requiring the company’s consent before a 
share is transferred, also amounts to a pactum de non cedendo. A transfer 
of shares in contravention of a pactum de non cedendo is accordingly 
‘incomplete’ or ‘ineffective’.762 
 
The court’s reasoning can be summed up by the following passage: 
 
It seems to me that the rights constituting the shares were created 
with conditional restrictions against alienation. These restrictions 
are contained in the document recording it and the right itself is 
limited by the conditional stipulation against alienation.763 
 
This passage is founded on the words in Paiges,764 and the effect of a 
cession subject to a pactum de non cedendo with regard to shares seems 
to be the same as that of a pactum de non cedendo concluded in general 
                                                    
759 1991 (4) SA 78 (Tk) 80C.  See Chapter 3 for a case summary. 
760 Supra 81G-H. 
761 1989 (4) SA 372 (D).  It must be pointed out that the company under discussion in this 
case was not a private company, but a public company. This means that it was not 
required by statute to restrict the transfer of its shares, but it elected to do so by choice, 
with such a restriction amounting to a pactum de non cedendo.   See Chapter 3 for a 
case summary.  See also JM Otto ‘Oorsig van regspraak: sessie’ 1990 De Rebus (vol 19) 
101. 
762 Supra 383D-E.     
763 Supra 383B. 
764 Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates 1920 AD 600 617: ‘The stipulation against 
cession is part and parcel of the agreement creating the right, and the right is limited by 
the stipulation’. 
 
 
 
 
 contracts as discussed in Paiges:  Ineffective to vest ownership in the 
cessionary.765 
 
The most authoritative case on the issue is that of Smuts v Booyens; 
Markplaas (Edms) Bpk en ’n ander v Booyens.766  In this case the Appeal 
Court confirmed the existing case law by stating that if a private company 
adopts the model articles and the procedure in articles 21 – 24 is not 
complied with before the shares are offered to a person who is not a 
shareholder, the rights to the shares cannot be transferred at all.767  The 
court added that the right would ‘from its inception, lack the attribute of 
transmissibility’ as the restriction would be in the form of an absolute 
prohibition.768 
 
  
It is interesting to note that a pactum de non cedendo does not bind the 
trustee in insolvency, yet it does bind the deputy-sheriff when attaching 
shares in execution of a debt.  Surely both are instances of involuntary 
cessions?  Yet different rules apply. 
 
Another noteworthy observation is that none of the cases dealing with 
pacta de non cedendo with relation to shares make reference to the 
interest requirement – that is – that the prohibition must be in the interest 
of the company (the debtor).  Nor do the courts refer to Trust Bank as an 
authority for having departed from the interest requirement when the 
pactum de non cedendo appears in the articles or the shareholder’s 
agreement creating the personal right from its inception (as is usually the 
case with shares). 
                                                    
765 Van der Berg v Transkei Development Corporation 1991 (4) SA 78 (Tk) 81G: non-
transferable until the articles have been complied with.  Smuts v Booyens; Markplaas 
(Edms) Bpk en ’n ander v Booyens 2001 (4) SA 15 (SCA) 24G: intransmissible ab initio. 
766 2001 (4) SA 15 (SCA).  See Chapter 3 for a case summary.  The ratio in the Smuts v 
Booyens case has been followed in the recent case of Sindler NO and others v Gees and 
others and six other cases 2006 (5) SA 501 (C) 506G-H. 
767 Supra 22D read with 24F. 
768 Supra 24G read with 24H-25A. 
 
 
 
 
  
It appears that these courts have abandoned the interest requirement and 
in doing so have ignored the ratio in Paiges.  Perhaps the interest 
requirement has been abandoned in company law because a private 
company is required by statute to place restrictions on the transfer of its 
shares. 
 
A situation which has not been addressed by the courts is where a 
shareholder in breach of a pactum de non cedendo cedes his shares to a 
third party, for example a bank, as security for a loan.  If the restriction in 
the articles is an absolute one, it appears that a security cession would not 
be possible since the courts have made it very clear that the personal right 
would ‘lack the attribute of transmissibility’ and ‘cannot be transferred at 
all’.  The third party-cessionary of shares ceded in securitatem debiti in 
such a case would effectively receive nothing. 
 
The situation would be different if the restriction on transfer is not absolute, 
for example, if the articles only restricts registration and consequently 
membership, but does not restrict the cession of the shares.  In such a 
case it seems as though a cession in securitatem debiti with the pledge 
construction may take place, because if this construction is carefully 
considered, the shares are not ceded, but only pledged as security.769  It 
appears as though a cession in securitatem debiti with the pactum fiduciae 
construction would result in a valid transfer of ownership of the shares 
since this construction effects an out-and-out cession.770  The company 
(the debtor), however, would be fully entitled to refuse to register and 
recognise the third party-cessionary as a member of the company.  This 
would result in ownership vesting in a third party, being the beneficial 
owner of the shares and membership and shareholding vesting in the 
cedent being the nominee shareholder.  
 
                                                    
769 See below for a more detailed explanation of the pledge construction. 
770 See below for a more detailed explanation of the pactum fiduciae construction. 
 
 
 
 
 The third party may decide to sue the company on the basis that it was 
unaware of the pactum de non cedendo in order that its name can be 
entered into the register of members and consequently be recognised as a 
shareholder.  The question was raised in the court a quo of Smuts v 
Booyens whether a company can argue constructive notice against a third 
party.  A company may raise this as a defence against those dealing 
directly with it, but can a company raise constructive notice against a third 
party in such an instance?  The question was not dealt with in the Appeal 
Court because, on the facts, Cameron JA found it unnecessary to 
consider.771   
 
5.2.2 American law 
 
In America the Model Business Corporation Act772 is a model piece of 
company law legislation upon which the different states in America may  
base their company law legislation.773 
 
According to the Model Business Corporation Act, restrictions on share 
transfers are valid and enforceable provided that the restriction is 
conspicuously noted on the front or back of the share certificate.  If no 
share certificate was presented, the proviso is that the company sends the 
                                                    
771 Smuts v Booyens supra 25 E-F. 
772Http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL270000pub/nosearch/mbca/assembled/2
0051201000001.pdf (accessed on 30 April 2009).  This Act is revised every year.  About 
35 American states have company law legislation based on the Model Business 
Corporation Act.  The state of Delaware has drafted its own company laws in a statute 
called the Delaware General Corporation Law, which is completely different from the 
Model Business Corporation Act, yet it, too, has very similar provisions to the Model 
Business Corporation Act regarding the restrictions on share transfers [s202(a)-(e)].  
Further, other states, where many large companies are located, have legislation that 
combines the Model Business Corporation Act and the Delaware General Corporation 
Law and thus also apply the same principles governing share transfer restrictions, for 
example New York, California, Texas and Illinois.  
773 See generally AC Harberle et al in American Jurisprudence 2ed vol 18A (1985) 557-
569; RW Hamilton Corporations 4ed (1997) 288-293; FH O’Neal ‘Restrictions on transfer 
of stock in closely held corporations: Planning and drafting’ 1952 Harvard Law Review 
(vol 65) 773; CA Platt ‘The right of first refusal in involuntary sales and transfers by 
operation of law’ 1996 Baylor Law Review (vol 48) 1197; MB Gershanik ‘Legislature 
provides for certificateless shares; amends law on transfer restrictions’ 2005 Louisiana 
Bar Journal (vol 53) 237; SR Carpenter ‘Net operating losses:  Preserving what you never 
wanted in the first place’ 2007 Utah Bar Journal (vol 20) 16. 
 
 
 
 
 new shareholder an information statement containing (amongst other 
things) the restrictions attached to the shares.774 
 
The Model Business Corporation Act also states that, should the transfer 
restrictions not be conspicuously noted on the share certificate, or if an 
information statement is not sent to the shareholder, then the restriction on 
transfer is not enforceable against a person not having knowledge 
thereof.775  
 
The Act includes two of the restrictions contained in the South African 
model articles.  The first is the transfer restriction subject to approval by 
the directors, although the Model Business Corporation Act goes a step 
further by permitting the approval to come from any person provided the 
approval or disapproval is not manifestly unreasonable.776 
 
The second is the restriction that the shareholder first offer the shares to 
the company or to other shareholders or to any other person before 
offering it to a person outside the company.777   
 
A prohibition not included in the South African Companies Act, but which 
is contained in the Model Business Corporation Act, is the ability of a 
company to prohibit the transfer of shares to designated persons or 
classes of persons, provided however, that the prohibition is not manifestly 
unreasonable.778  
 
                                                    
774 Model Business Corporation Act s6.27(a)-(b).  The Uniform Commercial Code article 
8-204 has a similar provision regarding restrictions on the transfer of securities (shares 
sold on the stock exchange) as such transfers are ineffective against a person without 
knowledge of the restriction, unless the restriction appears conspicuously on the security 
certificate or the registered owner has been notified of the restriction. 
775 Model Business Corporation Act s6.27(b). 
776 Model Business Corporation Act s6.27(d)(3).  See also O’Neal op cit 776 – a ‘closely 
held corporation’ is akin to a private company in South African law. 
777 Model Business Corporation Act s6.27(d)(1).  See also O’Neal op cit 776. 
778 Model Business Corporation Act s6.27(d)(4). 
 
 
 
 
 Another difference between the South African model articles and the 
Model Business Corporation Act is that in South Africa share transfer 
restrictions are generally found in the articles or in shareholder’s 
agreements, although restrictions may validly be found elsewhere.  
According to the Model Business Corporation Act, however, share transfer 
restrictions are commonly found in various locations.  The articles of 
incorporation779 may contain a restriction, or it may be contained in a by-
law780 of the company, or it may be included in an agreement amongst the 
shareholders, or in an agreement between the shareholders and the 
company.781 
 
Lastly, it seems as though the restriction requiring a shareholder to first 
offer the shares to certain people (like shareholders) before others, would 
not apply to an involuntary transfer or to a transfer by operation of law.782  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
779 In American law the ‘articles of incorporation’ is not equivalent to our articles of 
association, but rather to our memorandum of association. 
780 A ‘by-law’ is akin to a regulation made by the company. 
781 Model Business Corporation Act s6.27(a).  See also O’Neal op cit 785-786. 
782 Harberle et al op cit 571 and 573.  See also Platt op cit 1209-1210 where she 
discusses that this can only be seen as a general principle as there seems to be 
controversy in some states, for example, Texas where there is authority for the view that 
an involuntary transfer would also be bound by such a restriction.  In her conclusion 
(1211) she states that the courts may be moving toward a tendency of enforcing these 
restrictions upon involuntary transfers.   
 
 
 
 
 5.3 Insurance law 
 
                                     pactum de non  
 Insured                        cedendo agreement                    Insurer 
(creditor)                                                                          (debtor) 
 
     
    
        cedes rights under 
        insurance policy 
                                                                      third party attempts to enforce the 
                                                                     right against the insurer 
                                                                                                                                                                             
  
 
 
Third party (cessionary)                                                                   
                           
            
 
5.3.1  South African law 
 
In South African law an insured can freely cede his rights under an 
insurance policy without the consent, and even without the knowledge of 
the insurer (usually an insurance company).783  The right which is 
transferred is the insured’s conditional right to be indemnified if he suffers 
a loss when the risk insured against materialises.784  The effect of a 
cession of rights under an insurance policy is illustrated by the following 
quotation: 
 
The effect of a cession is that the claim vests in the cessionary and 
nothing remains with the cedent. The cessionary is creditor and as 
such is the only person who can sue for or receive payment. Thus, 
if the insured has ceded his conditional right to indemnification, it is 
the cessionary who can claim and receive payment if the insured 
should subsequently suffer a loss.785 
                                                    
783 MFB Reinecke et al ‘Insurance’ in LAWSA first re-issue vol 12 (2002) para 435.  The 
cession of the rights under an insurance policy must be distinguished from the 
assignment of the policy (otherwise known as subrogation), which in insurance law has 
acquired a specific meaning.  Assignment of the insurance policy denotes the substitution 
of the original insured with another person and a different set of legal principles applies.  
See Reinecke et al op cit para 439.  See also DM Davis Gordon and Getz on the South 
African Law of Insurance 4ed (1993) 267 footnote 1. 
784 Reinecke et al op cit para 435.  It further seems perfectly valid for the insured to cede 
his rights under the insurance policy regardless of whether or not the risk insured against 
has occurred and regardless of whether the policy is one of indemnity insurance or non-
indemnity insurance (life insurance). 
785 Reinecke et al op cit para 437. 
 
 
 
 
 It often happens, however, that insurance policies contain clauses which 
restrict or absolutely prohibit the cession of rights under the policy.  
Obviously echoing the Paiges case, the applicable legal principle for a 
pactum de non cedendo to be valid and enforceable in an insurance 
policy, is proof that it serves a useful purpose.786  It has been held that, for 
an insurer, this requirement is easy to prove.787 
 
Once the insurer has proved that the pactum de non cedendo serves a 
useful purpose, it stands to reason that a cession in contravention is void 
and cannot vest ownership in the cessionary.788  In this manner pacta de 
non cedendo in insurance contracts are treated in the same way as pacta 
de non cedendo that feature in general contracts. 
 
Controversy only arises when the insurance policy contains a pactum de 
non cedendo and the insured cedes his rights under the policy in 
contravention thereof as security for a debt – a so-called cession in 
securitatem debiti.789 
 
If a right is ceded in securitatem debiti, it is largely unsettled as to which 
legal construction is intended, unless of course it is clear from the 
agreement between the parties.790  The construction can either be one of 
pledge or of pactum fiduciae.  
 
The pledge construction is well known for being imprecise and 
‘obscure’.791  
                                                    
786 Davis op cit 267; Reinecke et al op cit para 436. 
787 Northern Assurance Co Ltd v Methuen 1937 SR 103 111.  See Chapter 3 for a case 
summary.  See also Davis op cit 267; Reinecke et al op cit para 436. 
788 The cessionary would presumably have an action for damages for breach of contract 
against the insured (the purported cedent). 
789 See PM Nienaber ‘Cession’ in LAWSA 2ed vol 2 (2003) para 52-56; S Van der Merwe 
et al Contract General Principles 2ed (2003) 463 et seq; Badenhorst et al Silberberg and 
Schoeman’s The Law of Property 4ed (2003) 377-379.  
790 Davis op cit 274. 
791 Van der Merwe et al op cit 467.  
 
 
 
 
 The court in Muller v Trust Bank792 stated that this construction is based 
on the principles governing the pledge of a corporeal movable where the 
right of action is pledged to the cessionary.   
 
The cedent, notwithstanding the cession, still retains ownership or a ‘bare 
dominium’793 despite the fact that while the cession is operative the cedent 
is precluded from exercising his rights against the debtor.794   
 
The courts in Cohen’s Trustee,795 Muller796 and Millman v Twiggs,797 
stressed that the cessionary does not obtain ownership, but only obtains a 
jus in re aliena which allows him to realise the right should the cedent 
default. 
 
The cedent also has a reversionary interest in that once the debt has been 
discharged the right of action must be reverted to him, thus he need only 
demand the return of his property and a re-cession is not necessary to 
complete his title.798  
 
This construction has been heavily criticised as being unsound for a 
number of theoretically based reasons,799 yet the courts still prefer this 
construction to that of the pactum fiduciae construction.800 
                                                    
792 Muller v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1981 (2) SA 117 (N) 123G and 124E-F.  See also 
Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1968 (3) 166 (A) 186. 
793 Italtrafo SpA v Electricy Supply Commission 1978 (2) SA 705 (WLD) 712. 
794 National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Cohen’s Trustee 1911 AD 235 256; Davis op cit 
272-273. 
795 Supra 242. 
796 Supra 123H-124A. 
797 Millman NO v Twiggs and another 1995 (3) SA 674 (A) 676G-H. 
798 Cohen’s Trustee supra 246-247. 
799 Van der Merwe et al op cit 467.  The reasons can be listed as follows:  (1) There is no 
historical basis for using this construction when dealing with incorporeals.  (2) The notion 
that a cessionary can obtain a real right of security in an incorporeal asset is unsound as 
one cannot have a real right over a personal right.  (3) The fact that the cedent can retain 
the dominium in the personal right which has been ceded as security defies the essence 
of a cession.  (4) The idea that a right of pledge (which requires delivery) can exist in 
respect of an asset which is incapable of being possessed is flawed.   
 
 
 
 
  
A question that may be rightfully asked is why the cedent’s rights are 
returned to him on demand without the need for a cession to restore his 
title?  If the cedent ceded the rights under the insurance policy as security 
for a debt, when the debt has been discharged, how else can he possibly 
retrieve the rights other than by a re-cession?  If the cedent can simply 
demand the rights back, then he never ceded them in the first place.  If the 
parties’ intentions are to effect a security cession, then the existence and 
use of the pledge construction is totally inappropriate.  Further, a security 
cession by way of pledge is clearly a misnomer as cession does not 
actually take place.  Should our courts insist on using this construction it 
should be termed something which reflects more accurately the 
transaction it describes.  
 
According to the pactum fiduciae construction, the right of action is 
completely ceded to the cessionary, together with an undertaking (the 
pactum fiduciae) that the cessionary will re-cede the right of action to the 
cedent upon discharge of the debt.801  The right of action thus vests 
completely in the cessionary and the cedent is left with a personal right to 
enforce the re-cession once the debt has been discharged.802 
   
If the parties’ intentions are unclear and the pledge construction is 
preferred, then the pactum de non cedendo has not actually been 
breached, as ownership of the right still vests in the insured (the cedent).  
During the course of the security cession, however, the cedent cannot 
                                                                                                                                              
800 Innes CJ in the Cohen’s Trustee case 251-252 stated that although judicial recognition 
has been given to the pactum fiduciae construction (using Sutherland v Elliot Bros 2 
Menzies 349 as an example), he and the other judges still preferred the pledge 
construction; the court in Muller 123G held that the right of parties under a cession in 
securitatem debiti must be determined according to the law of pledge;  the Appellate 
Division in Millman v Twiggs 671G authoritatively stated that ‘when a right is ceded with 
the avowed object of securing a debt, the cession is regarded as a pledge of the right’.  
Notable cases that have showed a preference for the pactum fiduciae construction are 
Lief v Dettmann 1964 (2) SA 252 (A) and Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard Bank of 
South Africa Ltd 1968 (3) 166 (A). 
801 Davis op cit 271-272; Nienaber op cit para 53; Van der Merwe et al op cit 465-466. 
802 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 claim performance from the insurer, nor can the insurer validly perform to 
the cedent as the rights under the policy have been ceded.803   
 
This effect is surely something the insurer wished to guard against by 
inserting the pactum de non cedendo into the insurance policy in the first 
place.  The insurer cannot sue for damages as the contract has not, 
strictly speaking, been breached.  Perhaps a cession in this manner could 
be a ground upon which to cancel the policy.804   
 
If the pactum fiduciae construction is preferred, then it seems that the 
pactum de non cedendo has been breached, as ownership would then 
vest in the cessionary.  The insurer would be fully within its rights to claim 
damages therefor. My only reservation is that the insured (the cedent) is 
not left empty-handed.  The insured is left with a personal right to re-
cession, which is obviously not ownership, but neither is he left with 
nothing as is the usual outcome after a cession. 
 
Cessions in securitatem debiti are first and foremost cessions, regardless 
of the fact that they are cessions in security.  There should be, therefore, 
only one construction of cessions in securitatem debiti. 805  Accordingly, 
cessions in securitatem debiti of insurance policies containing a pactum de 
non cedendo should be considered as ordinary cessions and should be 
treated as such. 
 
5.3.2  American law 
 
In this legal system a distinction is drawn between life insurance policies 
and indemnity (or property insurance) policies.  The validity and effect of 
                                                    
803 Reinecke et al op cit para 438. 
804 Cancellation would depend on the terms of the policy.  This is most certainly still 
largely undeveloped. 
805 See my criticism of the pledge construction above. 
 
 
 
 
 an anti-assignment clause appearing in these policies is correspondingly 
different.806   
 
In the absence of a provision to the contrary, life insurance policies may 
be freely assigned as they are deemed to be investments.807  Should an 
anti-assignment clause be present in a life insurance policy, it would, 
however, be valid and binding.808 
 
An indemnity insurance policy, on the other hand, is considered to be a 
personal undertaking, as it is not so much the property itself that is 
insured, but rather the interest of a particular person in that property.809  In 
fact, indemnity insurance policies usually contain anti-assignment clauses, 
subject to the consent of the insurer first being obtained.810  If such a 
policy is assigned without the consent of the insurer the assignment is 
ineffective.811 
 
The situation is different once the risk materialises or the loss occurs, as 
then the insured is free to assign the policy without the consent of the 
insurer.812  The reason for this is because: 
 
                                                    
806 See generally PF Hofer ‘Corporate succession and insurance rights after Henkel: A 
return to common sense’ 2007 Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Law Journal (vol 42) 
763; ER Anderson and J Gold ‘Assignment of insurance claims by policyholders to 
underlying claimants’ 1997 Practising Law Institute (vol 557) 687. 
807 SL Johnson et al ‘Insurance’ in American Jurisprudence 2ed vol 43 (1982) 851; RA 
Lord Williston on Contracts 4ed vol 17 (2000) 105-107; NN Bernstein International 
Encyclopaedia of Laws vol 3 (2002) 61.   
808 RA Anderson Couch on Insurance Law 2ed vol 16 (1983) 756-757.  The anti-
assignment clause would only be valid and binding before the loss occurs.  Once the loss 
has occurred the policy may be freely assigned.  See Johnson et al op cit 854.   
809 Johnson et al op cit 852; Bernstein op cit 61. 
810 Ibid.  Or they prohibit assignment absolutely before loss. 
811 Johnson et al op cit 852; Anderson and Gold op cit 696; Hofer op cit 771. 
812 Lord op cit 124-125; Anderson op cit 763-765.  Further, a provision prohibiting 
assignment is only effective before the loss or death has occurred.  A provision 
prohibiting assignment absolutely after loss or death is accordingly null and void on the 
basis of public policy.  See Johnson et al op cit 854; Anderson op cit 758-759, 766; 
Bernstein op cit 61.  See also Anderson and Gold op cit 697 et seq; Hofer op cit 771. 
 
 
 
 
 [Once the loss has occurred]… it is not the personal contract which 
is being assigned, but a claim under or a right of action on the 
policy.813 
 
Insurance contacts indemnifying against the risk of fire are singled out and 
treated slightly differently.  Fire insurance policies may not be assigned 
before loss as they are also regarded as personal contracts.814  Further, 
sometimes the insurer does not have a discretion on whether to include an 
anti-assignment clause in a fire insurance policy – legislation may, in 
certain states, oblige an insurer to include such a prohibition.815 
 
Cessions in securitatem debiti, or assignments as collateral or security as 
they are termed in America, are generally permitted on the premise that an 
insurance policy is ‘a species of property which may be pledged’.816 
 
If, however, the insurance policy is subject to an anti-assignment clause 
and the insured assigns the policy as collateral for a debt before loss has 
occurred, the assignment would generally be valid even without consent.   
 
The reason for this is because an assignment as collateral would not fall 
within the meaning and scope of a general provision preventing 
                                                    
813 Johnson et al op cit 854. 
814 Johnson et al op cit 852.  See also KH York, JW Whelan and LP Martinez Cases, 
Materials and Problems on General Practice Insurance Law 3ed (1994) 224.  The authors 
discuss the case of Christ Gospel Temple v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co 417 A.2d 660 
(1979) where the judge held that:  ‘It is well settled that a fire insurance policy is a 
personal contract of indemnity, and is on the insured’s interest in the property, not the 
property itself’.  [Judge’s emphasis] 
815 Anderson op cit 757; York et al op cit discuss the case of Christ Gospel Temple v 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co supra and include the following passage from the case:  
‘Although the Appellants argue on several grounds, that we must ignore the clear 
prohibition against assignments without Liberty’s consent, we can find no legal basis for 
doing so.  The provision in question [viz the provision prohibiting assignment] is not 
simply a self-protective clause inserted the whim of the Appellee, but rather a legislatively 
mandated provision, specifically required to be included in fire insurance policies such as 
the one in issue in the instant case’.  [Judge’s emphasis] 
816 Johnson et al op cit 859.  See also MC Dransfield ‘Transfer or pledge of fire insurance 
policy as collateral security for debt within policy provisions prohibiting or restricting 
assignment of policy’ 1953 American Law Reports 2d (vol 31) 1199.  This article, 
however, only focuses on the assignment of a fire insurance policy as collateral for a 
debt, but considers the issue from the perspective of many of the individual states of 
America and provides a comprehensive overview of the case law. 
 
 
 
 
 assignment.  The policy must expressly prohibit the assignment of any 
interest whatsoever under the policy in order to prevent an assignment as 
collateral in addition to an ordinary assignment.817 
 
In the absence of a specific anti-assignment clause, American law permits 
a security assignment of the rights under insurance policies (even before 
loss has occurred) because when a security assignment is made, the 
insured is not divested of his legal interest in the policy.818  The assignee 
acquires only ‘an equity’ under the policy by the creation of a lien in his 
favour to the extent of the debt owed.819 
 
In terms of the American law approach, ‘assignment’ of an insurance 
policy as collateral for a debt would actually be a misnomer since nothing 
would be transferred to the ‘assignee’.  The ‘assignee’ merely acquires an 
equity in the policy to the amount of the debt that manifests itself in a lien.  
Apart from the misleading name, security cessions in America are 
definitely more theoretically acceptable than security cessions in South 
African law.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
817 Johnson et al op cit 859-860.  See also Dransfield op cit 1199 et seq, in so far as fire 
insurance policies which are assigned as collateral are concerned.  
818 Ibid. 
819 Johnson et al op cit 859-860; Bernstein op cit 61.  In American law a lien describes a 
‘non-possessory’ security interest, unlike in South African law where a lien describes the 
right to retain (or possess) something until a debt has been paid.  An equitable lien is ‘a 
right enforceable only in equity to have a demand satisfied out of a particular fund or 
specific property without having possession of the fund or property.’  See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lien (accessed on 22 July 2009).  See also PJ Badenhorst et 
al Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 4ed (2003) 389 et seq. 
 
 
 
 
 5.4 Negotiable instruments  
 
 
                         renders negotiable instrument not  
Creditor            transferable and hands to the creditor         Owner of negotiable  
(cedent)                                                                                 instrument (debtor) 
 
     
    
        cedes rights under 
        negotiable instrument 
                                                                     third party attempt to enforce the 
                                                                     right against the debtor 
                                                                                                                                                                              
  
 
 
Third party (cessionary)                                                                   
                           
 
 
5.4.1 South African law  
 
A negotiable instrument, such as a bill of exchange, cheque or promissory 
note, has been described as: 
 
… a legal document entitling the holder thereof to a specified sum 
of money…the right to the sum of money is transferable with the 
ease with which a cash payment is made.  It is obvious that the 
handing over of an instrument presents a safer and more 
convenient method of transferring money or the right to a sum of 
money from one person to another.820 
 
 
A fundamental characteristic of a negotiable instrument is its ability to be 
transferred from person to person.821  This transfer usually takes place 
through negotiation,822 and if the bill is taken in good faith and for value 
(inter alia), the transferee becomes the holder in due course.823  The 
                                                    
820 MA Fouché et al Legal Principles of Contracts and Negotiable Instruments 5ed (2003) 
270. 
821 It must be stated at the outset that this discussion focuses only on a negotiable 
instrument which is an order document and not a bearer document. 
822 The word ‘negotiation’ merely means a transfer that complies with s29 of the Bills of 
Exchange Act 34 of 1964.  See FR Malan and JT Pretorius Malan on Bills of Exchange, 
Cheques and Promissory Notes 4ed (2002) 129; Fouché et al op cit 276.  
823 Malan and Pretorius op cit 129; Fouché et al op cit 270, 276. 
 
 
 
 
 position of the holder in due course is a secure one since it remedies an 
absence of title or any defect in title of the transferor.824 
 
A negotiable instrument (or rather the rights thereunder) may also be 
transferred through an ordinary cession, where the transferee does not 
become the holder or holder in due course, but the cessionary.825  In such 
a case the cessionary-transferee takes the instrument subject to a lack of 
title or any defects in the title of the cedent-transferor and is not afforded 
the secure position of a holder in due course.826 
 
It often happens that a party827 wishes to make the instrument non-
transferable – that is – that the instrument goes no further than the named 
payee or an indorsee.  In terms of s6(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act a 
party can make a bill of exchange non-transferable by inserting words 
prohibiting transfer, or indicating an intention that the bill should not be 
transferable.828   In terms of s75A of the Bills of Exchange Act a party can 
render a cheque non-transferable by, inter alia, writing the words ‘not 
transferable’ boldly on the face of the cheque usually between transverse 
                                                    
824 Fouché et al op cit 270.  The title of holder in due course is thus an exception to the 
general rule contained in the maxim nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse 
haberet. 
825 DV Cowen and L Gering Cowen on the Law of Negotiable Instruments in South Africa 
4ed (1966) 6-7, 271-272; Malan and Pretorius 164; A Govindjee ‘Negotiable Instruments’ 
in LAWSA 2ed vol 19 (2006) para 65.  See also Factory Investments (Pty) Ltd v Ismail 
1960 (2) SA 10 (T) 13. 
826 Cowen and Gering op cit 6-7, 271-272; Malan and Pretorius op cit 132; Govindjee op 
cit para 65. 
827 Usually the drawer, the person who gives the order to the drawee (usually a bank in 
the case of cheques), to pay a sum of money to the named payee (or his indorsee).  
Fouché et al op cit 270. 
828 See also Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Sham Magazine Centre 1977 (1) SA 
484 (A). 
 
 
 
 
 
 parallel lines.829  A promissory note with the word ‘only’ written clearly and 
legibly after the name of the payee will render it non-transferable.830  
 
The question that now arises is whether such transfer prohibitions would 
have the effect of pacta de non cedendo on negotiable instruments that 
are transferred through cession. 
 
The court in Trust Bank v Standard Bank831 touched indirectly on this 
issue.  The topic of discussion in this case was deposit vouchers that were 
subject to a condition stating that they were neither transferable nor 
negotiable.   
 
While all the judges in this case agreed that deposit vouchers were not 
negotiable instruments, there was some dispute as to whether the 
condition upon which they were issued amounted to a pactum de non 
cedendo. 
 
In the minority judgment of Ogilvie Thompson JA, the opinion was 
expressed that the prohibition on transfer concerned the document itself 
(the piece of paper) and not the rights embodied therein.  A transfer of the 
rights was thus possible as the prohibition did not constitute a pactum de 
non cedendo.832 
 
The majority were of the view that, although the deposit vouchers only 
evidence the rights recorded therein, on an ordinary interpretation, the 
words prohibiting transfer were an attribute of those rights and not the 
                                                    
829 See generally Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Sham Magazine Centre 1977 (1) 
SA 484 (A); Eskom v First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd 1995 (2) SA 386 (A). 
830 L Gering and DG Tobias Handbook on the Law of Negotiable Instruments 3ed (2007) 
154; Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Sham Magazine Centre 1977 (1) SA 484 (A) 
503-504.   
831 Trust Bank of Africa Ltd v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1968 3 SA 166 (A).  See Chapter 3 
for a case summary. 
832 Supra 182C.   
 
 
 
 
 document itself.  The prohibition was accordingly held to amount to a valid 
pactum de non cedendo.833   
 
Would the judges’ opinions have been different if the instrument under 
discussion was a negotiable instrument that had been ceded contrary to a 
prohibition on the face of it? 
 
Malan and Pretorius submit that words prohibiting transfer do not 
necessarily prevent a cession of the rights, as these prohibiting words 
would usually refer to the document itself and not to the rights embodied 
therein. 834 
 
On the other hand, according to Govindjee,835 who relies on Trust Bank as 
authority, if the rights under a negotiable instrument are ceded despite 
words prohibiting transfer, for example, payable ‘to X only’ or marked ‘not 
transferable’, such a cession would be invalid.  It seems as though this 
author has applied the majority ratio in Trust Bank, a case not concerning 
negotiable instruments, to a situation dealing with negotiable instruments. 
 
Govindjee is not alone in his view.  Oelofse is also of the opinion that 
rights under a document marked ‘not transferable’, or that is payable to a 
specific person only, can in no manner be transferred.836 
 
                                                    
833 Supra 190C, 191B-C. 
834 Malan and Pretorius op cit 429-430.  See also FR Malan ‘Die nie-oordraagbare tjek’ 
1980 De Jure 391 393 where he states that because personal rights arising from bills of 
exchange can be transferred by cession (as illustrated by Factory Investments (Pty) Ltd v 
Ismail supra) it stands to reason that the ratio in the Trust Bank case cannot be directly 
applied to negotiable instruments like bills of exchange, cheques and promissory notes.  
Malan also associates himself with the minority judgment of Ogilvie Thompson JA (as 
explained above) and described this judgment as insightful (‘insiggewend’).  See also FR 
Malan ‘The liberation of the cheque’ 1978 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 107 116.  
835 Govindjee op cit para 65. 
836 AN Oelofse ‘Rektawissel en rektajtek, verhandeling en sessie in die Duitse en Suid-
Afrikaanse reg’ 1987 Modern Business (vol 9) 129 135 where he uses the cases of 
Volkskas Bpk v Johnson 1979 (4) SA 775 (K) and Gishen v Nedbank Ltd 1984 (2) SA 
378 (W) in support of his view.  Neither of these cases deal with the issue directly, but 
proceed on the assumption that a cession of a non-transferable instrument is not 
possible. 
 
 
 
 
 Oelofse points out that words excluding negotiation of an instrument, for 
example, ‘not negotiable’ or ‘not indorsable’, may rule out a negotiation of 
the instrument, but not a cession as the instrument is still susceptible to be 
transferred by any other mode.837  In his view, where transfer in general is 
prohibited, then even a cession is not possible.  He notes that it is 
ultimately the construction of the prohibitory words that will determine 
whether the instrument can be ceded or not.838  
 
A convincing argument can be made in support of the authors who hold 
the view that a negotiable instrument which is not transferable precludes a 
transfer through cession.  Were it otherwise, the presence of a pactum de 
non cedendo on the instrument would make little sense.  More 
compellingly, however, it must be remembered that a negotiable 
instrument (the piece of paper itself) and the rights thereunder are 
inextricably linked.  If prohibitory words appear on the face of the 
document, the prohibition pertains not only to the document itself, but also 
to the rights it embodies.   
 
Thus, in my opinion, the minority judgment of Ogilvie Thompson JA and 
the view of Malan are flawed, since the document itself is worthless 
without the rights which attach thereto.  
  
5.4.2 American law 
 
In America the law of negotiable instruments is governed by article 3 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter referred to as the ‘UCC’).  As in 
South African law, negotiation is the usual manner in which a negotiable 
instrument is transferred. The UCC dictates whether a transfer amounts to 
                                                    
837 Oelofse op cit 136. 
838 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
 a negotiation or whether a transferee has the right to compel a 
negotiation.839 
 
As in South African law, an assignment of a negotiable instrument will not 
confer on the assignee a better title than that of the assignor, and he takes 
subject to equities.840   
 
Although the UCC recognises that a negotiable instrument may be 
transferred by way of assignment,841 article 3 of the UCC states that 
transfers of negotiable instruments are generally regarded as negotiations.  
These two methods of transfer are therefore deemed to be clearly 
separate from each other and are accordingly treated differently.842  
 
The general law of contract and assignment seems to be the applicable 
governing law when a negotiable instrument is assigned, and not article 3 
of the UCC.843 
 
If, therefore, a negotiable instrument is negotiated in accordance with the 
UCC, the rules therein are applicable.  If a negotiable instrument is 
assigned, then the general principles governing assignment are 
applicable.   
 
                                                    
839 UCC 3-203 (post 1990 version).  FM Hart and WF Willier Negotiable Instruments 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code vol 2 (2007) part 1B-23. 
840 Hart and Willier op cit 1B-23; AMH Foley et al ‘Bills and Notes’ in American 
Jurisprudence 2ed vol 11 (1997) 397, 544. 
841 This possibility is found in the words ‘unless otherwise agreed’ in UCC 3-203(c).  See 
Hart and Willier op cit part 3-9 – 3-10. 
842 Hart and Willier op cit part 1B-23; Foley et al op cit 397 and 544: ‘Negotiability is 
limited to the special class of contracts known as negotiable instruments, while 
assignability applies to contractual rights and chooses [sic] in action in general, as well as 
to any right of property or interest therein’.   
843 Hart and Willier op cit part 3-6 – 3-8: ‘The rights of the assignee against the assignor 
are primarily governed by the contract between the two parties…’.  See also part 3-8: ‘If a 
negotiable instrument is assigned, Article 3 of the Code generally has little application to 
the transfer’. 
 
 
 
 
 It thus stands to reason that if a negotiable instrument contains an anti-
assignment clause or any words prohibiting its transfer, the law as 
discussed in Chapter 2 would find application.   
 
In Chapter 2 it was explained that there are two types of assignment in 
American law to which different rules apply:  Assignments of a general 
nature and assignments of a commercial nature. 
 
The Restatement of Contracts is the law governing assignments of a 
general nature, although the validity and effect would depend upon the 
interpretation of the Restatements by the courts of a particular state.844  If 
a negotiable instrument contains an anti-assignment clause the 
Restatements and the judicial interpretation thereof would be the 
applicable law.  
 
Article 9 of the UCC governs contracts of a commercial nature.845  Article 
9, however, functions primarily to regulate the assignment of accounts 
receivable (book debts) in the context of factoring agreements.846  Article 
9-406(d) renders any prohibition on the assignment of an account 
receivable as invalid and ineffective if it falls within the definition of 
‘account’.   
 
Article 9-102(2) defines ‘account’ as a right to payment of a monetary 
obligation.  A few examples include:  Property that has been leased or 
disposed of, services rendered or to be rendered and an insurance policy 
issued or to be issued.  Article 9-102(2) goes further to state that the 
definition of ‘account’ does not include, amongst other things, ‘rights to 
payment evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument’.   
 
                                                    
844 For example the ‘magic words’ or Illinois interpretative approach etc.  See Chapter 2. 
845 See Chapter 2. 
846 See below as well as Chapter 2 for a further explanation.  
 
 
 
 
 In case it was not clear whether the article was referring to a negotiable 
instrument, article 9-102(47) contains a definition of the word ‘instrument’.  
This article confirms that the word ‘instrument’ indeed means negotiable 
instrument. 
 
Accordingly, a negotiable instrument is excluded from the definition of the 
word ‘account’ and can therefore not find application under article 9 of the 
UCC.  Thus, if a negotiable instrument contains an anti-assignment 
clause, it can only be dealt with as an assignment of a general nature 
where the Restatements would be applicable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5.5  Factoring (book debt financing) 
 
 
                                            Factoring house          
 
      factoring house 
      enforces debts                                                       creditor cedes book debts to the                                     
      against debtor                                                        factoring house to obtain finance 
                                   
 
 
                                                       
 
                                  creditor sells good or  
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‘Book debt financing’ or ‘accounts receivable financing’847 as it is also 
called, is one of the main components of ‘factoring’.848  It has been said 
that to describe or explain what factoring is in brief is not an easy task due 
to the lack of agreement regarding its very characterisation.849   
 
The basics of a factoring agreement are very similar across most legal 
systems.  What follows is thus a non-legal-system-specific background to 
factoring agreements before the South African and American legal 
systems are discussed.850     
                                                    
847 It seems as though ‘accounts receivable financing’ is the preferred term in America, 
whereas ‘book debt financing’ or ‘boekskuldfinansiering’ appears to be more widely used 
in South Africa.   
848 The term ‘factoring’ is often used in a generic sense to refer to the book debt financing 
component of factoring.  See N Joubert ‘The legality of continuity clauses in factoring 
contracts’ 1994 South African Law Journal (vol 111) 604 (hereinafter referred to as 
‘continuity clauses’). 
849 R Noel, S Mills and N Davidson Salinger on Factoring 4ed (2006) 1. 
850 For South African materials dealing with factoring generally see N Joubert Die 
Regsbetrekking by Kredietfaktorering (1985) LLD Thesis Randse Afrikaanse Universiteit 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘Kredietfaktorering’); N Joubert ‘Boekskuldfinansiering en pacta 
de non cedendo’ 1986 Modern Business 109 (hereinafter referred to as 
‘Boekskuldfinansiering’) ; N Joubert ‘The legal nature of the factoring contract’ 1987 
South African Law Journal 88 (hereinafter referred to as ‘The factoring contract’); S Scott 
‘Sessie en factoring in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg’ 1987 De Jure (vol 20) 15 (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Sessie’); S Scott The Law of Cession 2ed (1991) 259 et seq (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘Cession’; S Scott ‘Claim enforcement (debt collection)’ 2002 SA Mercantile 
 
 
 
 
  
I would describe factoring as the business conducted by a ‘factoring 
house’ or a ‘factor’.851  It is a dual-faceted system providing credit facilities 
as well as financial services to clients (predominately small to medium 
sized businesses) who, in return, sell their book debts or accounts 
receivable to the said factoring houses. 
 
I classify the factoring system as a dual-faceted one since two main 
functions can be broadly distinguished:   
 
First, factoring provides immediate cash flow to a business requiring cash 
for various reasons, for example, to expand the business, to pay off 
pressing debt, to re-finance credit extended to its customers and to 
purchase goods or services.852 Often book debt financing is the only form 
of financing that a small to medium business can acquire.853  Further, this 
type of finance is quick and easy to obtain when compared to a bank loan 
as the solvency (or insolvency) of the business (the client) is not 
considered.854   
 
                                                                                                                                              
Law Journal (vol 14) 491 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Claim enforcement’); Sasfin (Pty) Ltd 
v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 (A). 
851 There has been much variation in the use of terms describing the factor to the 
factoring agreement (especially terms in Afrikaans, see Scott ‘Sessie’ 15 et seq.  The 
terms ‘finance house’ and ‘finance company’ have also been used. My view is that 
although any of the listed terms would suffice, I prefer the term ‘factoring house’ because 
the factor is usually a large company (or bank) and this term therefore seems more 
appropriate. 
852 Http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factoring_(finance) (accessed on 17 April 2009); WD 
Malcolm ‘Accounts receivable financing under the uniform commercial code’ 1966 Rabels 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (vol 30) 434 435; Joubert 
‘Boekskuldfinansiering’ 110. 
853 Joubert Kredietfaktorering 467; Joubert ‘Boekskuldfinansiering’ 109; Noel et al op cit 
35-36. 
854 Http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factoring_(finance) (accessed on 17 April 2009).  It is 
rather the strength of the book debts or the creditworthiness of the debtors that will 
determine whether the factoring house will do business with a potential client.   
 
 
 
 
 All the client need do is cede its book debts to the factoring house.  Book 
debts are the monies owing to the client by its debtors.855  The factoring 
house would consequently own the book debts and would be legally 
entitled to enforce them.856  In return, the factoring house pays the client 
the monetary value of the book debts minus certain fees, for example, its 
collecting fee, interest, and sometimes a fee covering the possibility of 
non-payment.857   
 
Secondly, a factoring house provides a range of financial services.858  
These services include notifying the debtor of the change in creditor and 
most importantly, collecting the debt.  Collecting the debt may prove to be 
a great benefit or advantage to the client since it takes the responsibility of 
this task out of the client’s hands.859   
                                                    
855 In South Africa book debts may be current or future book debts.  See Joubert 
‘continuity clauses’ 604 et seq.  
856 It must, however, be added that the specific factoring agreement between the factoring 
house and the client may stipulate that although the factoring house is legally entitled to 
enforce the claim, the client must collect the debt and hand over the proceeds.  This 
arrangement is not the usual modus operandi of a factoring agreement, but because the 
parties are free to draw up the contract as they see fit, it is perfectly valid.  This, of 
course, makes it very difficult to describe a typical factoring agreement.  See also 
Malcolm op cit 436.  
857 Http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factoring_(finance) (accessed on 17 April 2009). In 
America the factoring house usually pays the client a sum of money which is a 
percentage of the face value of the book debts.  The remainder is kept in reserve and 
held until payment by the client’s debtors has been made.  The cost associated with the 
transaction is the factoring house’s fee and it is deducted from the reserve and the 
balance is paid to the client. Sometimes the factoring house may charge the client an 
additional service charge, as well as interest determined by the period of the debtors’ 
delayed payment.  An amount that might not be collected due to non-payment may also 
be taken into account. 
858 The range of financial services depends upon the specific agreement between the 
client and the factoring house or on which factoring package the client selects.  It is 
possible that in a specific agreement none of these services may be offered by the 
factoring house in a certain package, or required by the client.  Since a factoring 
agreement can be so client-specific it is easy to see how the term is so difficult to define.  
859 Http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factoring_(finance) (accessed on 17 April 2009); Scott 
‘Claim enforcement’ 491, 493-494.  The task of collecting debt is a specialised service 
requiring skills and manpower that a small to medium (business) client may not posses.  
Thus, it eliminates the need for and cost of employing permanent skilled staff to perform 
this function.  It also eliminates the need to outsource the service.  As part of the debt 
collecting service, most factoring houses also provide reports on the creditworthiness of 
the debtors, keep a detailed history of their payments and provide periodical reports to 
the client on payments received. 
 
 
 
 
 It has been recorded that in 1983 the world factoring turnover was 66 994 
million US dollars. 860  The factoring turnover for the same year in South 
Africa was 725 million US dollars.861  To illustrate how the factoring 
industry has grown, in 2004 the total world factoring turnover was 
1 161 290 million US dollars.862  In South Africa in 2004, the total factoring 
turnover was 9 585 million US dollars.863  Despite the fact that factoring 
has been on the rise in South Africa since 1983, when these statistics are 
considered against those in other countries,864 it provokes justifiable 
concern as to why South Africa is lagging behind.865 
 
5.5.1 South African law 
 
The factoring house will require some kind of interest in the book debts if it 
is to extend credit to its client.  Book debts are therefore ceded to the 
factoring house either by an out-and-out cession or as a cession in 
securitatem debiti.866   
 
It makes sense that anything that would prevent the factoring house from 
acquiring such an interest, like pacta de non cedendo for instance, poses 
a grave threat to the smooth functioning of this powerhouse industry.867  It 
is perhaps the presence of pacta de non cedendo applicable to factoring 
                                                    
860 Joubert ‘The factoring contract’ 88, 89 footnote 4. 
861 Ibid. 
862 Noel et al op cit 360 
863 Noel et al op cit 359. 
864 See Noel et al op cit 359.  For example, the total factoring turnover in the United 
States of America in 2004 was 110 511 million US dollars. 
865 All totals have been expressed as a number in US dollars for the purpose of 
comparison. 
866 Joubert ‘Boekskuldfinansiering’ 109.  Thus in South African law it seems possible that 
a factoring contract can come into existence in a situation where, once the credit 
extended by the factoring house has been repaid by the client, the book debts will once 
again find themselves in the hands of the client.  This is not a typical factoring 
arrangement. 
867 Joubert ‘Boekskuldfinansiering’ 109. 
 
 
 
 
 contracts that has restrained the growth of the factoring industry in South 
Africa, whereas this industry is a thriving one in other countries. 
 
One of the main reasons why a debtor would insist that a pactum de non 
cedendo be included in a factoring contract is to prevent a situation where 
he has to account for the debt twice:  Once to the cedent in the false but 
genuine belief that he is still the creditor and again to the cessionary upon 
the presentation of proof of cession.  If the cedent absconds or is 
insolvent, the debtor may never recover this undue payment.868 
 
Besides the risk of double payment, debtors apparently also seek to avoid 
the cost, complication and inconvenience of changing the creditor in their 
books, especially when their bookkeeping is managed by computer 
programs, as is so often the case.869  Hence, for the debtor’s all-round 
protection, the pactum de non cedendo is frequently seen as a standard 
clause in contracts, especially for the purchase of goods on credit.870   
 
The creditor may have no scope to negotiate if the debtor places a large 
order of goods while insisting upon a contract containing a pactum de non 
cedendo.  This, as a result, leaves the creditor in the lurch if the situation 
arises where immediate finance is needed.871  
 
In South Africa the position of pacta de non cedendo applicable to 
factoring agreements is just as uncertain as that of pacta de non cedendo 
appearing in ordinary contracts:  The judicial decisions are somewhat 
divided on the issue and the correctness of the historical basis as 
illustrated in the locus classicus872 is doubtful.873  
                                                    
868 Even if notice of cession was sent to the debtor, such notice can be easily missed. 
Joubert ‘Boekskuldfinansiering’ 109; Scott ‘Sessie’ 33.  
869 Joubert ‘Boekskuldfinansiering’ 109-110; Scott ‘Sessie’ 33.  Surely nowadays with 
modern computer programs and technology this would not be a problem? 
870 Joubert ‘Boekskuldfinansiering’ 110. 
871 Ibid. 
872 Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates Ltd 1920 AD 600. 
 
 
 
 
  
Joubert is of the opinion that pacta de non cedendo applicable to factoring 
contracts should be invalid on the basis that they are against public policy. 
Public policy places a high premium on economic growth and the optimal 
utilisation of capital.  Pacta de non cedendo may stifle this if allowed to 
neutralise book debt financing.874 
 
Scott criticises Joubert’s straightforward approach as giving almost no 
attention to the principle of freedom of contract, the interest of the debtor 
and the reasonableness or not of the pactum de non cedendo.875   
 
Scott is of the opinion that when the pactum de non cedendo appears in 
the contract creating the right, then according to the principle of freedom of 
contract, the right to cede the book debts becomes non-transferable 
regardless of whether or not the restriction is in the interest of the 
debtor.876 
 
If the pactum de non cedendo was super-imposed on an already existing 
right, Scott is of the opinion that the right to cede the book debts is only 
transferable if the debtor has an interest.877  Should such an interest exist 
and should the book debts be ceded contrary to the prohibition, the debtor 
has an action for damages for breach of contract.878 
 
                                                                                                                                              
873 See Chapters 3 and 4 for a more detailed discussion. 
874 Joubert ‘Boekskuldfinansiering’ 110-112; Joubert Kredietfaktorering 68.  For a further 
discussion of Joubert’s views see Chapter 4. 
875 Scott ‘Sessie’ 36.  She also questions the importance of the role that factoring plays in 
South Africa, since Joubert had previously mentioned that factoring is not that well known 
in South Africa.  It must be borne in mind that Joubert’s statement and Scott’s comment 
were made 24 years and 22 years ago, respectively.  As illustrated by the factoring 
turnover statistics mentioned above, factoring has developed in leaps and bounds in 
South Africa and such statements no longer hold true. 
876 Scott ‘Sessie’ 32, 37; Scott Cession op cit 265.  See also Chapter 4 for a more 
detailed discussion of Scott’s views. 
877 Scott ‘Sessie’ 32. 
878 Scott ‘Sessie’ 32 and footnote 134, 36-37.  
 
 
 
 
 The fact that pacta de non cedendo in general, and pacta de non cedendo 
appearing in book debts, find themselves in a precarious position, places a 
huge strain on the future growth potential of factoring as a powerhouse 
industry.  Is a factoring house expected to scrutinise each and every 
contract related to each and every book debt to determine if some book 
debts are subject to a pactum de non cedendo?   
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the search for pacta de non cedendo would 
be a cumbersome task, it could be accomplished, but at what cost?   
 
It can be argued that the factoring house could employ a team of 
permanent staff whose only job would be to inspect the contracts 
concluded between its clients and its clients’ debtors to determine which 
book debts were able to be ceded and which were not.  In my opinion, this 
extra step in the procedure would be time consuming and would result in a 
delay in the speedy obtaining of finance.  Book debt financing may 
eventually lose its lustre of being a quick fix. 
 
Not only would this proposed inspection result in a delay in obtaining 
finance, but the client would ultimately have to carry the cost of the 
factoring house employing extra staff to do a job that may be seen as 
unnecessary.  The charges and fees of factoring would increase and 
consequently, factoring would become a more expensive method of 
obtaining finance. 
 
Two suggestions of note to remedy this problem are either for the factoring 
house to obtain the debtors’ consent to the cessions which are hindered 
by pacta de non cedendo; or for the factoring house to indemnify the 
debtors against the risk of making double payments and to offer 
indemnification in the case of additional bookkeeping expenses.879  
 
                                                    
879 Scott Cession op cit 267. 
 
 
 
 
 These suggestions, however, are not practical since they also translate 
into extra time and costs for the factoring houses, and that will eventually 
have a negative impact on its clients, who depend on this industry to 
function as quickly as possible and as inexpensively as possible.  
Obtaining a debtor’s consent would take just as long as an inspection if 
not longer, and the factoring house would still have to inspect each 
contract.  Indemnification would be the more time effective option, but 
would obviously not be cost effective and the client would ultimately have 
to bear the extra expense. 
 
5.5.2 American law 
 
The problems that pacta de non cedendo create in South Africa law are 
not a concern in America due to the introduction of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC) which deals with commercial law in general.  
Article 9 of the UCC governs the legal principles concerning security 
interests in personal property.   
 
A book debt or an ‘account receivable’, being the more popular term in 
America, is personal property as it is an asset in the estate of the creditor.  
It is also a security interest as it can be used as collateral or security 
should the creditor be required to offer collateral in any kind of transaction.   
 
In its application article 9 also includes outright sales of accounts 
receivable (the typical factoring contract) and sales of contractual rights as 
though they were transfers of security interests.880 
 
Article 9, therefore, regulates the assignment of accounts receivable, 
provided that the transaction falls within the definition of ‘account’ in article 
9-102(2).881 
                                                    
880 Malcolm op cit 453 where even though the different transactions embody different 
legal concepts, the functions of the transactions are of primary importance.  Since 
security transfers and outright transfers are similar, they are treated exactly the same. 
 
 
 
 
  
If the assignment falls within this definition, then article 9-406(d) renders 
any prohibition on the assignment of an account receivable invalid and 
ineffective. 
 
Accordingly, no matter how clearly an anti-assignment clause is phrased 
in a factoring contract falling within the ambit of article 9, it will be rendered 
ineffective.  It has been said that the American legislators have drafted 
article 9 in this manner as a ‘modern credit economy’ requires contractual 
rights to be freely assignable in order to function properly.882 
 
Article 9 was considered in great detail in Chapter 2.  My opinion that 
article 9 serves its purpose well will, however, be re-iterated.  If factoring 
houses are to be in existence to offer needy businesses quick finance, 
accounts receivable have to be freely assignable, and it would be 
ludicrous to impede or to refuse to improve the very mechanism that drives 
this industry.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
881 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion. 
882 JE Murray Corbin on Contracts revised ed vol 9 (2007) 491. 
 
 
 
 
 5.6 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter has compared the law governing a pactum de non cedendo 
appearing in specific contracts in South Africa with the law governing an 
anti-assignment clause appearing in specific contracts in America. 
 
The purpose of this comparison, as already mentioned, was to determine 
if a possible solution could be found to alleviate the problems experienced 
in the South African law of pacta de non cedendo. 
 
This comparative examination revealed two points of interest.  First, in 
both American law and South African law slightly different legal principles 
apply when a prohibition on cession is contained in a specific contract to 
when such a prohibition is contained in a general contract. 
 
Secondly, and more significantly, the difference in the legal principles 
between pacta de non cedendo contained in general contracts and the 
legal principles of pacta de non cedendo contained in specific contracts, is 
plainly obvious in South African law.  American law, in contrast, has a 
more consistent approach, albeit not entirely uniform. 
 
It is these two points, but especially the second, that have motivated the 
proposed solution discussed in the next Chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER SIX 
 
PROPOSED SOLUTION 
 
American law is not perfect in every respect – no legal system is, but I am 
of the opinion that South African law can look to American law for 
inspiration. My proposed solution is to take the general manner in which 
American law approaches pacta de non cedendo and to apply it to South 
African law in a manner that would be sensible in a South African context, 
considering at all times current trends and future commercial realities. 
 
I propose to divide the law of pacta de non cedendo into two broad 
categories as it is done in America:  Contracts of a general nature and 
contracts of a commercial nature. 
 
6.1 General contracts 
 
Both anti-assignment clauses in America and pacta de non cedendo in 
South Africa experience inconsistencies and uncertainties when they 
appear in a contract of a general nature.  These grey areas are 
undoubtedly more prevalent in South African law.   
 
Further, as can be seen from the comparative examination in the previous 
Chapter, slightly different principles are applied when prohibitions on 
cession appear in specific contracts or in specific areas of the law, for 
example, in company law or in the law of insolvency.  In American law, the 
approach to anti-assignment clauses contained in specific contracts is 
more consistent with the approach to anti-assignment clauses contained in 
general contracts.  In South African law the difference in applicable legal 
principles is much more distinct. 
 
This creates unnecessary complications.  Is one set of legal principles that 
experiences inconsistencies and uncertainties not challenging enough?  
 
 
 
 
 Why should a slightly different set of rules (with its own shortcomings) 
apply when a pactum de non cedendo appears in a contract of specific 
application? 
 
Some of these shortcomings were considered in Chapter 5, for example, 
whether or not a particular party, who is acting nomino officio, like a 
trustee of an insolvent estate or a deputy-sheriff of the court, is bound by a 
pactum de non cedendo.  Why should the rules afford a party more or less 
rights depending upon the capacity in which he acts?  Another 
shortcoming can be seen in insurance law when an insurance policy is 
ceded in securitatem debiti, as it is still largely unclear whether the pledge 
construction or the pactum fiduciae construction is to apply.  Also, in 
negotiable instruments it is uncertain whether the rights under a negotiable 
instrument marked ‘not transferable’ can still be ceded.  Further, in 
company law, it seems as though the interest requirement has been 
abandoned altogether.  
 
Would it not be simpler and more logical if the rules were all the same?  
Judging from the comparative examination of anti-assignment clauses in 
Chapter 5, it appears that an attempt is made in America to apply a 
uniform approach to all prohibitions on assignment whether contained in 
general or specific contracts.   
 
This attempt has been successful in some areas, for example, in the law 
of negotiable instruments, where article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code 
finds application if a negotiable instrument is negotiated.  If a negotiable 
instrument is assigned, the Restatement of Contracts applies.883  Also, in 
the law of bankruptcy the trustee is considered to be in the same position 
as that of the creditor (the debtor of the bankrupt estate) as the creditor’s 
                                                    
883 FM Hart and WF Willier Negotiable Instruments Under the Uniform Commercial Code 
vol 2 (2007) part 3-8: ‘If a negotiable instrument is assigned, Article 3 of the Code 
generally has little application to the transfer’.  See also Chapter 5. 
 
 
 
 
 assets are still fully subject to their ‘nonbankruptcy attributes’.884  Thus, the 
Restatement of Contracts would find application.  I, therefore, suggest that 
in South Africa the law governing the areas of general and specific 
application should be standardised.    
 
It should not make a fundamental difference if the subject-matter of the 
prohibited cession varies.  If the rights under an insurance policy, for 
example, are prohibited from being ceded, or if shares are prohibited from 
being ceded, why should different rules apply?  All pacta de non cedendo, 
whether appearing in general or specific contracts, should be dealt with in 
the same manner – as pacta de non cedendo of a general nature. 
 
As will be discussed below, the only exception to the standardisation of 
pacta de non cedendo should be when they appear in commercial 
contracts, that is, factoring contracts.  Allowance has been made for this 
exception for the purpose of enabling South African law to keep abreast 
with current trends and commercial realities.885 
 
6.1.1 Validity 
 
I propose that pacta de non cedendo be valid and binding automatically, 
without an interest first being proven to exist.886  My reasons are as 
follows: 
 
First, the interest requirement serves no purpose in light of my proposed 
solution as a whole.  Under the current position, if the pactum de non 
cedendo is valid, the right to claim performance from the debtor, which is 
an asset in the creditor’s estate, is rendered non-transferable.  Thus, the 
debtor must show that he has a clear interest in the prohibition before the 
                                                    
884 TH Jackson The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy law (1986) 104.  See also Chapter 5. 
885 See Chapter 5 where the benefits and the annual financial turnover of this 
powerhouse industry were mentioned. 
886 See Chapter 4 for a general discussion of the interest requirement. 
 
 
 
 
 creditor is deprived of the freedom to administer his estate as he sees fit 
(which is a rather drastic consequence for any creditor to bear).  If, 
however, the pactum de non cedendo does not render the right non-
transferable, as is my suggestion, the effect is not so far-reaching and the 
need for the interest requirement can fall away.  
 
Secondly, the interest requirement is not a requirement for the validity of 
other contractual terms.  Why is the pactum de non cedendo so significant 
as to warrant the extra requirement?  Other contractual terms depriving 
contractants of more than merely the right to cede are valid without an 
interest requirement first having been met, for example, agreeing to cede 
the right to inheritance887 or a legacy,888 ceding the right to prospect889 and 
ceding a right of pre-emption.890  
 
Thirdly, in keeping with the principle of freedom of contract, if the parties 
agree to prohibit cession, why should the debtor have the extra 
encumbrance of showing that the prohibition is in his interest?   
 
Fourthly, there is no historical basis upon which the interest requirement 
can be founded.  The court in Paiges v Van Ryn Gold Mine Estates Ltd891 
relied on Sande and Voet as authority, but as discussed in Chapter 4, 
these two old authorities were in all likelihood not writing about pacta de 
non cedendo, but rather pacta de non aliendo.  
                                                    
887 S Scott The law of Cession 2ed (1991) 169; Moodley v Moodley 1953 (3) SA 860 (N); 
Weiner NO v The Master 1976 (2) SA 830 (T); Rein NO v Fleischer NO 1984 (4) SA 863 
(A). 
888 Scott op cit 169; Nel v Nel 1912 EDL 435. 
889 Scott op cit 168; Cullinan v Pistorius 1903 ORC 33; Henderson v Hanekom 1903 20 
SC 513. 
890 Scott op cit 169; Van der Hoven v Cutting 1903 TS 299; Hersch v Nel 1948 (3) SA 686 
(A). 
891 1920 AD 600. 
 
 
 
 
 Fifthly, since I base my proposed solution on the general manner in which 
American law deals with agreements prohibiting cession, where no such 
requirement exists,892 it is consequently out of place. 
 
Lastly, it should not make a difference if the pactum de non cedendo was 
inserted into the agreement creating the right or whether it was super-
imposed onto an already existing agreement.  Although I acknowledge 
that the pactum de non cedendo can take either of these constructions, it 
should have no impact on the validity or effect.     
 
6.1.2 Effect 
 
In Chapter 2 it was discussed that American law follows what they call the 
‘modern approach’.  If the power to assign has been extinguished, the 
personal right is rendered non-transferable.  If only the right to assign has 
been prohibited then it is still possible for the personal right to be 
transferred, but an action for damages arises in favour of the debtor for 
breach of contract.  In American law, the debate surrounds the 
interpretation of the modern approach.  Three different judicial 
interpretative approaches exist.  Could the modern approach and one of 
these interpretations perhaps be a viable solution in South Africa? 
 
• The Allhusen or Rumbin v Utica minority interpretative approach893 
requires only general terms to extinguish the power to assign, 
provided the general terms are plain, clear and unambiguous. 
 
This approach has the benefit of being flexible and giving effect to 
freedom of contract as parties are given the scope to use their own 
language to express their intentions.  Thus, the main advantage of 
this approach is that it does not scrutinise the specific words used 
by the parties (like the magic words approach).  
                                                    
892 The interest requirement also does not feature in the English law for that matter. 
893 See Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
 
  
The fatal flaw, as pointed out in Chapter 2, is that if the parties only 
employ general language to extinguish the power to assign, how 
much more general should their language be, or how should their 
intentions be couched only to restrict the right to assign? 
 
In my opinion, to differentiate between a general intention where 
the power to assign is extinguished and an even-more-general 
intention where only the right to assign is prohibited, the contract 
language will inevitably be scrutinised. 
 
From a South African law perspective, objection can be raised to 
the somewhat confusing distinction between a general and even-
more-general intention.  Further, it places a wide discretion in the 
hands of the court in deciding the parties’ intentions.  This 
interpretative approach is certainly not ideal. 
 
• The so-called ‘magic words’ approach requires certain words (the 
magic words), for example, ‘void’, ‘invalid’ or ‘ineffective’, to render 
the personal right non-transferable, otherwise an assignment in 
contravention results only in damages for breach of contract.894   
 
As a solution in South Africa, this interpretative approach would 
practically result in compelling contractants to use certain words, 
almost like Roman lawyers did with their stipulatio.  It is, however, 
much simpler than the Allhusen or Rumbin v Utica minority 
approach and basic to use, for example, ‘an assignment in 
contravention of the anti-assignment clause shall be void’.  Another 
benefit is that it limits the amount of discretion that a court may 
exercise. 
 
                                                    
894 See Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
 
 Whether it will be successful in South Africa is debatable.  Ignorant 
parties may not only be unable to use the magic words to their 
advantage, but may actually be in a worse position by using them 
incorrectly.   
 
The South African law of contract requires consensus ad idem for a 
contract to be valid and enforceable.  If it can be shown that the 
written contract does not reflect the consensus reached by the 
parties, then a court will generally not give effect to the written 
contract.895  In such a situation what would our courts do?  It may 
be difficult, if not impossible, to determine if (oral) consensus was 
reached with or without magic words. 
 
It would also be impossible for a court to determine the existence of 
magic words if the agreement was an oral one ab initio and not 
reduced to writing.  In our law an orally concluded contract is 
perfectly valid.  If the magic words approach were to be adopted it 
would force contractants to conclude written agreements, since 
without a document evidencing the use of magic words, or a 
stipulation of whether a duty is created or a power is relinquished, 
the intentions of the parties would be difficult to ascertain. 
 
• The Illinois approach896 improves on the above two approaches in 
the sense that it is not so heavily reliant on words.  According to this 
                                                    
895 Khan v African Life Assurance Society Ltd 1932 (WLD) 160 167: ‘In contracts regard 
must be rather to the truth of the matter (rei veritas) than to what has been written…for 
there may be mistake in the writing… the Romans did not allow the true agreement 
between the parties to be prejudiced by a slip of the pen or other inaccurate expression.’ 
See S Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles 2ed (2003) where it is explained 
that this general principle must, however, be read against the possibility that a contract in 
South African law may be upheld on the ground of reasonable reliance.  This can occur 
when, although the contractants were not ad idem, a contractant can show that he 
reasonably relied on the belief that consensus had been reached (35-36).  This general 
principle must also be read against the possibility that, although consensus was not 
reached, the contract may still be upheld if a contractant can prove that the contract 
contains an iniustus error or inexcusable mistake (38 et seq).  South African courts will 
also generally uphold a written contract where the parties agree to rectify the document to 
express their true intentions (162-163 et seq). 
896 See Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
 
 approach, all the surrounding circumstances and factors need to be 
taken into account when determining whether or not the power to 
assign has been extinguished.    
 
From a South African law perspective, this interpretative approach 
is the best of the three approaches, but is not quite the ideal 
solution as it still contains the uncertainty of a court-finding:  A court 
may decide that the effect of a contravention lies either in damages 
for breach of contract or that the right is non-transferable.   
 
The reason that a court has the option to make either of these decisions is 
because this approach (and the Allhusen or Rumbin v Utica minority 
approach) gives the contractants the freedom to deviate from the default 
position, being that of damages for breach of contract.897 
 
In my opinion there should be no scope for deviation.  The effect of 
contravention should be the same in every case with the only question 
before the court being whether the anti-assignment clause or pactum de 
non cedendo was indeed contravened in light of the specific facts of a 
particular case.   
 
My view, therefore, is that inspiration can be sought from the default 
position of the modern approach applied in American law in so far as the 
effect of a cession in spite of a pactum de non cedendo is concerned – 
that is – it should give rise to damages for breach of contract in every 
case.  This, however, necessitates a rejection of the modern approach as 
whole, along with the three possible interpretative alternatives. 
 
The debtor may argue that damages is not a satisfactory remedy and that 
the right should rather be rendered non-transferable. If one, however, 
                                                    
897 As set out in the Restatement of Contracts where s332(2)(b) states that if a contract 
prohibits the assignment of rights and a contracting party assigns the rights regardless of 
the prohibition, then, unless a different intention is manifested, the debtor is entitled to 
damages for breach of the contract, but the breach does not render the assignment 
ineffective. 
 
 
 
 
 considers the debtor’s reasons for insisting on including a pactum de non 
cedendo in a contract, it makes no logical sense why a prohibition on 
cession should be treated differently to any other ordinary contractual term 
where an action for damages would suffice in the case of a breach.  Why 
must the right be rendered non-transferable? 
 
As already mentioned, the possible reasons that a debtor may insist on a 
pactum de non cedendo are: 
 
g) he fears double payment of the debt (if notice is missed); 
h) he may be prevented from using set-off against the creditor; 
i) he is familiar with the creditor; 
j) he is of the belief that the creditor may be more willing to grant time 
extensions; 
k) he is of the belief that the creditor may be more willing to overlook 
some indebtedness;  
l) a change in creditor may be generally inconvenient. 
 
None of these reasons are so severe that the debtor would be 
unconscionably prejudiced should the effect of a cession in contravention 
of a pactum de non cedendo result in damages for breach of contract as 
opposed to non-transferability of the right.  
 
Damages as the effect of a cession in contravention of the pactum de non 
cedendo do, however, raise one red flag:  Quantification.  If one considers 
the list above, what patrimonial harm or loss could the debtor possibly 
suffer by the creditor ceding the right contrary to a pactum de non 
cedendo?  In South African law the general rule is that damages cannot 
be recovered for loss which is non-patrimonial.898 
                                                    
898 Van der Merwe et al op cit 389; RH Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa 5ed 
2006 546-547 where Christie states that the plaintiff must prove his damages and if none 
can be proven, damages will not be awarded.  It is also stated that contractual damages 
are strictly confined to patrimonial loss and are not extended to any form of intangible 
loss.; AJ Kerr The Principles of The Law of Contract 5ed (1998) 646, 679 where the 
author explains that it is insufficient for the plaintiff to show that the contract has been 
 
 
 
 
  
Of course, it is not being suggested that the debtor be left with a right to 
claim damages, while being pointed out that this right is practically empty.  
The ‘damages’ that I am referring to are ‘damages’ that can be attained 
through the use of a penalty clause. 
 
If a debtor can insist on a pactum de non cedendo for his protection, he 
can similarly insist on a penalty clause, which would function in his favour 
should the pactum de non cedendo be contravened.  
 
A penalty clause is a clause or stipulation in a contract stating that in the 
event of the contract being breached, the offending contractant will pay a 
sum of money or render a certain performance to the other contractant.899   
The advantages of the penalty clause to the debtor are that he may claim 
the penalty (a sum of money) without proving that he has suffered 
damages and the penalty clause is wide enough to include non-
patrimonial damages.900  If the right is ceded contrary to the pactum de 
non cedendo, the debtor will have to perform to the cessionary, but at 
least he will have a sum of money to ease the inconvenience he may 
suffer, if any.   
 
                                                                                                                                              
breached, and that to merit an award of damages, loss of a patrimonial nature must also 
have been suffered.  This loss cannot be one of inconvenience or the like, but must be of 
an economic nature. 
899 Van der Merwe et al 412.  Penalty clauses are governed by the Conventional 
Penalties Act 15 of 1962.  The definition of a penalty clause in s1 reads as follows: ‘Any 
person shall, in respect of an act or omission in conflict with a contractual obligation, be 
liable to pay a sum of money or to deliver or to perform anything for the benefit of any 
other person…either by way of penalty or as liquidated damages’.  I am hard pressed to 
think of a situation where the debtor would not prefer monetary compensation, but 
something else instead, yet it is quite possible for the parties to agree to any other type of 
performance (for example the rendering of a service).  This performance also need not be 
made to the debtor himself, but can be made to any person.  See also Christie op cit 560: 
‘At the time of contracting it is not uncommon for the parties to include a term in their 
contract binding the one party to pay a fixed sum of money or return the property and 
forfeit all instalments paid or due, or something similar, in the event of committing a 
specified breach or perhaps any breach of the contract’.  See also Kerr op cit 685-690.      
900 Van der Merwe et al 412.   
 
 
 
 
 The advantage of the penalty clause to the creditor is that the clause 
provides certainty as to the monetary amount to which he would be held 
liable should he breach the contract.  This, I am sure, will cause the 
creditor to ponder a little longer before ceding at a whim.  The creditor will 
have to weigh up breaching the contract and paying the penalty to the 
debtor against the possible gains of ceding the right to the cessionary.  
This may dissuade him from breaching the contract.  Alternatively, the 
creditor may breach the contract, but be quite content to pay the penalty if 
the gain from ceding the right outweighs the consequences of breaching 
the contract (also an advantage to the debtor). 
 
Not only do penalty clauses provide the abovementioned advantages, but 
they also operate in a fair manner (another advantage for both parties):  
 
Section 3 of the Conventional Penalties Act, the legislation governing 
penalty clauses, states that a court may reduce the penalty if it seems to 
be out of proportion to the prejudice suffered by the debtor due to the 
breach of the contract.901   
 
Section 1 of the Act does not restrict the penalty to one sounding in 
money, but allows the parties to agree to any other type of performance as 
a penalty if this is what they would rather prefer.  This alternative 
performance may also be rendered to a party other than the debtor 
himself.   
 
I am of the opinion that, should this suggestion be applied to pacta de non 
cedendo in South African law, it would not only be in keeping with 
                                                    
901 Van der Merwe et al 416-417.  The court will reduce the penalty to that which is 
reasonable in the circumstance considering every interest which may be affected by the 
breach, for example, proprietary interests, sentimental interests, convenience and 
reputation.  The onus, however, rests on the creditor to prove that the penalty is prima 
facie out of proportion to the prejudice suffered by the debtor.  Should the creditor 
succeed in proving this, the debtor has the opportunity to rebut the allegations.  See also 
Christie op cit 563-564 and Kerr op cit 690-694. 
 
 
 
 
 international trends, but it would bring about a much needed balance in 
this area of the law of cession:   
 
• Creditors could now dispose of their rights (which are assets in their 
estates), whereas the current position renders rights subject to 
pacta de non cedendo non-transferable.   
 
Of course, if a creditor has agreed that he will not cede a right and 
breaches this agreement, he should not be allowed to escape 
liability just because the right is an asset in his estate.  Agreements 
must be honoured and a breach must bring about some 
consequence for him to bear and a penalty clause would achieve 
this. Albeit the creditor cedes on pain of monetary compensation 
arising from a penalty clause, he must be able to cede his rights 
should he wish to do so. 
 
• The debtor could now rely on the pactum de non cedendo as being 
automatically valid and binding, whereas under the current position 
he must have an interest in the prohibition for it to be valid.  
Although the right in the creditor’s estate would not be rendered 
non-transferable, the debtor would still be protected in the case of a 
cession in contravention of a pactum de non cedendo by monetary 
compensation arising from a penalty clause which would function 
as damages. 
 
I think that it is possible for these improvements to be made within a 
judicial decision.  The meeting of a suitable set of facts with a willing and 
capable judge may, on the other hand, be wishful thinking.902 
 
6.2 Commercial contracts 
 
                                                    
902 I say this because South African judges are so reluctant to depart from previously 
decided cases, although Thring J delivered a surprisingly bold judgment in Capespan 
(Pty) Ltd v Any Name 451 (Pty) Ltd 2008 (4) SA 510 (C), see Chapters 3 and 5.   
 
 
 
 
 The following suggestion will certainly bring about a drastic change in 
South African law, but a change that I believe is long overdue.  It is also a 
suggestion that will bring our highly outdated legal principles up to date 
with modern worldwide commercial trends.   
 
I propose that South African law take a lesson from American law and 
render pacta de non cedendo invalid and unenforceable when appearing 
in book debts for the purpose of book debt financing or factoring as 
illustrated by article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).   
 
I think that many small to medium businesses in South Africa are missing 
out on huge growth and finance opportunities which could, in turn, boost 
the general economy.  If we changed our laws to implement this new 
system, we could also influence and encourage our neighbouring 
countries to do the same, thereby uplifting the businesses and economies 
in Africa as a whole. 
 
In Chapter 4 three international instruments were briefly discussed:  The 
UNIDROIT Factoring Convention of 1988, which covers the assignment of 
receivables in a factoring contract; the UNCITRAL Convention on the 
Assignment of Receivables in International Trade of 2001, which covers 
assignments of international receivables; and the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts of 2004 (PICC).  The instrument 
applying only in Europe, Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) of 
2003, was also discussed. 
 
Although none of these instruments support the solution that I propose, 
they all consider the cession of receivables or book debts in general and 
suggest ways to unify the principles across nations to allow for 
international factoring.  These general principles can be used as a guide 
for South African law to implement its own set of rules so that they may be 
in line with international tendencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 To be in accordance with my suggestion, however, preference should be 
given to article 9 of the UCC, as the Code renders pacta de non cedendo 
appearing applicable to factoring contracts automatically invalid, 
notwithstanding any provision in the contract between the debtor and the 
creditor which may indicate otherwise.  The instruments mentioned above, 
however, regard pacta de non cedendo as valid and deem a cession in 
contravention thereof as giving the debtor a claim for damages for breach 
of contract. 
 
I make this suggestion for all the reasons and benefits as discussed in 
Chapter 5.  It appears that English academics, whose law on the issue is 
more similar to the South African position than to the American approach, 
also share my view. 
 
While complaining bitterly about the approach in the English law, but 
without suggesting any kind of radical revamp, Goode903 and Munday904 
both enviously examine the liberal approach in America.905 
 
A more outspoken Allcock also favours the idea that book debts should be 
freely transferable. He is of the opinion that the difficulties (if any) that it 
would cause the debtor would not outweigh the commercial desirability of 
freely assignable debts.906  He concludes his article with an expression of 
anticipation for the legislature in England to enact legislation similar to that 
in America ‘making all debts assignable regardless of any restriction’.907  
 
                                                    
903 RM Goode ‘Inalienable rights?’ 1979 Modern Law Review (vol 42) 553. 
904 RJC Munday ‘Prohibition against assignment of choses in action’ 1979 Cambridge 
Law Journal (vol 38) 50. 
905 See Chapter 2 for a more detailed discussion. 
906 B Allcock ‘Restrictions on the assignment of contractual rights’ 1983 Cambridge Law 
Journal (vol 42) 328 345.  See Chapter 2 
907 Allcock op cit 346.  
 
 
 
 
 Salinger is another English academic who shares the view that the 
economy in the United Kingdom would be much better served if the 
legislature implemented a system similar to that in America.908  
 
Joubert, a South African authority on the issue, states that it was not 
surprising that article 9 of the UCC renders pacta de non cedendo invalid 
when applicable to factoring contracts.909  He went on to recommend that 
the position be the same in South Africa.910   
 
This suggestion was made in 1985 and was very insightful since factoring 
was not yet that well known in South Africa.  How much more relevant and 
necessary is this suggestion 24 years later, when factoring has become a 
powerhouse industry in South Africa generating thousands of millions of 
US dollars?  
 
Malcolm, an American academic, writing about book debt financing under 
the UCC, has only praise for article 9 and remarks that: 
 
…the UCC provides maximum simplicity and effectiveness for 
accounts receivable financing in the United States but at the 
same time is basically fair to all interested parties.  It is excellent 
legislation.911    
 
 
Further, as Murray (an American academic) points out, article 9 has stirred 
little, if any, litigation, considering that it limits a debtor’s freedom of 
contract.  Disputes rather involve matters of interpretation, that is, whether 
                                                    
908 FR Salinger ‘Factoring:  Are the true benefits still to come?’ The Company Lawyer 
1981 (vol 2) 243 247. 
909 N Joubert Die Regsbetrekking by Kredietfaktorering (1985) LLD Thesis Randse 
Afrikaanse Universiteit 468.  Joubert is without a doubt the leading authority on factoring 
in South Africa and has written much on the topic.  See Chapter 5.  
910 Joubert op cit 468.  His reason was that if it were not so it would be against public 
policy.  See Chapter 5.  His reasoning is not exactly the same as mine, but the end result 
nonetheless is – although perhaps today, 24 years later, he may agree with me. 
911 WD Malcolm ‘Accounts receivable financing under the uniform commercial code’ 1966 
Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht (vol 30) 434 458. 
 
 
 
 
 an assignment of a debt falls under the definition of ‘account’ as stipulated 
in article 9 of the UCC.912   
 
If such an approach were to apply in South African law, when a dispute 
arises, a court need only apply the definition of ‘account’, while keeping 
the overall purpose and function of book debt financing in mind at all 
times, and it should readily be clear whether a certain cession of a debt 
falls under the definition or not.  Should the court encounter an unusually 
complicated case, nothing would prevent it from looking to American case 
law for assistance. 
 
For this solution to find practical application, legislation must be enacted.  
Radical reform of this nature is not a task that our courts have the power 
to carry out.  Hopefully, the legislature will have the wisdom to codify this 
area of the law of cession. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
912 JE Murray Corbin on Contracts revised ed vol 9 (2007) 219.  See Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 
After an examination of the relevant case law, it becomes clear that many 
of the principles governing pacta de non cedendo are uncertain.  Rather 
than clarifying and improving the position, some judgments have had the 
opposite effect.913 
 
The leading case, Paiges, is open to criticism on the ground that the 
historical foundation upon which it was based is incorrect.  It was pointed 
out in an earlier Chapter that Sande and Voet, the old authorities heavily 
relied on by the court in Paiges, were in all likelihood referring in their 
writings to restraints on the alienation of corporeal things and not restraints 
on the alienation of incorporeal things.   
 
It therefore follows that the historical development of the pactum de non 
cedendo as recounted in Chapter 1 is not entirely correct, as part of what 
was discussed in Chapter 1 is actually the historical development of the 
pactum de non aliendo or restraints on the alienation of corporeal things.  
Since there is no record (to my knowledge) documenting the historical 
development of the pactum de non cedendo, the historical development 
would be open to speculation.   
 
Further, not only did the court in Paiges apply the incorrect legal 
principles, but the court did not apply them consistently.  The court 
followed Sande and Voet in determining the validity of pacta de non 
cedendo, but followed German jurists when determining the effect. 
 
                                                    
913 For example, Italtrafo SpA v Electricity Supply Commission 1978 (2) SA 705 (W) and 
Vawda v Vawda and others 1980 (2) SA (TPD) 341 where the courts cast doubt on the 
interest requirement by potentially creating a new standard being that of a ‘material and 
reasonable’ interest.  Another example can be found in MTK Saagmeule (Pty) Ltd v 
Killyman Estates (Pty) Ltd 1980 (3) SA 1 (A) where the Appellate Division appears to 
have laid down another ground for invalidity on the basis of non-compliance with a 
contractual formality. 
 
 
 
 
 From the discussion of the cases, it can be seen that no court has 
expressly identified these mistakes or attempted to correct them, albeit the 
Appeal Court has had the opportunity to do so on many occasions.     
 
This state of affairs is certainly unsatisfactory and academics have 
accordingly developed their own views of the rules governing pacta de non 
cedendo, which are not necessarily in line with the courts’ views. 
 
 
The court in Paiges mentioned only a pactum de non cedendo that is 
inserted at the time when the agreement creating the personal right is 
concluded. If the pactum de non cedendo is formed in this manner, most 
academics are of the opinion that since the personal right is 
intransmissible ab initio, the debtor need not show that he has an interest 
in the prohibition, thus deviating from the interest requirement laid down in 
Paiges.914  
 
Further, most academics also recognise a second form of pactum de non 
cedendo.  This form occurs when the pactum de non cedendo is super-
imposed on an already existing contract.  For this form of pactum de non 
cedendo to be valid, the debtor must show that he has an interest in the 
prohibition.  Although the interest requirement still survives the second 
construction, this construction was unknown to the court Paiges. 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that the interest requirement has survived the 
second construction, it has been vehemently criticised from two opposing 
points of view.  On the one hand some academics argue that the interest 
requirement deprives parties of their freedom of contract as the debtor has 
to show that he has an interest in the prohibition for it to be valid, even 
                                                    
914 This view may be supported by Trust Bank of Africa v Standard Bank of South Africa 
Ltd 1968 (3) SA 166 (A) which was confirmed in Italtrafo SpA v Electricity Supply 
Commission 1978 (2) SA 705 (W) and in the recent case of Capespan (Pty) Ltd v Any 
Name 451 (Pty) Ltd 2008 (4) SA 510 (C). 
 
 
 
 
 though the parties intend to bring a pactum de non cedendo into 
existence.915 
 
On the other hand, other academics are of the opinion that the interest 
requirement does not go far to limit freedom of contract because the 
concept is vague and has no real meaning, and seen from that 
perspective, the debtor would always be able to show that he has an 
interest.916  I have agreed with this school of thought. 
 
Yet other academics have approached the issue by attempting to judge 
the pactum de non cedendo against the idea of unlawfulness and public 
policy by using a restraint of trade clause as an analogy;917 or by judging 
pacta de non cedendo against public policy in general.918  Both of these 
alternative arguments were, however, found to be unworkable. 
 
Considering that the legal principles governing pacta de non cedendo 
were based on an incorrect historical foundation, does it follow that all the 
legal principles that have developed from Paiges, like the interest 
requirement, the two possible constructions of the pactum de non 
cedendo, the supposed limitation on the freedom of contract, and the 
alternative arguments, as well as the various submissions by other 
academics, are of no relevance and applicability to the pactum de non 
cedendo? 
 
Unfortunately, the principles laid down in Paiges and all that has 
developed thereafter is relevant as it is the applicable law as it presently 
                                                    
915 See GF Lubbe and CM Murray Farlam & Hathaway: Contract Cases, Material and 
Commentary 3ed (1988) 655; SR Roussouw ‘Pacta de non cedendo’ 1991 Responsa 
Meridiana 54-55. 
916 Welsh ‘General principles of contract’ 1950 Annual Survey 81 82; JC De Wet and AH 
Van Wyk Kontraktereg 4ed (1993) 254 footnote 16; S Scott ‘Italtrafo SpA v Electricity 
Supply Commission 1978 (2) SA 705 (W)’ 1978 Tydskrif vir Hendendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 334; S Scott The Law of Cession 2ed (1991) 206. 
917 N Joubert Die Regsbetrekking by Kredietfaktorering (1985) LLD Thesis Randse 
Afrikaanse Universiteit 464 et seq; N Joubert 1986 ‘Boekskuldfinansiering en pacta de 
non cedendo’ Modern Business 110. 
918 Roussouw op cit 54. 
 
 
 
 
 stands.  Despite being based on a flawed foundation, the Paiges judgment 
was nonetheless handed down by the Appellate Division and the Appeal 
Court has not since made any amendment. 
 
I was of the opinion that a solution is not to be found in any of the 
submissions made by our academics.  The approach adopted by Paiges 
and the courts that follow is equally unsatisfactory.  The whole concept of 
agreements prohibiting cession has been re-evaluated and I have made a 
suggestion in this regard preferring a law of property approach. 
 
I proposed to divide the law of pacta de non cedendo into two broad 
categories as done in America:  Contracts of a general nature and 
contracts of a commercial nature. 
 
• As to contracts of a general nature:  Whether appearing in a 
general or a specific contract, the pactum de non cedendo should 
be standardised and governed by the same principles.  I proposed 
that these principles should deem pacta de non cedendo valid with 
the interest requirement being done away with.  The construction 
that the pactum de non cedendo takes should have no impact on its 
validity or effect.  Further, if the personal right is ceded contrary to 
the pactum de non cedendo, the debtor should be able to claim 
monetary compensation through a penalty clause that should be 
attached as a standard clause to all pacta de non cedendo 
agreements, as quantification would cause difficulties if damages 
were to be claimed.   
 
This change, to be brought about in a judicial decision, would not 
only be in keeping with international trends, but it would bring about 
a much needed balance in this area of the law of cession.   
 
• As to contracts of a commercial nature:  I proposed that when a 
pactum de non cedendo is contained in a commercial contract – 
 
 
 
 
 that is – a factoring contract (book debt financing), the pactum de 
non cedendo should be automatically invalid despite any 
agreement between the debtor and the creditor to the contrary.  
This follows the general approach of article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code in America.   
 
The purpose for this suggestion was because factoring has grown 
into a powerhouse industry generating thousands of millions of US 
dollars.  The factoring industry not only boosts the general 
economy, but comes to the financial aid of small to medium 
business as well as providing debt collecting and other services.919  
Pacta de non cedendo are thus hindrances to the smooth 
functioning of the factoring industry.  For this radical change to be 
effected I was of the opinion that legislation is called for.   
 
Hopefully this re-evaluation of the pactum de non cedendo will re-capture 
the attention of academics and judges alike, so that those in the position to 
do so, will carefully re-consider its validity and effect.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    
919 Http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Factoring_(finance) (accessed on 17 April 2009); S Scott 
‘Claim enforcement (debt collection)’ 2002 SA Mercantile Law Journal (vol 14) 491. 
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